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RESTRUCTURING THE CORPORATION'S
NEXUS OF CONTRACTS: RECOGNIZING A
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO PROTECT
DISPLACED WORKERS
MARLEEN A. O'CONNOR*
As American corporations struggle to compete in international mar-
kets, they frequently use layoffs and plant closings as a means to cut
costs. These changes may benefit the economy in the long run, but they
profoundly destabilize the lives of millions of workers who have grown
economically dependent on the relationships they have developed with
their employers.
In this Article, Professor Marleen O'Connor argues that corpora-
tions should be legally responsible for alleviating the harsh effects that
corporate restructuring has on employees. Specifically, she argues that
directors should owe employees a fiduciary duty to provide adequate sev-
erance pay, job retraining and other benefits to ease the transition dislo-
cated workers face. Although the law does not now recognize such
obligations, many states recently have enacted stakeholder statutes that
allow directors to consider the interests of employees, suppliers, and cus-
tomers when making business decisions. Professor O'Connor concludes
that courts should rely upon these statutes, as well as general fiduciary
principles, as a foundation for judicial intervention to ameliorate the
impact corporate restructuring has on employees.
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Safeway Stores, Inc. once had a long-standing reputation as a benevolent
employer that offered job security.' That perception changed in 1986 after Her-
bert and Robert Haft launched a hostile takeover attempt for Safeway.2 Safeway
avoided the takeover by increasing its indebtedness to $5.7 billion through a
leveraged buyout with Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Company.3 Consequently,
Safeway was forced to streamline its operations to meet its interest and principal
payments. To minimize costs, Safeway eliminated 9,500 jobs through store sales
and layoffs.4 Experienced employees found themselves out of work after many
years of service.5 Financial analysts praised Safeway's restructuring as one of
the more successful leveraged buyouts because the layoffs enhanced the com-
pany's profitability. 6 The workers had a very different impression of the buyout;
the transaction profoundly disrupted many of their lives by defeating noncon-
tractual expectations of continued employment.
1. See, e-g., Faludi, The Reckoning: Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits but Exacts a Heavy
Human Toll, Wall St. J., May 16, 1990, at AS, col. 2 (Safeway was a successful company that was
gradually "thinning its work force with a program that included some layoffs but generally relied on
less painful methods like attrition.").
2. After the leveraged buyout, Safeway replaced its motto "Safeway Offers Security" to
"Targeted Return on Current Investment." Id. at AS, cal. 1. Dart Group, Corp., which the Herbert
and Robert Haft family owned, made $140 million in profits from the failed takeover bid. Mayer,
Hafts Drop Bid to Buy Safeway; Family Agrees to End Takeover Effort in Return for $59 Million,
Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
3. See, eg., Kaletsky, How Safeway Blazed a Trail, Fin. Times, Aug. 2, 1989, at I10 (after
refinancing, the company's debt-equity ratio was thirty-one to one).
4. See, eg., Oversight Hearings on the Role of Pension Funds in Corporate Takeovers" Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 233, 234 (1989) [hereinafter Pension Hearings] (statement of William J. Olwell,
Executive Vice President, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union).
5. See, ag., Faludi, supra note 1, at AS, col. 4 (Safeway turned to part-time help to avoid
medical insurance and other benefits.); Victor, What About the Workers?, 21 Nat'l J., Feb. 18, 1989,
at 39 (One Safeway employee stated: "People that have worked for companies 20-30 years, and they
shut down overnight and leave you out in the cold-its a very sad situation.").
The United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), the largest union in
the AFL-CIO, was almost powerless to help its members. Safeway refused to negotiate the possible
sale of stores or to discuss the terms of the buyout with the union. Id. The union contract did not
provide for severance payments and the union did not have much leverage to negotiate severance
payments after the layoffs. The Dallas employees, with an average of seventeen years of service,
received severance pay of one-half of one week's pay for each year of employment up to eight weeks.
Faludi, supra note 1, at As, col. 5. Sixty percent of these workers had not found full-time employ-
ment one year after the layoff. Id.
6. See, ag., Farrell, LBOs: The Stars; the Strugglers; the Flops, Bus. WK., Jan. 15, 1990, at 58
(increased operating profit margins were due in large part to using the leveraged buyout and the
threat of store sales and closings to force concessions from the employees); Fisher, Safeway Buyout:
A Success Story, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, at Dl, col. 3 (Safeway sold assets and reduced labor
costs to decrease debt, and "walk[ed] a labor relations tightrope."); Kaletsky, supra note 3, at 110
(crucial factor in success was reducing average labor costs from 14.1% of gross sales to 11.2%).
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Safeway buyout represents the pattern that many corporations fol-
lowed during the 1980s when an unprecedented number of corporations in-
creased their leverage to ward off or finance takeovers. 7 These buyouts
dramatically illustrate that corporate restructuring extracts severe social costs.8
Although restructuring may result in long-term benefits for the economy, the
issue arises whether a more equitable and efficient transition policy should be
developed to aid employees faced with job dislocation. 9 Specifically, the ques-
tion of an appropriate transition strategy involves whether corporations should
be legally responsible to their employees for mitigating the harsh consequences
of layoffs and plant closings.
In the past, employees who suffered from layoffs and plant closings had no
legal remedy against their employers. 10 Recently, however, Congress and state
legislatures have enacted statutes to alleviate the problem.11 In 1988, Congress
7. See, eg., Farrell, supra note 6, at 58 (In the 1980s, 2,800 companies engaged in leveraged
buyouts totalling $235 billion and averaging nine dollars of debt for every one dollar of equity). In
the largest of these deals, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. won the contest for control of RJR
Nabisco, Inc., increasing its indebtedness from $5 billion to $20.1 billion. For a detailed description
of this transaction, see DeMott, Introduction-The Biggest Deal Ever, 1989 DUKE L.J. I
(symposium).
8. During the later phases of the takeover era, with an increase in bust-up takeovers, the
takeover debate shifted from the traditional concern for shareholders to concern for stakeholders.
See e.g., Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders
and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 447 (1988) [hereinafter Coffee, Takeover Reform] (recogniz-
ing an "important paradigm shift" that "moves the focus of the debate away from the law's usual
concern with reducing 'agency costs' to protecting the interests of stakeholders"); Gilson, Just Say
No to Whom?, 25 WAKE FoaEsr L. Rnv. 121, 121 (1990) ("The focus has moved from claims that
blocking an offer benefits shareholders, to the very different claim that management is warranted in
blocking an offer even if doing so is detrimental to shareholders.").
9. See, eg., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA:
PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY 46-
48 (1982); Coffee, Shareholders Versus Manager= The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Corporate Web] ("[Albrupt transitions usually produce casual-
ties, and a recurring concern of the law has been how to cushion the impact of such transitions,
either by slowing their pace or offering compensation."); Ryan, Corporate Directors and the "Social
Costs" of Takeovers--Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64 TUL. L. REv. 3, 6 n.3 ('The eventual
reality of long-term improvements, however, can do little to mitigate the short-term consequences
for workers affected by a restructuring, because essentials such as food, clothing, shelter, and educa-
tion are short-term needs requiring a steady cash flow.").
10. See, e-g., Local 1330, United States Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264, 1282-83 (6th Cir. 1980) (labor union has no legal right to purchase steelworking plants
from employer to prevent shutdown). Professor Singer has written a thorough criticism of this
opinion. See Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988).
11. Several commentators also have noted that employees and others may be hurt in leveraged
buyouts and that measures should be taken to discourage these transactions. See, e.g., Bebchuck,
Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1693,
1793 (1985); Law, A Corporation Is More Than Its Stock, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1986, at 80,
83; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 105-06, 117, 122 (1979);
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age ofFinance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36-42 (1987)
[hereinafter Lipton, Corporate Governance]; Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover At-
tempt, 28 CASE W. REs. 882, 899-900 (1978); see also Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corpora.
tions Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 803 (1986) [hereinafter Johnson, Who Are
They For?] (proper for corporation to repurchase shares to prevent takeover to protect customers,
employees, and others); Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 903, 908 (1988) (discussing the historical development of corporate power with regard
to the ultra vires doctrine and other limitations); Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate The-
ory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 806, 806 (1989) (raising the old question:
"[W]hat is a corporation?"). In contrast, some commentators have argued that takeovers should not
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adopted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN),
which requires employers to give advance notification of mass layoffs and plant
closings. 12 Several states also require notice and severance pay in plant clos-
ings. 13 In addition to these direct measures, most state legislatures have pro-
vided an indirect source of assistance to workers through antitakeover laws.
14
More than forty states rushed to enact several types of statutes designed to dis-
courage takeovers perceived to threaten layoffs and plant closings.15 Specifi-
cally, over one-half of the states have enacted "stakeholder" statutes which
provide directors with more leeway to resist takeovers by allowing them to con-
sider the interests of employees, suppliers, customers, and other nonshareholder
constituents in making business decisions. 16
To date, the courts have not examined the scope of the stakeholder statutes.
be impeded to benefit nonshareholder constituents. See eg., Gilson, A Structural Approach to Cor-
porations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 862-65
(1981).
12. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988)
(requires 60-days notice prior to layoffs of 50 or more employees by an employer of 100 or more
employees). For a detailed description of WARN, see Remarks of John S. Irving on Plant Closings
Before NAM Conference, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Oct. 26, 1988, at D-1. For an analysis of the
effects of WARN, see Studies Conclude Advance Notice Reduces Duration of Workers' Unemploy-
ment Spells, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Feb. 8, 1989, at A-10 (notice facilitates labor market adjust-
ments by allowing workers to find jobs prior to displacement). But see Herz, Worker Displacement
in a Period of Rapid Job Expansion: 1983-87, 113 MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1990, at 21, 28-29
(WARN may have little impact on length of unemployment).
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-51o (1989) (companies with 100 or more employees required to
continue health benefits for 120 days following a closing or relocation); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 394B-9
to -10 (Supp. 1990) (companies with 50 or more employees required to provide 45-days notice of a
relocation or closing and severance pay equal to the employees' weekly pay less unemployment
benefits); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (1988) (businesses with 100 full-time workers re-
quired to give 60-days notice and one-week's severance pay for every year of service); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (companies required to provide two-week notice if the company
requires worker to give advance notice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-602 (Supp. 1990) (companies
employing more than 50 employees required to give notice); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp.
1990) (companies with 100 or more workers required to give 60-days notice).
14. Professor Coffee asserts:
[S]tate legislation regulating corporate governance in order to prevent corporate flight ar-
guably achieves what might otherwise be invalidated on either preemption or interstate
commerce grounds if the same goals were pursued explicitly through plant closing legisla-
tion (or by any other means that sought to embargo the transfer of jobs or assets out of
state).
Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 8, at 437-38. For a discussion of the preemption issue, see
Note, NLRA Preemption of State and Local Plant Relocation Laws, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 407, 414-25
(1986).
15. Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 8, at 437 n.8 (discussing how a "perceived crisis" may
lead to state legislatures hastily passing legislation). For further discussion of state anti-takeover
legislation, see infra notes 288-326 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 288-326 and accompanying text. Economist Kenneth Arrow defines
"stake" as follows:
[A] value from which one is not shielded by the market nor shielded by the existence of
alternative opportunities.... [E]mployees are, to some extent, locked into a firm as indeed
a firm is locked into its employees. Therefore, the employees can suffer from the firm's
failure, not only the firm's failure to deal adequately with the labor situation, but even
when the firm's failure in product markets creates a loss to the individual workers.
Arrow, The Multiple Responsibilities of a Corporation, in THE Fisr INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
ON STAKEHOLDERS 53, 59 (J. Weiler, ed., Univ. of Dayton, School of Business Admin., June 1988)
[hereinafter First Internatioanl Symposium]; Freeman & Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A
New Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REv. 88, 89 (1983) (stakeholder term
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Thus, the extent to which they will protect nonshareholder interests remains
uncertain. Although state legislatures enacted these statutes to provide manage-
ment with greater discretion to defend against hostile takeovers, most of the
statutes are worded broadly enough to encompass any business decision. The
stakeholder statutes have been described as "revolutionizing"1 7 corporate law
because they may allow directors to pursue objectives other than shareholder
wealth maximization. Hence, the stakeholder statutes may alter significantly the
legal model of the corporation.
This Article analyzes the implications of the stakeholder statutes for the
problem of worker dislocation resulting from layoffs and plant closings.18 The
Article develops a stakeholder model of corporate social responsibility that rec-
ognizes that employees have legitimate noncontractual claims against the corpo-
ration. Under this model, the directors' fiduciary duty is not viewed narrowly as
an obligation only to maximize the shareholders' wealth. Rather, the model
expands directorial fiduciary duties to encompass actions that shield workers
from disruptions brought about by plant closings and other corporate changes.
Such fiduciary duties toward workers would require directors to provide ade-
quate severance payments, job retraining, and other appropriate relief to dis-
placed workers.
Part I of this Article examines the causes and consequences of layoffs and
plant closings. This Part then explores how the stakeholder statutes parallel a
new economic theory of the firm called the "nexus of contracts" theory. The
nexus of contracts theory regards the firm as a set of mutually dependent rela-
tionships among various corporate constituents such as shareholders, employees,
suppliers, customers, and the community. Next, Part I analyzes the nature of
the employees' relationships with the corporation. Labor economists explain
that employees tend to develop long-term attachments to corporations under
implicit contracts. Under these arrangements, employees accept lower wages in
"coined in an internal memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963, refers to 'those
groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist.' ").
17. Hanks, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Have
Come, 3 INSIGHTS 20, 22 (Dec. 1989).
18. While other stakeholders suffer injury from corporate restructuring, it is appropriate to
concentrate on nonmanagerial employees because they are usually the most vulnerable constituency
and they have the most direct relationship with the corporation. M. AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE
GAME THEORY OF THE FirM 122-23 (1984) ("[S]ince the employees' body is the most enduring and
readily identifiable constituency of the firm, the inclusion of the employees in the model is a first step
towards a more complete theory of corporate firms."). In addition, an adverse impact on employees
tends to have a multiplier effect on other nonshareholder constituents who rely on the corporation.
See, ag., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 67-72; Millspaugh, Plant Closings and the
Prospects for a Judicial Response, 8 J. CORP. L. 483, 484-86 (1983).
This Article focuses on large corporations that employ a substantial number of people. These
corporations are the most likely to provide insurance to employees in terms of implicit contracts.
See infra text accompanying notes 98-100. One commentator asserts:
If the rationale of non-stockholder constituency statutes-that return on equity should be
shared with all who help to produce it even if they have already been compensated in
accordance with statutory rights-is sound, then why limit it to corporations? Why not
extend it to partnerships, trusts, and even sole proprietorships?
Hanks, supra note 17, at 25. The theories presented in this Article may apply to other business
associations as well; such a discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
[Vol. 691194
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return for a degree of job security. This discussion reveals that a significant
source of shareholder gains in corporate restructuring may result from opportu-
nistic breaches of the corporation's implicit contracts with its employees.
Recently, Professor Macey recognized that plant closings and other corpo-
rate changes exploit nonmanagerial employees. 19 According to Professor Ma-
cey, these employees should form unions to bargain for protection.20 Exactly
why private contracts should be deemed sufficient and whether a more efficient
and equitable means of safeguarding the interests of employees exists are ques-
tions that the corporate law literature has not addressed.21 Accordingly, this
Part then explores how practical and legal restrictions impede the employees'
ability to negotiate for contractual restrictions against corporate opportunism.
Part I concludes that collective bargaining and traditional corporate governance
schemes are inadequate to cope with the losses that fall on employees brought by
corporate restructuring events that are necessary in a changing economy.
Part II reviews how courts and legislatures have responded to the social
costs of corporate restructuring by allowing directors to consider the interests of
nonshareholder constituents. Although these changes are significant, Part II
concludes that these developments are inadequate because management may
weigh the employees' expectations only when the directors' interests conflict
with those of the shareholders. For corporate law to achieve the goal of protect-
ing employees while holding directors accountable, it must recognize that direc-
tors have fiduciary duties to protect displaced workers.
Part III turns to the normative question of whether corporate fiduciary law
19. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Funda-
mental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE LJ. 173, 188, 191-97 (responding to Coffee, Corporate Web,
supra note 9, and Singer, supra note 10). Professor Coffee has argued that takeovers and leveraged
buyouts hurt managers and others whose expectations deserve protection. Coffee, Takeover Reform,
supra note 8, at 448-50; Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 73-75; Professor Coffee, however,
would limit this relief to managers who are likely to have deferred compensation and developed firm-
specific expertise over the years in exchange for continued employment. Coffee, Takeover Reform,
supra note 8, at 446-47, 454-58; Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 73-86. This Article disagrees
with Professor Coffee's assertion that "lower-level" employees do not merit this protection. See
infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
20. While Professor Macey prefers a private contractual solution, he states that if a public law
solution was necessary, severance pay legislation might be the most appropriate response. Macey,
supra note 19, at 195. At one point, however, he does recognize that "courts should be sensitive to
the possibility of opportunistic behavior by plant owners." Id. at 193 & n.76.
21. For this Article's response to Professor Macey's argument that workers should form unions
to gain protection, see infra notes 173-209 and accompanying text. Professor Macey lists five other
reasons why the private contracting solution is better than government regulation. A corresponding
citation is provided for this Article's answer to each of these points. For response to Professor
Macey's belief that a public law solution would discourage corporate investment, Macey, supra note
19, at 195, see infra notes 498-523 hod accompanying text. For response to Professor Macey's asser-
tion that government regulation would create moral hazard problems, Macey, supra note 19 at 193-
94, see infra notes 416-22 and accompanying text. For response to Macey's statement that the legis-
lative process is inefficient because it is influenced by powerful interest groups, Macey, supra note 19,
at 175, see infra note 510 and accompanying text. In addition, for response to Professor Macey's
argument that the problems posed by shareholders' engaging in opportunistic conduct are too di-
verse for a public law solution, Macey, supra note 19, at 193, see infra notes 517-19 and accompany-
ing text. Finally, for response to Macey's argument that a public law response would hurt employees
because they would be forced to purchase this right by giving up other rights, Macey, supra note 19,
at 194-95, see infra notes 409-13 and accompanying text.
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should be expanded to encompass the interests of employees. This Part evalu-
ates the corporate objective by exploring the nature of the corporation's implicit
contract with its employees using free market and relational contract perspec-
tives. In contrast to the free market analysis, the relational contract view recog-
nizes that employees should be compensated for the significant investments they
make in corporations.
Part IV compares the potential costs and benefits of recognizing a fiduciary
duty to protect employees with legislative proposals to modify corporate behav-
ior. Recognizing a fiduciary duty to workers during corporate restructurings is
efficient because opportunistic conduct and the remedies to compensate for such
behavior can best be identified ex post on a case-by-case basis. This theory leads
to the Article's conclusion that the corporation's nexus of contracts should be
restructured to recognize that directors have fiduciary duties to mitigate the ef-
fects of layoffs and plant closings upon displaced workers.
I. WORKER DISPLACEMENT AND THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS THEORY OF
THE CORPORATION
A. The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Labor
1. Layoffs, Plant Closings, and the Displaced Worker
Extensive layoffs and plant closings have focused national attention on the
problems of displaced workers.22 The current restructuring era differs from
prior periods of economic change in at least two respects. First, the impact of
plant closings and layoffs is more widespread than in the past few decades.
2 3
Increasingly, industries with low-margin operations are forced to close plants
and lay off workers to avoid labor costs. 24 Yet even large, healthy companies
such as Safeway and RJR Nabisco have been compelled to take such meas-
ures.25 Second, the economy is undergoing a "deindustrialization" 2 6 process
that will continue to cause a steady displacement of workers.27 Thus, this re-
structuring era may last much longer than previous periods because corpora-
tions need to take drastic measures to remain competitive in the face of growing
22. For an extended discussion of plant closings, see F. O'CONNELL, PLANT CLOSINGS:
WORKERS' RIGHTS, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1986); Bureau of National Affairs,
Plant Closings" The Complete Resource Guide (1988).
23. See, eg., Bennett, Is Your Job Making You Sick?, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1988, § 3 (Medicine
& Health), at IR, 11R ("Fortune 500 companies alone have eliminated almost 2.8 million jobs since
1980-a million of them managerial."); Herz, supra note 12, at 21, 26 (plant closings much more
common reason for job loss in 1988 than in 1984).
24. See Di Norcia, Let's Restructure Labor, Too, in THE ETHICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANS-
FORMATION: MERGERS, TAKEOVERS, & CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 245, 24648 (W. Hoffman,
R. Frederick & E. Petry eds. 1987) [hereinafter ETHICS]; Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the
Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REv. 865, 867-68 (1990) [hereinafter
Johnson, Corporate Life]; Sethi & Bhalla, Demanagerialization of U.S. Industry: Corporate Restruc-
turing, Mergers and Acquisitions, and Displacement of Managerial Level Employees, in ETHICS,
supra, at 203, 205-06.
25. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
26. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 6 ("By deindustrialization is meant a
widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation's basic productive capacity.").
27. See infra notes 65-72.
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international competition.28
Analysis of the effects of this phenomenon upon workers requires consider-
ation of several factors. First, the overall decline in employment from layoffs
and plant closings must be examined. According to the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics' 1988 report on worker displacement, layoffs and plant closings lead to a
high incidence of job loss. This report reveals 9.7 million employees lost their
jobs between 1983 and 1988 as a result of layoffs and plant closings. 29 Approxi-
mately 4.7 million of these workers had held their jobs over three years.30 The
largest number of displaced workers, forty percent, held jobs in manufactur-
ing.3 1 The 1988 report also shows a decrease in the past two years in displace-
ment among operators, fabricators, and laborers, but a slight increase in the
number of workers losing technical, sales, and administrative support jobs.
32
Second, a review of the consequences of the deindustrialization era requires
an appraisal of the ability of workers to readjust after the permanent loss of their
jobs. Workers who lose their jobs to layoffs and plant closings spend an average
of eight weeks trying to find other jobs.33 Several factors influence the length of
unemployment, including geographic region, economic conditions, skill level,
age, race, and gender. Generally, labor is relatively immobile over markets be-
cause workers are unwilling to move to other areas following the loss of their
jobs. 34 The geographic region 35 and general economic conditions also influence
28. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES: THE CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT 57 (1980) (root of plant closure crisis is the great speed with
which capital is moved around the world).
29. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT ON DISPLACED WORKERS, 1 (1988) [hereinafter
LABOR REPORT]. For analysis of this report, see Herz, supra note 12 at 21; As Economy Grew Since
'83, Closings and Layoffs Took 9.7Million Jobs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at B12, col. I [hereinaf-
terAs Economy Grew]; see also Horvath, The Pulse of Economic Change: Displaced Workers of 1981-
85, 110 MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1987, at 3, 7 (surveying period from 1981 through 1985, 10.8
million displaced workers; almost half worked for three years or more with one-third of that number
having at least ten years on the job). For an overview of individual cases, see B. BLUESTONE & B.
HARRISON, supra note 9, at 51-55.
30. LABOR REPORT, supra note 29, at 1; Herz, supra note 12, at 22.
31. LABOR REPORT, supra note 29, at 2; Herz, supra note 12, at 24; As Economy Grew, supra
note 29, at B12, col. 4 (slight decline from 50% shown in 1986 survey).
32. LABOR REPORT, supra note 29, at 2; Herz, supra note 12, at 25.
33. Herz, supra note 12, at 28-29 (average slightly over eight weeks, but older workers suffer
10.5 weeks of unemployment); Horvath, supra note 29, at 8 (median duration of unemployment 13
weeks for workers reemployed by January, 1986; older workers and those unemployed in January,
1986 had longer periods of unemployment); see also Rosen, Implicit Contracts A Survey, 23 J.
ECON. LIT. 1144, 1171 (1985) (Workers have difficulty finding jobs because "[i]nformation gathering
and job search activities are costly and cannot be a matter of common knowledge by the idiosyn-
cratic nature of job-worker matches.").
34. Herz, supra note 12, at 30 (one out of six displaced workers moves to another city or coun-
try to find employment; figures slightly higher than previous survey); Horvath, supra note 29, at 10;
see also Podgursky & Swaim, Job Displacement and Earning Loss: Evidence from the Displaced
Worker Survey, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 17 (1987) (survey used to examine post-displacement
experience of large sample of workers); Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Labor Mobility, 41
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 30 (1987) (examining the impact of labor mobility on earnings).
35. LABOR REPORT, supra note 29, at 2 (900,000 displaced workers in midwestern states). The
1986 survey demonstrated that the East North Central area-Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin-suffered the most, with 1.1 million displaced workers. Horvath, supra note 29, at 6.
Sixty-five percent found employment as of January 1986, yet almost one-third had been without
work for six months or more. Id.
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the probability of finding new employment. 36 Similarly, as the workers' skill
level increases, the duration of unemployment decreases.37 Statistically, em-
ployees losing managerial and professional positions have a much better chance
of finding other jobs than displaced operators, fabricators, and laborers.38 To a
considerable extent, the hardship visits disproportionately on older workers with
years of dedicated service.39 Their only alternative may be early retirement,
although they may not be eligible for livable pensions.4" Blacks, Hispanics, and
women also experience longer periods of unemployment from job displacement
than white males.
4 1
Third, an analysis of the impact of the current restructuring phase must
take into account the severe consequences that long periods of unemployment
have on workers. Displaced workers often lose their health and pension bene-
fits.42 In addition, they may not find jobs until well after they exhaust their
unemployment payments and savings. 43 As a result, displaced workers are often
forced to lose their homes to mortgage foreclosures and to rely upon public wel-
fare.44 Under these circumstances, unemployment often causes serious psycho-
logical and medical problems.
45
Fourth, when displaced workers find employment, the new positions do not
provide them as much income or status. The 1988 report reveals that forty-four
percent of displaced workers earn less income from their new jobs.46 Specifi-
cally, thirty percent of the workers were compelled to accept wage losses of
twenty percent or more.4 7 Workers with large investments in firm-specific skills
experience substantial declines in earnings.48 In addition, once displaced work-
ers find new jobs, they are still vulnerable to job loss because they do not have
36. Herz, supra note 29, at 22 (portion of re-employed workers improved considerably in 1988
as compared to 1984).
37. See, eg., Horvath, supra note 12, at 6 (Table 3); see also B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON,
supra note 9, at 59.
38. Horvath, supra note 29, at 5 (three out of four persons who lost managerial jobs were re-
employed in January 1986; fewer than two out of three of the displaced operators, fabricators, and
laborers had been able to find new'jobs).
39. Herz, supra note 12, at 23-24 (1988 survey shows nearly one in three of displaced workers
ages 55 to 64 lost jobs held for 20 years or more); Horvath, supra note 29, at 7 (1986 survey shows
nearly two-fifths of displaced male workers age 55 and over held jobs for 20 years or more). Older
workers do have some protection in that layoffs are usually on a last-hired, first-fired basis. Corn-
field, Seniority, Human Capital, and Layoffs" 4 Case Study, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL. L. REV. 352,
352-54 (1982).
40. See eg., Horvath, supra note 29, at 4 ("Unplanned early retirements often seem to be the
only choice for many of the older displaced workers.").
41. See, eg., Herz, supra note 12, at 23; Horvath, supra note 29, at 4.
42. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 12, at 30 (large number of workers no longer covered by group
health insurance); Podgursky & Swaim, Health Insurance Loss The Case of the Displaced Worker,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., April 1987, 30, 30.
43. Herz, supra note 12, at 29 (more than half of the workers receiving unemployment insur-
ance exhausted benefits).
44. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 62.
45. See Id. at 63-66.
46. LABOR REPORT, supra note 29, at 1.
47. Herz, supra note 12, at 31.
48. See B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 58-59; Lipsky, Interplant Transfer and
Terminated Workers: A Case Study, 23 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 191, 197 (1970); Podgursky &
Swaim, supra note 34, at 27.
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seniority.49  i,
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, recent corporate restructuring has
brought about a sudden change in labor relations as corporations once known
for job security are forced to lay off workers.50 In the past, corporations slowly
restructured their workforces by waiting for attrition; currently, corporations
seek to accelerate the timetable to reduce the workforce to the lowest possible
level.5 1 In the process, many corporations display a diminishing regard for em-
ployees.5 2 Corporations use increasing concerns about high debt levels and for-
eign competition to release large numbers of workers, and then use the layoffs as
a pressure tactic to force wage concessions.
2. Takeover-Related Restructuring and Job Loss
The takeover phenomenon aided in focusing national attention on workers'
vulnerability to layoffs and plant closings. The collapse of the junk-bond mar-
ket, however, has lessened the pressure to engage in finance-related restructur-
ing.5 3 Nonetheless, employees continue to be injured in the aftermath as more
cost-conscious management reduces labor expenses by closing or relocating
plants, selling divisions, and imposing cutbacks.
Analysis of the impact of takeovers on labor is complicated by the contro-
versy surrounding the causes of hostile takeovers and whether they benefit the
economy.5 4 Statistical research has concentrated on corporations' stock prices
to determine the effect takeovers have on shareholders.5 5 This research indi-
49. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 37.
50. See, eg., Buono & Bowditch, Ethics and Transformation Tactics: Human Resource Consid-
erations in Mergers and Acquisitions, in ETHics, supra note 24, at 125, 126.
51. See, e.g., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 35 (Corporate managers confront
an "unprecedented profit squeeze associated with intensified international competition and chronic
stagflation."); Donaldson, Corporate Takeover The Moral Backdrop, in ETHICS, supra note 24, at
3, 12 ("[Clost-conscious corporate acquirors tend to reduce labor costs more vigorously than existing
management.").
52. See, eg., Newton, Takeovers, Makeovers, and Destruction: The Ethics of Corporate Trans-
formation, in ETHICS, supra note 24, at 27, 30; Buono & Bowditch, supra note 50, at 141 ("The lack
of respect for employees as individuals... is exemplified in such tactics as deceiving them about job
security after the merger, ignoring their personal rights and cultural orientations during the integra-
tion period, using coercive strategies to force change, and so forth.").
53. See, eg., Nathans & Gleckman, This Year, LBO Means Let's Back Off, Bus. WK., May 8,
1989, at 123 (the fall of Drexel Burnham Lambert caused hostile takeovers, and thus leveraged
buyouts, to decrease dramatically). But see Moore, KJR is Rolling with the Punches, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., May 7, 1990, at 49 ("The demise of leveraged buyouts may prove greatly
exaggerated.").
54. See, eg., Fortier, Hostile Takeovers and the Market for Corporate Control, EcON. PERSP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 2, 11-12 (empirical data does not clearly demonstrate efficiency gains);
Weidenbaurn & Vogt, Takeovers and Stockholder: Winners and Losers, 24 CAL. MGMT. REv. 157,
159 (1987) (same).
55. See, eg., Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29-42
(1983) (examining the effects of aquisitions based on stock prices); Magenheirn & Mueller, Are Ac-
quiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off After An Acquisition?, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS
171 (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein, & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988) [hereinafter KNIGHTS, RAIDERS,
AND TARGETS] (studying the effects of acquisitions based on returns to acquiring firm shareholders);
Herman & Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND
TARGETS, supra, at 211 (criticizing the reliance on stock price data and offering an alternative based
on profitability).
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cates that shareholders earn large premiums in takeovers, although the sources
of these premiums are unknown. 56 The more important consequences of take-
overs, however, may stem from companies' increasing their leverage to avoid
takeovers. 5
7
Recently, economists have begun to examine the impact that takeover-re-
lated transactions have on employees. At this point, little empirical research
exists to determine whether employees are better or worse off as a result of
changes in corporate control. 58 In one statistical study, Professors Brown and
Medoff found that wages and employment increase slightly after corporate ac-
quisitions.59 They concluded that "the common public perception that acquisi-
tions provide the occasion to slash wages and employment finds little
support."' 6 Although this study frequently is cited as demonstrating that take-
overs do not hurt employees,61 the Brown and Medoff report fails to substantiate
that proposition. The report's findings are highly suspect because they focus on
friendly acquisitions of small companies in the state of Michigan. 62 Other esti-
mates of the impact of the takeover phenomenon on labor are questionable be-
cause they are made by interested parties. According to union estimates,
"hundreds of thousands" of workers have lost jobs due to takeovers this past
56. See, eg., Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market For Corporate Control: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51-53 (1988); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 55, at 5.
57. Sea eg., Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 41.
58. Impact on Workers of Takeovers, Leveraged Buyouts, Corporate Restructuring and Green-
mail Hearings Before the Employment and Housing Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1987) (statement of William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor)
(estimates range from 100,000 to 500,000 workers have lost jobs due to takeover-related restructur-
ig); Halverson, First the Merger, Then the Job Cuts, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 4, 1989, at 9, col.
2 (labor economists are just beginning to gather the data); Knight, Are LBO's Really Good For Us?
Some Academics Question KKR's Claims, Wash. Post, May 30, 1989, at DI0, col. 2 (noting the need
for "a study conducted by someone with no ideological ax to grind and no personal profit at stake");
see also Johnson, Corporate Life, supra note 24, at 868 & n.9 (Empirical evidence of the effects of
takeover activity on employee job loss "although scant is emerging."); Ryan, supra note 9, at 9
(further empirical study needed).
59. Brown & Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9, 11 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEOVERS]
(analyzing data from Michigan unemployment insurance system administrative records); see also
Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corp., HARv. Bus. Rv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, 61, 71 (Kaplan study indi-
cates that employment does not fall after buyouts); Leveraged Buyout Involvement Common Among
Large Public Plans, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 154 (Jan. 15, 1990) (study by the Institutional Voting
Research Analysis Group, Inc. finding that employment among rank-and-file workers did not de-
dine and that plants did not close after leveraged buyouts); LBO" Many Invest Small Amounts,
PENSION & INVEST. AGE, Jan. 8, 1990, 10, 10 (same). But see Bhide, In Praise of Corporate Raiders,
PoL'Y REV., Winter 1989, at 21, 23 (finding evidence of plant closings and layoffs following two-
thirds of hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986).
60. Brown & Medoff, supra note 59, at 23.
61. See, eg., Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 612 (1989);
Macey, supra note 19, at 195; Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 467, 478 [hereinafter Macey, National Economy]; Ribstein, Takeover Defenses
and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 146 (1989); Scheffman, The Economics and Ethics of
Adjusting to a New Competitive Environment: Mergers and Takeovers, in ETHics, supra note 24, at
99, 103-04.
62. Carliner, Comment, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note 59, at 25, 27 (criticizing
Brown and Medoff study because it concentrated on the friendly acquisition of very small firms in
Michigan); Scheffman, supra note 61, at 104 (sample contains few mergers and Michigan experience
may not be representative).
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decade, while thousands more have suffered wage and benefit reductions.6 3 At
the other extreme, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Company claims that leveraged
buyouts have caused overall employment to rise. 64
Despite the absence of conclusive empirical data establishing the connec-
tion between takeovers and job loss, worker displacement tends to be "the most
effective argument favoring restrictions on takeover activity."' 65 The many in-
stances of corporations increasing their leverage as a takeover defense and then
implementing massive layoffs has fueled the popularity of this view.6 6 Dramatic
changes in financial practices propelled many of these restructurings, forcing
corporations to sell profitable operations to meet short-term cash demands to
fund debt.67 As a result, the layoffs that followed were not only unexpected;
they were made within a short period of time.68 While numerous illustrations
exist,69 a few cases sufficiently exemplify the situation. Owens-Corning Fiber-
glass Corporation defeated a hostile bid by Wickes Corporation by implement-
ing a stock repurchase, which resulted in $2.6 billion debt. Following the
repurchase, Owens-Corning cut 13,000 employees from its 28,000 workforce.
70
63. Hostile Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 262 (April 8, 1987) [hereinafter Hostile Takeover Hearings] (statement
of Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO); Pension Hearings, supra note 4, at 6 (state-
ment of Thomas R. Donahue) (estimating 90,000 AFL-CIO jobs lost).
64. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.'s (KKR) study purports to demonstrate how 17 leveraged
buyouts resulted in an increase in employment. Pension Hearings, supra note 4, at 42 (increase in
employees from 276,000 to 313,000 within three years of LBO). This study has been criticized
harshly. See, eg., Knight, supra note 58, at DIO, col. 1 (KKR used projections, not actual figures,
and study did not count operations that were sold after the LBO).
65. Grundfest Challenges Argument that Takeovers Cause Job Losses, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 11, at 423 (Mar. 18, 1988) [hereinafter Grundfest Challenge]; see also Johnson & Millon,
Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1862, 1907 (1989) (State legislators and the general
public widely believe that hostile takeovers bring plant closings and employee layoffs.).
66. Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L.
REv. 457, 497 (1988) (describing "what social psychologists call the 'availability heuristic' ").
67. Di Norcia, supra note 24, at 250 ("closures and employee layoffs are often required purely
to finance" a transfer of ownership); Farrell, supra note 6, at 58 ("a perilous financial game played to
enrich a few savvy paper entrepreneurs"). Employees also have been hurt by corporate restructuring
when their corporation terminates pension funds or transfers funds back to the corporation. Thomas
Donahue, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer, testified that since 1980, employers have "recaptured"
more than $1.4 billion from pension plans terminated because of mergers and buyouts. Pension
Hearings, supra note 4, at 14; see also Williams, Raking in Billions from the Company Pension Plan,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2 ("some of the most familiar names in corporate America
... are diverting [pension funds] to other corporate uses such as takeover financing").
68. See, eg., DeMott, supra note 7, at 25-26.
69. Senator Proxmire listed the following cases of leveraged buyouts followed by loss of jobs:
GAF-Union Carbide, 25,000 jobs; Chevron-Gulf, 18,000 jobs; Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.-
American Hospital Supply Co., 6,000 jobs; Burroughs-Sperry, 11,790 jobs. Hostile Takeover Hear-
ings, supra note 63, at 256 ("Some of these numbers are difficult to comprehend. But each unem-
ployed person constitutes a tragedy, a drama of hardship."); see also Buzzota, A Quiet Crisis in the
Work Place, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1985, at A27, col. 2 ("The dramatic growth of corporate mergers
and takeovers [is] undermining the elusive pursuit ofjob satisfaction in America."); Mintz, Commu-
nity Dislocations: A Painful Side Effect of Merger, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1980, at A2, col. 1 ("Com-
munity dislocations have long been part of the industrial landscape, painful side effects of the
corporate drive toward lower costs and higher profits. But today there is a new dimension to this old
problem. The reason is the wave of conglomerate mergers that has swept across the economy.");
Prokesch, People Trauma in Mergers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at D-l, col. 3 ("Management
turnover at all levels is on the rise and employee loyalty is at a low.").
70. See, eg., O'Brien & Kline, An Rx For Jobs Lost Through Mergers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1987, § 4, at 23, col. 2 (Owens-Corning closed its profitable Barrington, N.J. plant, causing more
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Similarly, Phillips Petroleum Company used a $4.5 billion stock buyback to
thwart takeover attempts by T. Boone Pickens and Carl Icahn. Phillips subse-
quently sold substantial assets and dramatically cut its workforce.71 Recently,
RJR Nabisco, Incorporated released 2,300 workers following its leveraged
buyout by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Company that increased RJR's debt to
$20.1 billion.
72
Based upon the relationship between job loss and takeovers, union officials
and others assert that takeovers allow shareholders to exploit labor by profiting
at the workers' expense. 73 Conversely, commentators such as Professor Joseph
Grundfest assert that "while the 'emotional appeal' of tying job losses to take-
overs is indisputable, . .. 'the logic of the relationship between job loss and
takeover activity simply does not support the political rhetoric.' "74 In other
words, many of the layoffs and plant closings might have occurred anyway, and
might not have resulted simply from merger and acquisition activity. 75 Further,
layoffs and plant closings are viewed as necessary for corporations to remain
internationally competitive.
Thus, the controversy over takeovers merely may be part of the larger,
growing concern about the long-standing problem of plant closings in general.
Regardless of whether takeovers directly cause job loss, layoffs and plant clos-
ings continue to create a high level of unemployment that produces great hard-
ship for displaced workers. Indeed, from the workers' perspective, job
displacement resulting from fundamental shifts in the economy is as damaging
as that related to finance-driven restructuring. To analyze further how corpo-
rate restructuring affects employees, the next section will examine the problem
than 800 people to lose their jobs); Willoughby, What a Raider Hath Wrought, FORBEs, Mar. 23,
1987, at 56 (In five months following takeover bid, "48% of the firm's total workforce [was] axed or
lost in divestitures."). The union has brought suit against Wickes Corp. claiming tortious interfer-
ence with a prospective business relationship. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
71. The Shrinkage at Phillip Pete, Bus. WK., May 27, 1985, at 46.
72. See, eg., Deutsch, RJR's Brave New World, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2
("[T]he new management team [has] discharged so many people that the remaining workers are in
shock."); Morris & McCarthy, RJR, in Long-Awaited Move, to Dismiss About 12% of Workers at
Tobacco Unit, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1989, at A3, col. 2.
73. See, eg., Stein, With Friends Like Milken .. .; His LBO Advantage is Cut from the Hides of
Workers, L.A. Times, Apr. 12, 1989, Pt. II, at 7, col. 3 ("[I]n large measure, [satisfying cash flow
demands] comes out of the hides of the laid-off, cut-back and disenfranchised workers."); Victor,
supra note 5, at 396 (observing same).
74. Grundfest Challenge, supra note 65, at 423 (quoting Securities & Exchange Commissioner
Joseph Grundfest).
75. See, ,g., id. at 424 (disputing that the Chevron-Gulf merger was responsible for adverse
consequences on Gulf's Pittsburgh employees, noting that from 1981 to 1983, prior to the takeover
threat, the number of Gulf employees had declined from 58,000 to 42,700); Bhide, supra note 59, at
23 (In half the cases where layoffs followed the takeover attempt, layoffs may have occurred regard-
less of the takeover because firms had profitability problem.); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1190
(1981) ("The new owners cannot improve the firm's performance by discarding valuable employees
or suppliers or by harming the interests of creditors."); Macey, National Economy, supra note 61, at
478 (no loss of jobs for "rank-and.file employees because new firm owners rarely liquidate subsidiar-
ies and fire the employees"); Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 140 (1986) (noting same); Ribstein, supra note 61, at
146 ("[hT]ere is nothing inherent in the structure of the transaction that injures employees."); Ro-
mano, supra note 66, at 497 (no empirical evidence that acquisitions result in greater job loss).
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from a theoretical perspective that focuses upon the employees' long-term im-
plicit employment contracts with the corporation.
. The Employees' Relationship With the Corporation
1. The Nature of Implicit Labor Contracts
Neoclassical economics employs a model of the firm that views managers as
buying and selling goods and labor in markets to maximize shareholder
wealth.76 The labor market establishes wage rates externally with demand deci-
sions made by firms on one hand and supply decisions made by workers on the
other.77 Based upon this market-determined wage, the relationship between the
workers and the firm consists of the workers directly exchanging a certain
amount of labor for a specific wage.7 8 Economists assume the corporation will
behave as any other rational economic actor and regard the corporation's partic-
ipation in this market as a "production function."' 79 Viewing the corporation as
a "black box," neoclassical economics does not evaluate the functions within the
firm or the relationships underlying them.80 This economic analysis corre-
sponds to the legal model of the corporation that consists of the shareholders
owning the firm and the employees contracting with the firm for wages.
8 1
Under this model, employees are not members of the firm and their rights come
from explicit contracts alone, often collective bargaining agreements.
8 2
Recently, however, microeconomics has pierced the black box of the firm to
analyze its operations under the nexus of contracts theory.8 3 This theory re-
gards the firm as a bundle of explicit and implicit contractual relationships
among shareholders, employees, consumers, and suppliers.8 4 In contrast to the
neoclassical view that firms merely engage in exchange in the labor market, the
employees' association is evaluated within the context of other relationships in
the firm. In particular, the nexus of contracts theory sees the firm in an equilib-
76. See, e.g., M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 3-4; Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of
the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757-58 (1989).
77. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 33, at 1145.
78. As Professor Bratton explains: "Neoclassical microeconomists followed Adam Smith's dic-
tum that the division of labor, and thus the firm, marks the extent of the market. They did not look
at production processes inside the firm or at the contracting arrangements underlying them." Brat-
ton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407, 415
n.35 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton, Critical AppraisalJ; see also, M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 3 (discuss-
ing workers contracting out labor for wages); Rosen, supra note 33, at 1148 (same).
79. See, e.g., Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 78, at 415-16.
80. See, e.g., id. at 416 (Economists "perceived actions inside of firms as 'engineering,' functions
of hierarchical structures, and, therefore, as unsuited to a discipline that studies markets."); Jensen
& Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 306-07 (1976) (describing prior analysis as a "black box" view).
81. M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 8.
82. Id. at 6 (claiming that traditional corporate law treats workers as an exogenous factor
rather than as an integral part of the firm with legitimate claims competing with shareholders).
83. This approach began with Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). See
e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 777 (1972); Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Fama & Jensen, Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 80.
.84. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 80, at 310-11.
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rium position as a result of the participants' competing for the optimal arrange-
ment of risks and opportunities to allocate the costs and rewards within the
organization."a Thus, the nexus of contracts approach does not distinguish
clearly the claims of employees from those of the shareholders. Adopting this
economic theory, corporate law scholars have constructed a legal model that
considers the rights in the corporation as effected through a set of explicit and
implicit contracts.8 6 Unlike the traditional legal model, the question of who
"owns" the corporation is irrelevant. 87 That is, each stakeholder has an entitle-
ment to the corporation and the issue becomes how to define the entitlement.
Most nexus of contract theorists fail to realize the ramifications of this point.8 8
This section will explore the nature of the corporation's implicit long-term con-
tracts with its employees within the nexus of contracts framework.
Employees tend to have long-standing relationships with corporations. The
typical worker spends eight years on a job; more than twenty-five percent of the
workforce stays with the same job for twenty years or more and the probability
of turnover decreases as job tenure increases.8 9 The implicit contract theory
explains why such long-term attachments occur.90 Implicit contracts are not
recognized as legal contracts;9 1 rather they are social arrangements typically en-
85. See4 eg., id. at 307-08.
86. The nexus of contracts view has gained wide acceptance among corporate law scholars.
See, eg., Macey, supra note 19; Ribstein, supra note 61. But see Brudney, Corporate Governance,
Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contract
analysis of investor-management relationship is seriously flawed); DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (claiming that contract-law principles add
little to resolve quesions of fiduciary obligation).
87. See. eg., Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 16 n.38 ("Once we view the shareholder as
simply a specialist in risk bearing .... the normative force inherent in the concept of ownership is
lost."); Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 19, 23 (1988) ("Ownership of the firm disappears as a meaningful concept under this model
because no one can own a 'nexus.' "); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 1416, 1447 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract] ("The question is not whether
employees and other 'constituencies' of the firm have entitlements or expectations-they do-but
what those entitlements are."); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395, 396-97 (1983) (noting same); Fama & Jensen, supra note 83, at 289 (corporation does not have
"owners"); Macey, supra note 19, at 179-80 (corporation not an object of claims based on property
rights).
88. See, eg., M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 4; Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 12; Stone,
Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 73, 152 (1988).
89. See Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. EON. REV. 716,
720 (1982) (Job changes occur at a-young age; ifa worker has been at ajob for a number of years, the
chances are that employment will continue for a long time.); see also Addison & Castro, The Impor-
tance of Lifetime Jobs: Differences Between Union and Nonunion Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAn. RHL.
REV. 393, 402 (1987) (noting that union workers enjoy slightly higher tenure which may be due to
informational advantage).
90. Labor economists have developed this theory to analyze unemployment for lower-level em-
ployees. The three early contributions to the implicit employment contract literature are Azariadis,
Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1183 (1975); Baily, Wages
and Employment Under Uncertain Demand, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 37 (1974); and Gordon, A Neo-
classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment, 12 EcON. INQUIRY 431 (1974). For further contribu-
tions to this literature, see Azariadis & Stiglitz, Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria, 98 Q.J.
EcoN. 1 (1983); Rosen, supra note 33, at 1144. Some economists criticize the overuse of this model
to explain unemployment. See Bull, Implicit Contracts in the Absence of Enforcement and Risk
Aversion, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 658, 658 (1983).
91. See, eg., Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549,
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forced through the operation of market forces. According to the implicit con-
tract theory, wages are not set in the external labor market. Instead, large firms
internalize their employment structures.92 Under these employment arrange-
ments, workers are underpaid at the beginning of their association with the firm
and overpaid at the end.93 Hence, as employees continue to work for the firm,
their dependence grows and, in a sense, they become "economically wedded" to
the corporation.9 4 To evaluate the employees' relationship to the corporation, it
is necessary to examine in detail the nature of the implicit employment contract
as well as the enforcement mechanisms used to police opportunistic breach of
such contracts.
Under implicit contract analysis, several factors explain why employees
tend to develop long-term attachments to corporations: employee risk aversion,
effort-motivating career paths, and human capital. 95 The first reason, employee
risk aversion, relates to differences in risk preference between workers and cor-
porations. Employees are risk-averse because they face serious consequences
from unemployment if their corporation suffers a temporary fluctuation in the
demand for their labor. As employees continue to work for a firm and become
older, their employment opportunities tend to decrease.9 6 Although employees
make risky investments of their time in firms, they cannot diversify their risk
because they usually have only one job.97 In contrast, corporations that employ
many workers have the ability to provide implicit insurance contracts to workers
protecting them from fluctuations in their wages. 98 Under this insurance con-
tract, younger workers accept wages that are lower than the marginal product
they produce for the firm.99 These reduced wages represent implicit insurance
premiums which the corporation credits to the younger workers' accounts. As
these workers grow older and cannot produce as much, the corporation indem-
1549 (1989) (economists' definition of contract is broader than lawyers' definition). Professor Eisen-
berg believes that this is a serious misuse of the term "contract." Eisenberg, Comment: Golden
Parachutes and the Myth of the Web, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 55, at 156-
57. In response, Professor Coffee states this is "a largely semantic point that does not meet the real
contention made here: that managers may have accepted lower, relatively fixed wages in preference
to a variable-wage system as the price of obtaining some employment security." Coffee, Sharehold-
ers Versus Managers." The Strain in the Corporate Web, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra
note 55, at 121 n.42 [hereinafter Shareholders Versus Managers].
92. See, eg., M. Aori, supra note 18, at 52 ("The traditional market-oriented or centrally
bargained wage system is gradually giving way to the firm-specific pay structure in so far as jobs are
tending to be evaluated more in relation to other jobs in the same firm and less with similar jobs in
other factories."); Bull, The Existence of Seif-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, 102 Q.J. ECON. 147, 147
(1987) (noting same).
93. See, e.g., Hutchens, Delayed Payment Contracts and a Finn's Propensity to Hire Older
Workers, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 439, 440-41 (1986).
94. See, eg., Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 19.
95. See, eg., Addison & Castro, supra note 89, at 393-94 (Over twenty-five percent of all work-
ers have twenty or more years of tenure; two-fifths of workers who work at a job for five years will
stay there for over twenty years.).
96. Id. at 395.
97. See, eg., Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 78-79 (usual market solutions for risky
investments, insurance, or diversification simply not feasible).
98. See, e.g., Chad, Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts, 98 Q.J. EON. 107, 107
(Supp. 1983).
99. See, e.g., M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 14; Bull, supra note 90, at 658.
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nifies the worker by continuing to pay a steady wage. 100 In addition, these in-
surance premiums protect workers during external market shocks that produce
a decline in the need for labor. 101 Therefore, through implicit contracts, work-
ers gain employment security by shifting some of their risk of unemployment
and declining wages onto the corporation.
The second theory, effort-motivating career paths, explains that the corpo-
ration is willing to provide unemployment insurance to employees because im-
plicit contracts deter shirking and other misbehavior.102 In this sense,
employees start their jobs for less pay to bond their work by subjecting their
income to possible forfeiture for inadequate performance.10 3 This allows the
firm to retain dedicated workers and ultimately repay them with higher wages
by postponing compensation until the later term of the employment relationship
and encourages employees to develop long-term relationships with the firm.1°4
Thus, the implicit contract serves as an economic "bonding" mechanism to re-
duce agency costs.
Finally, the human capital theory also illustrates why employees tend to
have long-term attachments to corporations. According to this theory, workers
usually develop skills that are firm-specific or industry-specific.' 05 Risk-averse
employees are reluctant to accumulate this human capital because the invest-
ment may lose its value when the employee loses his job.106 For example, an
older welder in fabricated metals may have much difficulty finding a new job in
the same field. 107 Because this human capital is integral to a firm's success,
firms attempt to persuade employees to acquire firm-specific skills by decreasing
the employees' risk of unemployment.108 In addition, employers seek to reduce
job turnover to decrease their hiring and training expenses.109 Thus, each expla-
nation demonstrates that both employers and employees benefit from the im-
plicit contract arrangement.110
Implicit contracts shift the employees' risk of job loss to the corporation
and theoretically provide employees with job security as long as they are compe-
100. See, eg., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 3-5; Bull, supra note 92, at 151; Holmstrom,
Equilibrium Long-Term Contracts, 98 Q.J. ECON. 23, 26 (Supp. 1983).
101. See, eg., Danziger, Real Shoclu Efficient Risk Sharing, and the Duration of Labor Con-
tracts, 103 Q.J. ECON. 435, 436 (1988); Rosen, supra note 33, at 1145.
102. See, eg., Cornell & Shapiro, Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance, 16 FIN. MGMT,
5, 5-6 (1987).
103. Wachter & Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29 INDUS. RELATIONS 240,
246, 250 (1990).
104. See, eg., Hutchens, supra note 93, at 441.
105. Hart, Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction, 50 REV.
ECON. STUD. 3, 4 (1983); Schultze, Microeconomic Efficiency and Nominal Wage Stickiness, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1985).
106. See, eg., M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 25-26 (1984); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93
YALE L.J. 1197, 1207-09 (1984).
107. Hutchens, supra note 93, at 456.
108. See, eg., Gamber, Long-Term Risk-Sharing Wage Contracts in an Economy Subject to Per-
manent and Temporary Shocks, 6 J. LAB. ECON. 83, 83 (1988); Rosen, supra note 33, at 1147 (Wage
income is in part an "installment payment on specific-investments.").
109. Hutchens, supra note 93, at 450.
110. See, eg., M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 14-15.
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tent. These contracts, therefore, require firms to maintain 'employment even
when production declines temporarily.11 1  But what about the problems of
bankruptcy, demand or supply shifts, and product obsolescence?1 12 Labor econ-
omists explain that complete implicit contracts would provide severance pay-
ments to workers if the probability of permanent job loss results from these
factors.1 13 They recognize, however, that these insurance contracts should en-
courage labor mobility,' 14 but that they should not create an incentive for the
workers to shirk their because they know they are protected if the corporation
fails. That is, this "moral hazard" problem cautions against an implicit contract
that provides too much job security. 15
Although employees rely on implicit contracts because they are risk-averse,
employees have no guarantee that the employer will honor the implicit contract.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the possibility that employers may not
comply with the terms of these contracts and the ways in which employees en-
force their implicit contracts.
2. Opportunistic Breach and the Problem of Enforcing
Implicit Labor Contracts
Employees bear the risk that firms opportunistically may breach the im-
plicit employment contracts. Firms may enter into implicit contracts, accept the
workers' insurance premiums, and then attempt to increase their profits by back-
ing out of the agreement when it is their turn to indemnify workers.1 16 Oppor-
tunistic conduct may occur in several ways." 7 First, employees make firm-
specific investments in their corporation to obtain higher wages than they would
111. See, eg., Gamber, supra note 108, at 84 ("[Ilf risk-neutral firms are insuring risk-averse
workers, then the real wage responds more to a given permanent shock than to a temporary shock of
the same size.").
112. Rosen, supra note 33, at 1170 (Implicit contracts are akin to marriage, however, "[n]ot all
marriages are made in heaven.").
113. Id. at 1170-71 ("Turnover is efficient if the severance payment offers complete insurance,
but is inefficient if severance payments are constrained and workers are not fully protected against
permanent separations."); Samuelson, Implicit Contracts with Heterogeneous Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON.
70, 87 (1985) (Implicit contract models often allow firms to make severance payments "presumably
because of the optimality of doing so.").
114. Samuelson, supra note 113, at 87; Holmstrom, supra note 100, at 48. Professor Holmstrom
assumes the absence of severance payments in his model because such payments would reduce the
displaced workers' incentive to search for new jobs; he does recognize, however, that his model could
incorporate severance payments.
115. See, eg., Rosen, supra note 33, at 1154 ("[Workers and firms jointly control layoff deci-
sions, precisely the type of situation where coinsurance is known to be desirable."); Samuelson, supra
note 113, at 71 n.3 (Severance pay issue poses serious challenge to implicit contract theory because
few firms provide this benefit.).
116. Rosen, Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets, 4 J.L. EON. & ORG. 49, 51 (1988)
(discussing ex post enforcement problem due to opportunistic breach); Shleifer & Summers, Breach
of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVEIs, supra note 59, at 33, 38, 41-42, 49.
"[I]mplicit contracts specify actions that ex post reduce the firm's value, even though agreeing to
these actions is ex ante value maximizing. Breach of contract can therefore raise shareholder wealth,
and the more so the greater is the burden of fulfilling past implicit contracts." Id. at 38.
117. See, eg., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 7 ("Inhere is always another risk associated
with any theory of contract enforcement through bonding: that the employer will fire the worker
(or, equivalently, make work conditions so unattractive that the worker will be induced to quit and
forfeit the bond).").
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earn in the general labor market without such skills.1 18 After workers acquire
these abilities, however, the corporation can renege on its promise to pay higher
wages by reducing the workers' earnings to those paid to workers without the
skills.119 Because the employees cannot use the firm-specific knowledge else-
where, they are vulnerable to this conduct. 120 Second, opportunistic breach may
occur because informational asymmetries exist, that is, the employees do not
have access to the firm's data about its operational and financial matters. 12 1 For
example, the firm may announce that production is less than it actually is in
order to lay off workers and maximize profits. 122 Third, older workers who
become less productive especially are exposed to opportunistic breach. 12 3 These
forms of opportunistic behavior are socially inefficient because they can destroy
the market for these implicit contracts.
124
Because implicit contracts are not recognized as legal contracts, the parties
cannot rely on the legal system for enforcement. People usually rely on implicit
contracts when they enter into long-term relationships. When parties embark
upon an extended association, they cannot foresee every contingency, nor deline-
ate every detail of their arrangement in a written contract. 125 Thus, to a certain
extent, transactors must rely on mutual trust and confidence that they will ad-
just their terms in the face of hardship rather than on the explicit terms of their
written contract for judicial enforcement.
Generally, both workers and employers depend on market forces to assure
performance of implicit contracts, that is, the penalty of withdrawing from the
118. Economists refer to this problem as "appropriable quasi.rents." Haddock, Macey &
McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 712-13
(1987) ("[I]nvestments that are specific to assets owned by others place the investor at risk from
those others' opportunistic behavior. As long as the individual realizes at least as much as can be
had in the best alternative, the invested human capital will remain, even if the returns are
expropriated.").
119. Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
120. Id.
121. Professors Azariadis and Stiglitz explain:
If contract wage payments do not vary much over states but hours of work do, the em-
ployer may announce a good state when the bad one occurs in order to extract more hours
from laborers; if, on the other hand, wage payments vary substantially more than do hours
of work, the employer may announce the adverse state when the favorable one occurs in
order to lower costs.
Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 12; see also Hall & Lilien, Efficient Wage Bargains Under
Uncertain Supply and Demand, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 868, 871 (1979) (observing same); Holmstrom,
supra note 100, at 48 (workers unlikely to observe firm's marginal product to enforce implicit
contract).
122. See, eg., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 12; Grossman & Hart, Implicit Contracts
Under Asymmetric Information, 98 Q.J. ECON. 123, 125 (Supp. 1983); Grossman & Hart, Implicit
Contracts Moral Hazard, and Unemployment, 71 Am. ECON. REv. 301, 302 (1981).
123. See, eg., Shleifer & Summers, supra note 116, at 41-42, 49.
124. See Di Norcia, supra note 24, at 245 ("Financial restructuring coupled with investor pri-
macy... perpetuates the discredited adversarial model of labor/management relations which di-
vides-and weakens-the North American firm.").
125. See, eg., Rosen, supra note 33, at 1149 ("An employment relationship represents a complex
interaction of authority, delegation, personal interactions and monitoring, so complex that remarka-
bly few provisions are actually written down."). For a general discussion of relational contracts, see
Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations" Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classi-
ficatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018, 1025-27 (1981).
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relationship and acquiring a bad reputation in the labor market. 126 Implicit
contracts, however, are designed to deter workers from leaving their jobs; work-
ers pay the firm a bond in the form of accepting lower wages that assures they
will perform adequately in the future. 127 To quit, workers must surrender this
bond. For the most part, these financial restrictions leave workers to rely on the
character of the firm to assure performance.' 2 8 The firm has a strong incentive
to abide by an ethical code to treat workers fairly because they want to attract
and retain the most qualified employees.' 29 This notion corresponds to the the-
ory explaining how firms benefit from implicit contracts by minimizing expenses
relating to hiring and training costs.' 3 0 In other words, if the firm breaches the
implicit contracts, worker distrust will develop, resulting in lower employee mo-
rale, productivity, and loyalty. 131 In addition, once a firm acquires a dishonora-
ble reputation, employees may quit, causing the firm to incur costs recruiting
replacements. 132
The firm's interest in maintaining its reputation, however, fails to solve
completely the problem of opportunistic breach of implicit employment con-
tracts; 133 labor economists are just beginning to explore the area of enforcement
in more detail.' 34 In particular, labor economists note that the risk of opportu-
nistic behavior is very high when the employer leaves a regional labor market
and relocates to another part of the country or world. 135 Additionally, as com-
126. See, eg., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 6; Carmichael, Reputations in the Labor
Market, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 713, 714 (1984); Holmstrom, Contractual Models of the Labor Market,
71 AM. ECON. REv. 308, 313 (1981).
127. Professor Aoki explains:
In order to 'attach' employees to the firm and to distribute a share of the saved cost
thereby, devices are developed in which the employees receive various benefits related to
their tenure with the firm, in the form of seniority rights, pension benefits, and the like. If
an employee quits his job in the middle of his career, he will lose these attained seniority
rights; his pension benefits may not be portable further, his skills and professional knowl-
edge may be firm-specific to some extent, and their economic value may be partly lost if he
changes job.
M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 182; see also Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 7 (bond assures
reliable future behavior by employees).
128. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 967-77 (1984) (loss
of reputation in market hurts employer more, to the advantage of the employee).
129. See, eg., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 19 ("One intuitive answer is obvious here:
firms do not wish to jeopardize the investments in hiring, training, and information gathering that
attend long-lived job attachments.").
130. Id. at 7.
131. Buono & Bowditch, supra note 50, at 141 ("Research indicates that mergers have less than
a 50-50 chance of being successful ... and much of that failure is increasingly attributed to misman-
agement of the firm's human resources."); Bull, supra note 92, at 157 (intrafirm reputation more
important than firm's reputation in the labor market).
132. See, eg., Cornfield, supra note 39, at 355.
133. See, eg., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1412-13 (1967) (During times of abundant
labor supply, the employer's interest in reputation is not "a very substantial deterrent to the em-
ployer who is tempted to bend his employees to his will."); Bull, supra note 92, at 148 (reputation
effects weak in markets for unskilled or semi-skilled, blue collar workers).
134. See Rosen, supra note 33, at 1169 (listing several possible formulas to analyze the area of
enforcement); Rosen, supra note 116, at 57-58.
135. Cf. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 116, at 39 (stating that an employer whose future repu-
tation is unimportant is likely to breach implicit contracts with employees).
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petitive pressures increase, firms have a greater incentive to breach implicit con-
tracts to maximize profits in the short run.136 Recognizing that much work
remains in the area of ensuring performance of implicit contracts, 137 labor econ-
omists suggest that to avoid opportunistic breach, firms must develop a more
complicated scheme to "bond" their future performance to the employees.
138
This "bonding" mechanism would take the form of explicit, guaranteed sever-
ance payments. 139 Attempting to explain why corporations often do not provide
severance payments, economists surmise that because implicit contracts are not
legally enforceable, "the temptation for the firm to renege on promised sever-
ance payments may be irresistible." 140
3. Corporate Restructuring and Opportunistic Breach of Implicit
Employment Contracts
This section explores the "expropriation theory," which suggests that
shareholders gain in takeovers at the workers' expense when the corporation
breaches implicit employment contracts, and extends the theory to encompass
other fundamental corporate changes such as layoffs, plant closings, and indus-
trial relocations not related to takeovers. Under this more expansive version of
the expropriation theory, many restructuring events allow corporations to en-
gage in opportunistic conduct by breaching implicit employment contracts.
Before examining the expropriation theory, it is important to emphasize
that no one really knows the source of the shareholders' premium received in
takeovers. Several other theories may explain the nature of the premium in dif-
ferent situations. 14 1 Some commentators contend that takeovers are beneficial
for the economy because they replace inefficient management, create synergy,
and allow managers to engage in empire building.142 In contrast to theories
implying that takeovers produce wealth, the expropriation theory suggests that
takeovers produce shareholder profit by transferring wealth from employees
through breach of implicit employment contracts.
The nexus of contracts and implicit contract theories form the basis for the
expropriation theory of the shareholders' premium. Shareholders and employ-
136. Holmstrom, supra note 100, at 49.
137. See eg., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 90, at 18-19.
138. Id.; Bull, supra note 92, at 153-54.
139. See Hall & Lazear, The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand, 2 J. LAn. ECON.
233, 250 (1984) (because firm has monopsony power, some degree of severance pay is desirable to
offset that power).
140. Samuelson, supra note 113, at 87; see Brand, Productivity and Employment: The 1988 In-
ternational Symposium, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 32, 34 (1988) (survey found 44% of companies
have some type of severance pay) (citing the General Accounting Office's PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
OF U.S. BUSINESS CLOSURES AND PERMANENT LAYOFFS DURING 1983 AND 1984 (1986)).
141. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1409-11
(1986); see eg., Black, supra note 61, at 612 (noting that wealth transfers seem to explain at most a
fraction of the aggregate shareholder gains from takeovers); see also Jensen, Eclipse of the Public
Corporation, 67 HARV. Bus. REv. (Sept.-Oct. 1989) 61, 63-64 (stating that "[t]he forces behind the
decline of the public corporation differ from industry to industry").
142. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 936-40 (4th ed. 1990).
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ees have conflicting attitudes toward risk based on these theories. 14 3 On the one
hand, shareholders' diversified portfolios protect against losses resulting from
unprofitable corporate changes. Firm-specific risks thus do not affect sharehold-
ers. 144 Because they receive the corporation's residual returns, shareholders
tend to favor a high degree of leverage. On the other hand, employees cannot
diversify their firm-specific risk, and thus prefer less risky ventures that will en-
sure that the corporation will be able to cover their labor costs. 145 Given these
assumptions, takeovers provide shareholders a means to compel managers to
take risks; managers will leverage up to increase stock prices to reduce the cor-
poration's attractiveness to potential acquirors.
Professors Shleifer and Summers have asserted that takeovers allow share-
holders to profit through the corporation's breaching its implicit employment
contracts. 146 According to this view, a hostile takeover allows the acquiror to
breach the corporation's implicit contracts because the new managers were not
parties to these contracts. Thus, new managers are more likely to fire older
workers and threaten to bankrupt and close the plants to coerce the other work-
ers to grant wage concessions. 147 Professors Shleifer and Summers suggest that
existing managers serve as trustees who safeguard the employees' firm-specific
investments. They believe that incumbent management will not seek to breach
implicit employment contracts to maintain the corporation's reputation in the
labor market. 148 Thus, takeovers allow transfers of wealth from workers in
terms of their loss of job security and deferred compensation. 149 This view pro-
vides theoretical support linking layoffs and plant closings to hostile takeovers.
In reviewing the theory of Professors Shleifer and Summers, one criticism
stands out. Their theory fails to recognize that the most important aspect of the
takeover phenomenon may stem from corporations increasing their leverage to
avoid takeovers; as discussed previously, these corporations also breach implicit
contracts by imposing layoffs and closing plants.' 50 Recognizing this problem,
Professor Coffee asserts that leveraged restructuring may involve wealth trans-
fers from middle- and upper-level management to the shareholders.' 5' He sug-
143. See Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 18 ("To sum up, the basic contrast is that
shareholders own many stocks, but managers have only one job.").
144. For an extended discussion of portfolio theory, see J. Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION,
ACCOUNTING AND THE LAW 164-75 (1980). Professor Cox notes that a diversified portfolio in-
cludes countercyclical stocks. Thus, if one stock performs below average, another stock will perform
above average. Id.
145. See id.
146. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 116, at 35 (noting the takeovers by Frank Lorenzo in the
airline industry as an example). Specifically, takeovers allow shareholders to capture the workers'
appropriable quasi-rents. Id. at 41-42.
147. Id. at 45; see Scheffman, The Economics and Ethics of Adjusting to a New Competitive Envi-
ronment: Mergers and Takeover, in ETHics, supra note 24, at 99, 103.
148. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 116, at 46.
149. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 116, at 44; see also Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at
24 (implicit contracts threaten a manager's job because they defer part of a manager's expected
compensation and do not legally bind new owners of a corporation after a takeover); Law, supra note
11, at 82 (noting that the interests of stockholders and managers conflict and that stockholders'
interests prevail).
150. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
151. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 8-10.
1991] 1211
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
gests that managers should receive severance packages to mitigate the risk of
opportunistic breach that occurs when firms increase their leverage.152
Professor Coffee explicitly confines his analysis to protecting managers in
finance-driven restructurings. This Article contends that Professor Coffee's the-
ory applies not only to leveraged restructuring transactions but also to other
restructuring events such as plant closings and layoffs that occur due to general
conditions in the economy. Moreover, this Article contends that Professor Cof-
fee's theory applies to employees other than managers. Indeed, several factors
suggest that nonmanagerial employees are much more deserving of protection
than managers.15
3
First, Professor Coffee argues that the takeover phenomenon involves spe-
cial circumstances that are not present in typical market operations. More spe-
cifically, he asserts that takeovers uniquely allow shareholders to obtain wealth
transfers from employees, especially managers. 154 Thus, Professor Coffee distin-
guishes between layoffs prompted by financial changes and layoffs caused by
production changes.1 55 This Article suggests that the expropriation theory also
encompasses other corporate changes that are not related to takeovers, such as
layoffs, plant closings, and industrial relocations. 156 Although shareholders are
the ultimate risk-bearers, many types of corporate restructuring allow share-
holders to transfer some of this risk to employees.15 7 From the implicit contract
perspective, employees receive lower wages that represent insurance payments to
the corporation. If the firm suffers from market conditions such as increasing
competition and shifting industrial investments, employees who are released for-
feit job security for which they previously have paid. 158 Thus, shareholders
should not receive the extra profits that arise from breaching implicit contracts
under these circumstances. 1
59
C. A Comparison of Nonmanagement Employees' and Managers'
Vulnerability to Opportunistic Breach of Implicit Contracts
Professor Coffee limits his use of the expropriation theory by drawing a line
between management employees and "lower-echelon workers. '16  He argues
that the corporation should protect managers' reliance upon implicit con-
152. Id.
153. See Brudney, Comment, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETs, supra note 55, at 150, 151
("There may well be obligations to the community and the enterprise's displaced lower-income em-
ployees for mitigation of the effects of any such move. But the case is less clear for entitlements of
middle management, and certainly less clear for top management.").
154. See Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 76.
155. Brudney, supra note 153, at 151.
156. Cf id. at 150 (questioning why Coffee's theory does not apply to plant closings).
157. Cf Oesterle, supra note 75, at 138-42 (many exit events allow shareholders to breach im-
plicit employment contracts).
158. Rosen, supra note 33, at 83.
159. Brudney, supra note 153, at 151.
160. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 81 (This line is not mandatory, but Coffee strongly
advocates it.); Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 8, at 449 ("Lower-echelon employees contract
through other means and institutions (i.e., collective bargaining) and are not as exposed to opportu-
nism because they do not invest in much 'firm-specific' capital or expect an ex post 'settling up.' ").
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tracts. 161 Professor Coffee provides three reasons for denying protection to
nonmanagerial employees. First, employees are not hurt by hostile takeovers as
much as managers. Second, employees do not invest as much in human capital
and do not expect as much deferred compensation as managers. Finally, em-
ployees, unlike managers, have collective bargaining agreements to safeguard
their interests.
In examining the first basis for distinguishing between managers and em-
ployees, Professor Coffee asserts that takeover-related transactions do not hurt
nonmanagerial employees as much as managers. 162 The available evidence indi-
cates that this is true; certainly, in many takeovers, middle managers tend to be
the first to lose their jobs. 163 Takeovers, however, also affect nonmanagerial
employees in situations such as the Safeway and RJR Nabisco restructurings.164
More significantly, as explained above, the focus upon takeover-related restruc-
turing is too narrow; the deindustrialization process is causing a steady displace-
ment of labor, particularly blue-collar workers.' 65
1. What Are the Expectations of Nonmanagerial Employees?
Professor Coffee suggests that managers, but not employees, deserve com-
pensation for the breach of implicit contracts because managers possess firm-
specific human capital; as a result, they will have a difficult time finding
equivalent positions. Professor Coffee concludes: "Because managerial compen-
sation is thus set within an internal market, the loss of a job means more to a
manager than to those employees whose wages are determined by an external
market."' 166 This assertion is surprising because Professor Coffee relies upon the
implicit contract theory which, as he acknowledges, labor economists originally
formulated to explain unemployment for "lower-level" employees. 167 Coffee ex-
tends this model to managers, contending that they are "even more dependent
on the firm for [their] expected future wealth and may suffer a greater loss if
forced to resort to the marketplace."' 168 At one point, however, Professor Coffee
states that managers currently are beginning to develop general purpose skills
and that firm-specific human capital applies more to lower-level employees in
161. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 23-24, 73-86.
162. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 78 ("[S]enior and middle management... persons
are essentially redundant if the bidder has similar personnel and their discharge does not threaten
immediate operating performance.").
163. See, eg., Halverson, supra note 58, at 9 (workers who lose jobs in takeover-related transac-
tions tend to be professionals and middle managers).
164. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
165. Kay & Griffin, Plant Closures: Assessing the Victims'Remedies, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REv.
199, 202-04 (1983). C" '[Tihe typical worker in a plant shutdown is in his late 40s, with high senior-
ity, relatively high earnings, specialized skills, and has strong ties to family and community.' " (quot-
ing Comment, Advance Notice of Plant Closings: Toward National Legislation, 14 J.L. REFORM 283
(1981))).
166. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 17-18.
167. Id. at 23.
168. Id.
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engineering and manufacturing. 16 9 Even so, Professor Coffee contends that
managers who do not invest in firm-specific skills deserve protection because
they are "economically wedded" to their firms. These managers face the prob-
lem of "golden handcuffs": they become dependent upon the firm because other
job opportunities do not provide them with the prospect of earning the same
salary. 170
Professor Coffee, however, fails to recognize that nonmanagerial employees
also make firm-specific investments. Professor Macey, in contrast, notes as
follows:
Unlike high-level managers, who make firm-specific human capital in-
vestments as individuals, rank-and-file workers are often trained as
groups and make firm-specific human capital investments simultane-
ously with their co-workers. This arrangement contains additional po-
tential for exploitation, because firms enjoy economies of scale in
hiring and training workers. 171
Even if nonmanagerial employees do not invest as much in human capital as
managers, workers who engage in labor-intensive activities also rely upon im-
plicit contracts for job security. As these workers grow older, they cannot pro-
duce as much as younger workers; thus, they give up wages when they begin
work to maintain a steady wage as they age. Viewed in this light, a distinction
between physical and human capital investments is inappropriate because it dis-
regards the interests of most of the corporation's employees. Indeed, unsophisti-
cated, unskilled workers have more need for the job security that implicit
contracts can provide because these employees are more vulnerable to opportu-
nism. Instead of facing the "golden handcuffs" problem of lower wages,
nonmanagerial employees face the prospect of no wages because they have fewer
opportunities for re-employment. 172 Therefore, contrary to Professor Coffee's
position, losing a job may mean more to nonmanagerial employees than to man-
agerial employees.
2. Can Nonmanagerial Employees Establish Explicit Contracts to Mitigate
the Consequences of Displacement?
Finally, Professor Coffee distinguishes between managers and employees by
suggesting that even if nonmanagerial employees are hurt by the breach of im-
plicit contracts, they can seek adequate protection through collective bargain-
ing.173 Professor Macey' 74 and other commentators similarly contend that the
presence of a union should mitigate the appropriation of workers' firm-specific
169. Id. at 39 ("[IThe road to executive success requires that the executive learn 'general pur-
pose' executive skills, not simply 'special purpose' (but dead-end) technological expertise.").
170. Id.
171. Macey, supra note 19, at 191.
172. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
173. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 81.
174. Macey, supra note 19, at 192.
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investments. 175 Thus, before examining whether a legal response is required to
foster a transition policy for workers, it is necessary to assess the extent to which
employees can anticipate the risks of restructuring and protect themselves
through explicit contracts.
a. Reasons Why Nonmanagerial Employees Do Not Have Explicit
Contracts for Employment Security
Most nonmanagerial employees do not have contractual safeguards against
job loss. Although golden parachutes often compensate upper-level managers
during hostile changes of control, 176 these devices rarely cover lower-level em-
ployees. 177 Many commentators assume that unions will bargain to protect
their members from the consequences of layoffs and plant closings. This view,
however, ignores the fact that less than twenty percent of the work force is un-
ionized. 178 Unorganized workers cannot extract explicit contractual relief and
must follow the terms that their employers provide. 179 Union employees do not
175. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 406-08 (1990); Rib-
stein, supra note 61, at 146.
176. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 91, at 131 n.170. Forty-eight percent
protected senior management with employment contracts; 50% provided change of control provi-
sions; 21.8% provided for payments if the employee left voluntarily. Id. at n.167 & n.170. Several
courts have upheld golden parachute provisions. See, eg., Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
377 N.W.2d 592, 604, 126 Wis. 2d 349, 371-72 (1985) (effect of hostile takeover on employee morale
considered in determining whether damage clause in golden parachute reasonable); see also Note,
Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE
L.J. 909, 913 (1985) (because of courts' traditional deference to directors' exercise of business judg-
ment, most golden parachutes are likely to pass judicial scrutiny if challenged).
177. Some firms have tin parachutes that apply to job dislocations after hostile acquisitions.
Nelson-Horchler, A Catchall Parachute Herman Miller Has a Silver Shark Repellent, INDUS. WK.,
Feb. 9, 1987, at 16; Robertson, Corporate Restructuring and Employee Interests: The Tin Parachute,
in ETHICS, supra note 24, at 195, 198 (firms are reluctant to disclose the adoption of tin parachutes);
Ryan, supra note 9, at 10-11 n.17 (identifying 19 companies, but "no official tally"). Most tin
parachutes are designed as poison pills, that is, they are triggered when a hostile acquiror discharges
employees. Cowan, New Ploy: 'Tin Parachutes' N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1987, at Dl, col. 3. Most tin
parachutes do not address the possibility that target management or its white knight will restructure
the company and dislocate its workers. Robertson, supra, at 198; Ryan, supra note 9, at 38-39. Two
courts have refused to enjoin directors from implementing tin parachutes after a hostile bid was
announced. See GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Tate
& Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
93,764, at 98,585 (Del. Ch. 1988). Two other courts have enjoined the tin parachute plans as
invalid defensive measures. See Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
772, 787-88 (D. Del. 1988); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1261
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). For further discussion of the case law dealing with tin parachutes, see Block &
Hoff, Employee Severance Agreements in Changes in Control, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
"'Labor, at whatever level, should not be victimized or go unrequited by control contests.'" Id. at
6, col. 2 (quoting GAF Corp., 624 F. Supp. at 1022).
178. See, e.g., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 235 ("Nevertheless, quite apart
from the fact that three-quarters of the American labor force has no direct protection at all, those
whose jobs are covered by collective bargaining agreements receive little-or very weak-protection
from job loss related to shutdowns or large cutbacks."); Dickens & Leonard, Accounting for the
Decline in Union Membership, 1950-1980, 38 INDUS. LAB. REL. REv. 323, 324 (1985) (most believe
that plant closures and layoffs are the cause of union decline). In an earlier article, Professor Coffee
recognized that a minority of the workforce is unionized. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 1145, 1248 (1984).
179. Eg., Blades, supra note 133, at 1411; Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers: The
Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employ-
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enjoy much more protection against layoffs and plant closings than nonunion
employees.18 0 Accordingly, this part of the Article analyzes the possible reasons
why unionized employees have not sought contractual provisions to mitigate the
consequences of restructuring.
The current restructuring era illustrates that the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) *81 fails to protect displaced workers;18 2 labor law scholars conse-
quently are calling for its repeal.183 Professor Stone describes the situation as
follows: "At the same time that corporate investment decisions are causing mas-
sive lay offs throughout the unionized sectors, the labor laws are being reinter-
preted to give unions less and less input into corporate decision making."
184
The courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have construed the
NLRA in several ways that allow corporations to restructure without consider-
ing the employees' interests. 185 An employer may relocate a plant to another
area to hire cheaper labor, yet may not transfer simply to avoid collective bar-
gaining obligations.18 6 This distinction often makes a finding of unfair labor
practices dependent on the employer's stated business reasons for the transfer.
Courts' traditional deference to employers makes it difficult for a union to pro-
tect its members from these relocations.187 Furthermore, a purchaser of assets is
not bound by any prior collective bargaining agreements and is free to replace
the entire work force under the successorship doctrine. Moreover, an asset pur-
chaser does not have a legal duty to bargain with the union unless the purchaser
ment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082, 1108 (1984) (nonunion employees "at mercy" of em-
ployer). But see Epstein, supra note 128, at 954 (even nonunion workers have strong bargaining
positions). For criticism of Professor Epstein's position, see Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. Rnv. 323, 409-15
(1986) (discussing the notion of the "romance of freedom of contract").
180. B. BLuESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 235; see also Rhine, Business Closings and
Their Effects on Employees-The Need for New Remedies, 35 LABOR L.. 268, 269 (1984) (noting
lack of protection under labor laws and proposing adaptation of existing common-law theories to
remedy misrepresentations to employees regarding job security).
181. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-69 (1988).
182. Professor Stone has written how "the privatized system of collective bargaining that has
emerged under the NLRA fails to protect labor from the adverse consequences of corporate deci-
sions, especially decisions that involve major investments or transformations in corporate form."
Stone, supra note 88, at 158; see also Gorman, The Negligible Impact of the National Labor Relations
Act on Management Decisions to Close or Relocate, 58 TUL. L. REv. 1354 (1984) (examining the
legal protection afforded workers by the NLRA when they are terminated upon the relocation or
closing of their place of work); Kay & Griffin, supra note 165, at 215 (stating that the reality of mass
layoffs has shown that labor law currently affords workers little protection).
183. See, eg., Sweeney & Siegel, Is There a Need to Amend the National Labor Relations Act?, 52
FORDHAM L. REv. 1142, 1143 (1984).
184. Stone, supra note 88, at 74.
185. See eg., Gorman, supra note 182, at 1355-56. For an economic analysis of recent labor
cases using the implicit contract theory, see Wachter & Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective
Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and
Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1988).
186. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (holding that
although employers may not discharge workers for union activity, they may discharge for reasons
unrelated to union activity).
187. See, eg., Stone, supra note 88, at 96-102. But see Baer, The NLRB and Plant Relocation,
N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1989, at 3, col. 2 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that an employer can
terminate his entire business for any reason, even spite against a union).
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retains a majority of the workforce.188
Although the NLRA does not provide much relief, presumably, unions
would attempt to negotiate terms that provide job security.18 9 Unions have diffi-
culty in bargaining for explicit contractual protection against layoffs and plant
closings because management strongly resents any limitations on its discretion
to operate the business. 1 90 In this regard, management often insists on "mana-
gerial prerogative" clauses that assure that it will have great flexibility in deter-
mining the level of employment and prevent unions from using their right to
strike. 19 1
More importantly, a union's ability to provide contractual protections de-
pends on equal bargaining strength.192 Professor Lynd maintains that the uni-
lateral nature of plant closing decisions demonstrates that unions possess weak
negotiating power. 193 A forceful union that is able to obtain high wages often is
not sufficiently powerful to shield its employees from a corporation that relo-
cates its operations to another area. As a result, contract clauses restricting
management's ability to lay workers off or close a plant are rare because employ-
ees do not have the negotiating power to offset the high price that management
demands for these provisions.
1 94
188. See, ag., Stone, supra note 88, at 106-07. But see DuRoss, Increasing the Labor-Related
Costs of Business Transfers and Acquisitions-The Spectre of Per Se Liability for New Owners, 67
WASH. U.L.Q. 375, 377-78 (1989) (concluding that "in most transfers the new owner is now the de
jure surety for any of the predecessor's labor-related obligations").
189. Stone, supra note 88, at 106-07. Some commentators, however, question union effectiveness
in representing workers' long-run interests. Traditionally, unions have focused on wages, ignoring
job security issues until an emergency arises. See, ag., Di Norcia, supra note 24, at 250. Union
leaders concentrate on increasing wages because they hold short-term political positions. See Dona-
hue & Raskin, The Role and Challenges Facing Unions in the 1940s and 1980s-A Comparison, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 1062, 1073-75 (1986). Thus, it is hardly surprising that union officials are not
motivated to negotiate contract terms that are best for employees in the long-run. See, ag., F.
O'CONNELL, supra note 22, at 56 (union members tend to prefer high wages and are not willing to
pay the price to obtain protection against corporate restructurings).
In contrast to the union structure notion, some commentators suggest that nonmanagerial em-
ployees do not seek contractual safeguards against dislocation because they are unsophisticated.
Professor Kennedy asserts that workers may have "miscalculated their true interests" by foolishly
sacrificing their long-run welfare for higher income in the present. Kennedy, Distributive and Pater-
nalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 630 (1982). According to Professor Kennedy, workers
know they may be laid off, but they tend to underestimate the chances of the plant closing and the
difficulty they will have finding a new job. Id. Thus, a paternalistic response is necessary because
these employees should be protected from mistakes that they will regret later. Id. at 631.
190. See, e.g., F. O'CONNELI., supra note 22, at 56. For an overview of the impact of plant
closures and relocations on collective bargaining, see Craver, The Impact of Financial Crises Upon
Collective Bargaining Relationships, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 465 (1988).
191. See, eg., Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CAsE W. REs. 396,
410 (1979) ("[L]abor relinquishes its most effective weapon against management-its ability to strike
... [while] management retains the prerogative to disrupt the lives of its employees by relocating or
closing its facilities.").
192. Singer, supra note 10, at 649.
193. Lynd, supra note 191, at 396.
194. See F. O'CONNELL, supra note 22, at 56. While there is a general decline in the labor
movement, some unions are gaining protection against layoffs and plant closings. Gould, Job Secur-
ity in the United Stater Some Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from a
Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV. 28, 29 (1988) (describing the collective bargaining agree-
ments negotiated by the United Auto Workers in the farm equipment and automobile industries).
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Three practical reasons may explain further unions' failure to seek cove-
nants explicitly regulating opportunistic behavior. First, unions suffer an infor-
mation disadvantage in negotiating for these provisions.195 Second, drafting
these covenants leads to great expense in attempting to anticipate and provide
for every contingency. Finally, job security may not be subject to mandatory
bargaining.
196
One of the main reasons that so few workers belong to unions is that collec-
tive bargaining agreements do not assure job security in this era of rapid eco-
nomic adjustment.1 97 Management has taken an antagonistic stance toward
unions reminiscent of the hostility demonstrated in the 1920s. 19 8 Hence, as Pro-
fessor Singer claims, "it is no answer to say the workers get what they bargained
for."1
9 9
b. Alternative Means for Unions to Safeguard Members From
Corporate Restructuring
In most corporate restructurings, union considerations are ignored because
unions are precluded from playing an active role at the negotiating table. Un-
ions that have sufficient power are exploring new methods to establish a voice in
corporate decisions that affect their livelihoods. 20° For example, in some chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, union officials bargain with other creditors about
significant corporate strategies. 20 1 In this regard, Professor Stone comments
that "unions and the other groups literally renegotiate the nexus of contracts
that comprise the corporation. ' 20 2 In addition to the bankruptcy setting, a few
unions have asserted influence in hostile takeovers.20 3 By using wage conces-
195. Bull, supra note 92, at 149-50 (informational asymmetry between the firm and workers
gives rise to a need for implicit contracts).
196. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-86 (1981) (Section 8(d)
does not apply to the decision to terminate business.); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 893-94
(1984) (no duty to bargain over relocation); see also Stone, supra note 88, at 95 (same); Note, An
Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining Over Partial Termination and Plant Relocation Decisions,
95 YALE L.J. 949, 949-50 (1986) (same).
197. See Dickens & Leonard, supra note 178, at 324.
198. See generally Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Legislation, 31
BuFF. L. REv. 9, 10-12 (1982) (describing labor relations before NLRA passed).
199. Singer, supra note 10, at 730. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fisehel respond that even
"take them or leave them" terms are real contracts that should be enforced "because their value or
(detriment) is reflected in price." Easterbrook & Fisehel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1429.
200. See, eg., Stone, supra note 88, at 75-78. "The developments challenge our current under-
standing of the labor-management relationship and seem to require a new conception of the role of
labor in the corporate structure." Id. at 79.
201. See, eg., id. at 169 (In these negotiations, "unions fight to the death.").
202. See, eg., id. at 160.
203. See Coffee, Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEo.
L.J. 1495, 1521-26 (1990). Union attempts to bargain for antitakeover protection may fail under
corporate law. In Air Line Pilots Association v. UAL Corporation, 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990),
the Seventh Circuit examined union contract provisions between United Air Lines and the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists designed to prevent the Air Line Pilots Association from taking
over the corporation. The Seventh Circuit held that Delaware corporate law barred such provisions.
The contract provided that the machinists' union could renegotiate their contract if a takeover oc-
curred and also provided that if United Air Lines offered an ESOP to the pilots, it had to offer a
similar plan to all other employees. Id. at 441-42.
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sions, certain unions have tipped the balance in favor of a bidder that they be-
lieve will be more sensitive to employee concerns.2° 4 On the legal front, unions
are lobbying to eliminate the tax deduction for debt to deter corporations from
pursuing higher leverage. 20 5 Organized labor also advocates changes in the law
to discourage employers from unilaterally terminating pension plans to finance
mergers and acquisitions with the plan's excess assets.20 6 Further, many unions
propose altering the successorship rules so that subsequent owners of the corpo-
ration must abide by previous collective bargaining agreements.20 7 Turning to
the courts, unions are filing innovative claims against their corporations for
wrongful discharge as well as suits against raiders for tortious interference with
contracts. 20 8 So far, these claims have not brought unions relief from corporate
restructuring; the courts have been reluctant to create remedies for plant clos-
ings even when employees agree to wage concessions and management assures
the workers that the plant will not close.2°9
This Article ultimately proposes that corporate directors should have a fi-
duciary obligation to displaced workers. Other options, however, must also be
investigated. In particular, the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives
must be analyzed to determine whether a legal solution is needed, or whether the
market eventually will adjust to reallocate the risks associated with
restructuring.210
204. For example, in the recent contest between Carl Icahn and Texas Air Corporation for con-
trol of Trans World Airlines, the unions in effect chose the victor by negotiating a concessions pack-
age with Icahn that they believed would be less drastic than the wage cuts and layoffs they
anticipated Texas Air would impose upon them if it obtained control. Salpukas, The Long Fight for
TWA: Unions Decided the Winner, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1985, at 1, col.5, at 35, col. 1.
205. See, e.g., Pension Hearings, supra note 4, at 193.
206. See, eg., id. at 197.
207. See, eg., id. at 206.
208. See, eg., Tasini, More Workers Are Saying "Take This Job Cut and Shove It," Bus. WK.,
Dec. 29, 1986, at 38. The Wickes Company attempted to gain control of Owens-Coming through a
hostile takeover in the summer of 1986. In defeating the takeover, Owens-Coming incurred $2.6
billion in debt and, as a result, had to implement massive layoffs. See supra text accompanying note
70. The Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers International Union brought suit
against the Haft group on behalf of 800 employees who previously had worked at the Barrington,
N.J. plant, claiming that Wickes intentionally interfered with the workers' prospective economic
relations with Owens-Coming. The court denied the company's motion to dismiss the claim. Glass
Molders Int'l Union v. Wickes Co., 707 F. Supp. 174, 179-80 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Geyelin &
Brannigan, Ex- Workers Can Sue Over Takeover Bid, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, at B8, col. 4.
Local governments also are finding ways to seek compensation for their investments in corpora-
tions that leave. See Russell, Implied Contracts and Creating a Corporate Tot One Way State and
Local Government Are Starting to Fight Plant Closings, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 1249 (1988); Schultz &
David, The Use of Eminent Domain and Contractually Implied Property Rights to Affect Business
and Plant Closings, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 383, 385-86 (1990); Comment, Eminent Domain:
The Ability of a Community to Retain an Industry in the Face of an Attempted Shut Down or Reloca-
tion, 12 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 231-34 (1985).
209. See Rhine, supra note 180, at 274.
210. M. Aoxx, supra note 18, at 4 ("When conditions permit, employees and their organizations
will no doubt seek to influence the decisions of firms through the exercise of their bargaining power
at all levels of the economy."); Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 91, at 79 (Employ-
ees "will change their behavior as the significance of the takeover's impact grows on them. Over
time, the process is a dynamic one, and defensive reactions must be expected from these other con-
stituencies that will in turn affect shareholders."); Stone, supra note 88, at 161 ("[A]ssets specificity
of the union members' investment... gives them a powerful incentive to seek to shape major corpo-
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One possible means of protecting employees against displacement is for un-
ions to encourage the growth of employee ownership of the corporation.21 1 Re-
cently, the number of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) has
escalated,2 12 and experts expect the number to continue to rise. A wide differ-
ence of opinion exists, however, as to whether employees benefit from these
schemes. 2 13 On the one hand, workers may not benefit because they cannot
diversify the risk of unemployment, while ownership of stock increases this firm-
specific risk.2 14 Thus, employee-ownership of stock tends to widen the gap in
risk preferences between employees and shareholders who hold diversified port-
folios. 2 15 On the other hand, employees may benefit from ESOPs even though
they increase their firm-specific risk because a trade-off exists between the costs
of underdiversification and the benefits of saving their livelihoods through own-
ership of the corporation.
2 16
Despite the debate over the benefits of ESOPs, 2 17 employees have used
these plans to gain bargaining power in several ways. Some have employed ES-
OPs to take over their corporations as a means of preserving collective bargain-
ing contracts. 2 18 Other unions have used ESOPs to increase their negotiating
rate decisions."). See generally Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509 (1986) (market solutions are favorable over government regulation).
211. For an extended discussion of ESOPs, see M. ROSEN, K. KLEIN & K. YOUNG, EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (1986). For a criticism of worker-owned firms, see Jensen & Meckling,
Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52
J. Bus. 469 (1979).
212. Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 118, at 701 ("[Tlhose making firm.specific
human capital investments sometimes defend against potential opportunism by taking control of the
asset to which their investment is specific."); see also Lipton, Corporate Governance, supra note 11, at
44 (predicting that in the twenty-first century employee ownerships will dominate corporate govern-
ance). The use of ESOPs will increase after the Polaroid decisions, which ruled broadly about the
use of ESOPs as a defensive measure. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278,
285-92 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Polaroid I1). Under the plan those cases, the employees would receive more
than $300 million worth of stock (14% of the company) over a ten-year period. The employees
financed the plan by a 5% pay cut, 401(k) matching funds, a delayed pay-scale change, and profit-
sharing retirement contributions. Under a confidential tendering provision, the employees have full
voting rights and must direct a trustee to vote both allocated and unallocated shares. The judge
referred to the plan as "shareholder neutral." Shamrock Holdings Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d
257, 262 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Polaroid 1). In finding that the ESOP was fair, the court stated that the
plan would improve morale and performance, even though it was unpopular with the workers be-
cause of the 5% pay cut. Id. at 272.
213. Farrell & Hoerr, ESOts Are They Good for You?, Bus. WK., May 15, 1989, at 116; Ruling
on Polaroid Anti-Takeover Defense Seen Boosting Use of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Daily
Lab. L. Rep. (BNA), No. 6, at A-6 (Jan. 10, 1989) (ruling a "mixed bag" for employees because the
most effective ESOPs are ones that management believes in because of the concept.).
214. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 76 n.210; Doernberg & Macey, ESOPs and Eco-
nomic Distortion, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGS. 103, 133-36 (1986); Macey, supra note 19, at 194 n.81;
Note, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 148, 168 (1985) (workers may lose jobs and pension benefits).
215. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 91, at 82-83 (ESOPs "exacerbate the
asymmetry in risk attitudes between shareholders and managers").
216. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 420 (3d ed. 1986).
217. See, eg., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 257-62.
218. Hyde & Livingston, Employee Takeovers, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1131, 1134 (1989) (efforts of
Air Line Pilots Association to purchase United Air Lines resulted in fall of corporate management);
see also Simmons, Ward, & Watson, An ESOP Can Be an Effective Anti-Takeover Device, NAT'L
L.J., June 30, 1986, at 25 (discussing recent examples).
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power in hostile takeovers by granting wage concessions to a favored bidder.2 19
For example, ESOPs aid workers when an anti-union raider has a strong likeli-
hood of winning a hostile battle for control. Under these circumstances, the
employees benefit by giving their allegiance to management through an
ESOP. 220 In several hostile takeovers, however, managers have exploited the
ESOP mechanism to serve their own interests.221
In addition to ESOPs, employees indirectly own a great deal of stock
through pension plans. 222 Institutional investors that administer employee ben-
efit plans may be an influential ally in defending employees against the conse-
quences of corporate restructuring. 223 Nonetheless, institutional investors at
present tend to promote the merger and acquisition fever because portfolio man-
agers receive their compensation based upon short-term profits.224 Many port-
folio managers also presume that fiduciary constraints may prevent them from
considering the implications of their investment strategies.22 5 Ironically, the in-
tended beneficiaries of these investment decisions, the employees, may be injured
by such a shallow outlook.2 26 Employees, therefore, should persuade institu-
tional investors to alter the incentive schemes for portfolio managers so that
these managers are free to consider the negative effects that corporate restructur-
ing may have upon jobs.
227
In sum, Professor Coffee's distinction between managers and lower-level
employees rests on a weak normative base that does not withstand close analysis.
Lower-level employees also rely upon implicit contracts by making firm-specific
investments of human capital. Moreover, firms often promise deferred compen-
sation to employees as a performance incentive as well as employment insur-
ance. Although managers also rely upon implicit contracts, they do not present
a compelling case for protection. Professor Brudney explains: "Management is,
if not the only constituency that can protect itself against the disaster, at least
the one best able to do so."'228 Managers are more sophisticated and better in-
219. See e.g., Burr, ESOPs Boom as a Defense, PENS. & INv. AGE, Apr. 17, 1989, at 1.
220. See Coffee, Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Covernance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO.
LJ. 1495, 1527 (1990).
221. Management uses the ESOP device because under Delaware law, an acquiring company
may not merge within three years of a transaction unless it acquires 85% of the company. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1988). ESOPs are excluded from the calculation unless em-
ployees have the right to tender the shares confidentially. Id.
222. See, eg., Ratner, When Rational Investing Has Adverse Effects, Legal Times, Apr. 24, 1989,
at 24 (Institutional investors owning 24% of U.S. corporations predicted to own a majority by the
end of this century.).
223. See, eg., Conard, Will Institutional Investors Take Charge?, 47 CoRP. DIRECTIONS 45
(1990) [hereinafter Conard, Take Charge]; Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 131-52 (1989).
224. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 222, at 24.
225. See, eg., Ravikoff & Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent
Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 524-28 (1980).
226. See, e.g., Minow, Social Investing: Making the Right Choices, Legal Times, Apr. 24, 1989,
at 28.
227. DeMott, Assessing Investors' Long-Term Commitment, Legal Times, Apr. 24, 1989, at 27
(noting that several British institutions have intervened in corporate management); Ratner, supra
note 222, at 25.
228. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989
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formed than employees about the risks of restructuring. 229 In addition, manage-
ment's control of the proxy machine provides them with a means to shelter
themselves from the consequences of corporate change.230 In contrast, con-
tracts do not safeguard employees from layoffs and plant closings. Although a
few unions provide some security to employees, most unions do not have the
bargaining power to do so. This conclusion raises the question whether a legal
response is appropriate to assure employees some degree of compensation for
their investments in the corporation.
D. Externality Analysis: Whether a Legal Solution Is Needed to Protect
Employees' Reliance on Implicit Contracts
Corporations may not have an incentive to mitigate the consequences of
worker displacement becanse they can impose on employees the costs of restruc-
turing without legal sanction. In other words, the quest to maximize profits may
lead corporations blindly to forgo devoting earnings to severance benefits. 231
Thus, an externality exists. As Professor Coffee explains: "The implicit con-
tract perspective leads directly to a recognition that shareholder wealth and so-
cial wealth do not necessarily coincide. '232 Professor Coffee adds the following
observation: "[E]ven if there is no net social loss, any wealth transfer is proba-
bly in an anti-egalitarian direction because employees are losing as shareholders
gain."
2 33
To demonstrate that an externality exists, however, does not complete the
inquiry. It is necessary to analyze whether the factors for eradicating an exter-
nality are present. Commentators explain that five factors must be met before a
legal reply is merited. 234 First, one party's conduct must have an impact on
others who have no ability to control this behavior. 235 As the previous discus-
sion reveals, even unionized employees do not have sufficient bargaining power
to prevent corporations from imposing on them the social costs of layoffs and
plant closings. 236 Second, these social costs must affect the actions of the party
that bears these costs. Displaced workers may suffer severe consequences from
long periods of unemployment.2 37 In addition, opportunistic breaches of im-
plicit employment contracts lower employee morale, productivity, and 1oy-
DuKE L.L 92, 147 (1989) ("[Managers'] self-interested behavior... provokes restructurings in the
first place."); Brudney, Comment, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS, supra note 153, at 152-53
(favors compensating lower-level employees, but finds it "hard, therefore, to see the case for equity
requiring a protective adjustment in management's status at takeover time").
229. Macey, supra note 19, at 185.
230. Id. at 179-80.
231. Singer, supra note 10, at 716.
232. Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 8, at 447 ("This may seem an unexciting conclusion,
except for the fact that it has not been seriously considered by financial economists.").
233. Id. at 448 (If the poor value a dollar more, then such transfers involve negative social
utility.).
234. Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 118, at 723-26.
235. Id. at 723-24.
236. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
1222 [Vol. 69
DUTY TO DISPLACED WORKERS
alty.2 38 Third, the injured party must desire a correction of the other party's
behavior. Workers desire protection from opportunistic breach of implicit em-
ployment contracts because market forces are particularly unlikely to be suffi-
cient to enforce the severance payment term of implicit contracts if the employee
is leaving a regional labor market.239 Fourth, a legal response is not appropriate
if the legislature has a bias toward any of the actors.24° Finally, the social costs
controlled must be greater than the costs of a public law solution.241
Part IV of this Article evaluates these last two factors. At this point, how-
ever, it is instructive to review how courts and legislatures have responded to the
social costs produced by corporate restructuring by allowing directors to con-
sider the interests of nonshareholder constituents.
II. CORPORATE LAW'S RESPONSE TO CONCERN FOR
STAKEHOLDERS' INTERESTS
A. Courts Construe the Directors' Responsibility to Nonshareholder
Constituents in Takeover Context
Applying the business judgment rule, courts provide directors with a great
deal of leeway in making decisions that increase corporate profits. In general,
courts have not penalized directors for pursuing social objectives that they rea-
sonably believe will enhance shareholders' wealth in the long run.242 There is
no long-run, however, for the shareholders who want to earn a premium on their
investments in a takeover.243 When takeovers threaten to impose social harm,
the interests of nonshareholder constituents may conflict with those of the share-
holders. 244 Thus, the issue arises whether the directors' duty to the shareholders
takes precedence over a duty to the other stakeholders in the corporation. An
overview of several takeover cases reveals that courts face an inherent tension in
their efforts to reshape the business judgment rule to protect shareholders from
directorial self-interest while at the same time attempting to shield non-
shareholder constituents from the consequences of takeovers.
238. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
239. Singer, supra note 10, at 791. (Even if employees prefer higher short-term wages over sever-
ance benefits, some commentators have argued the law should imply a property right in the employ-
ment contract because unemployment imposes costs upon the state.).
240. Haddock, McChesney & Macey, supra note 118, at 723 n.57 ("If the actors in the legal
system, such as the legislature, are themselves self-interested, these five conditions, while still neces-
sary, will not be sufficient to assure the desirability of legal intervention.").
241. Id. at 725-26.
242. The courts have not had much opportunity to discuss this issue. Courts, however, have
allowed directors to make charitable contributions because such actions increase the shareholders'
wealth in the long run. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed,
346 U.S. 861 (1953) (recognizing corporations have social responsibilities). But see Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("lIt is not within the lawful powers of a
board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit
of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others .... ").
243. See, eg., Davis, Epilogue, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 493, 519-20 ("[lit becomes harder to rational-
ize benefits for stakeholders on the basis of the corporation's long-term self-interest if its corporate
existence is about to end.").
244. See, e.g., Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Individual and Legislative Notions of Target
Management Conduct, 14 J. CoRP. L. 35, 46 (1988).
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When courts first confronted the takeover setting, they applied the business
judgment rule to directors' decisions to employ defensive tactics in the same
manner that they applied the rule to ordinary business transactions.24 5 As take-
overs continued, however, the courts eventually modified the business judgment
rule in response to the possibility that directors would employ defensive strate-
gies to save their jobs. Recognizing that takeovers empower shareholders to
discipline inefficient management, courts in some cases refused to grant the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule to permit market forces to operate freely.
For example, in 1984, in Norlin v. Rooney Pace, Incorporated,246 the Sec-
ond Circuit perceived its role as ensuring that the "owners" of the corporation
have a fundamental right to make "decisions affecting [the] corporation's ulti-
mate destiny." 247 The target directors in Norlin responded to a takeover by
transferring stock to a newly-created ESOP to enable them to retain control of
the corporation. The Second Circuit found that in establishing the ESOP, the
directors were not seeking "to benefit the employees, but rather to solidify man-
agement's control of the company." 248 The Norlin court acknowledged that di-
rectors should consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents, but focused
primarily on restraining directors from acting in their self-interest to prevent
shareholders from earning a takeover premium.249
As the takeover era proceeded, judges continued to mold the business judg-
ment rule to fit the special circumstances involved in hostile battles for control.
In Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Company,250 the Delaware Supreme
Court enhanced the business judgment rule as applied to defensive tactics by
placing the burden on directors to show that the takeover threatened corporate
policy and that the defensive response was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed." 25 1 In dicta, the Unocal court noted that directors appraising a takeover
bid should gauge "the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally).
'252
245. See e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying
business judgment rule to hold that directors did not breach their fiduciary duty in bringing an
antitrust suit against a would-be acquiror); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980)
(no error in requiring plaintiff to prove that directors' primary purpose for a course of action is to
retain control), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984)
(plaintiffs failed to plead facts supporting claim that directors rejected takeover proposal solely to
retain control).
246. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
247. Id. at 258; see also Hanson Trust PLC v. MC SCM Corp., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 1986)
(enjoining a lock-up option).
248. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 265.
249. Johnson, Who Are They For?, supra note 11, at 800.
250. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
251. Id. at 955.
252. Id. (citing Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilitles: An
Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403 (1985)). Other courts have noted that a board should consider non-
shareholder interests. See, eg., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1972) ("[A]
corporation publishing a newspaper ... certainly has other obligations besides the making of a
profit," including "those people who make its daily publication possible."); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston
Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 850 (D. Minn. 1986) (directors may consider employees in decisionmak-
ing process); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (defensive mea-
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This dicta provided the basis for the court's subsequent discussion in Rev-
lon, Incorporated v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Incorporated.25 3 of the ex-
tent to which directors can assess the consequences of a takeover on
nonshareholder constituents. Revlon involved an attempt by the Revlon board
to thwart a hostile bid by granting a lock-up option to a white knight in return
for certain assurances designed to pacify the corporation's noteholders. The di-
rectors defended this action by contending that Unocal permitted due regard for
other corporate constituents. The Revlon court qualified its previous statement
in Unocal by stating that the board could evaluate the concerns of nonsharehold-
ers "provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockhold-
ers." 254 In turning to the lock-up provision, however, the supreme court held
that once a "break-up of the company [is] inevitable," the duty of the board is to
maximize the return to shareholders. 25 5 Thus, the Revlon directors no longer
could weigh the effect of the takeover on nonshareholders once they put the
corporation up for sale. 256 Assuming that the corporation is not yet on the mar-
ket, the board may consider the impact of its actions on nonshareholder constit-
uencies. 25 7 Thus, the critical issue has become when "the breakup of the
company [is] inevitable," that is, when it is in the "Revlon mode."
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed this issue in Paramount Communi-
cations, Incorporated v. Time, Incorporated.258 After Time had agreed to merge
with Warner, Paramount stepped in with a bid for Time. In response, Time and
Warner restructured their deal to prevent the takeover. The issue arose whether
Time's original agreement with Warner triggered Revlon duties. The Delaware
Supreme Court held that Time did not place itself on the auction block when it
decided to maintain its long-term strategic policies of entering the global en-
tertainiment market. 25 9 Paramount reaffirmed the view that directors have no
duty to maximize the shareholders' short-term value and that directors may take
into account the interests of other constituents in making decisions in the corpo-
ration's best interest.2 6° Significantly, the lower court opinion emphasized that
Time had agreed to the merger because Warner was compatible with the "Time
sure may provide stability to employment relationship); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,401 (Del. 1989) (board may consider impact
on constituencies other than stockholders); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d
1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1987) (same). Other courts have rejected this approach, stating that the other
constituents can gain protection through contract. See, eg., Kirscher Bros. Oil, Inc. v. Natomas
Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 784, 796-97, 229 Cal. Rptr. 899, 906-08 (1986) (no fiduciary duty to preferred
stockholders to restructure merger); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94
(Del. Ch. 1986) (duty to preferred shareholders contractual); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d
873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (relationship between debtholders, even those holding convertible securi-
ties, is contractual).
253. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
254. Id. at 182.
255. Id.
256. Id. ("[Cloncern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among ac-
tive bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise
but to sell it to the highest bidder.").
257. Lipton, Corporate Governance, supra note 11, at 40-41.
258. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
259. Id. at 1151.
260. Id. at 1153; see Hansen, Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes: Analysis of the Law, in
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culture." That is, the directors did not see the "mission of the firm... as wholly
economic. ' 261 Recognizing the importance of Time's sense of social responsibil-
ity to its employees, the Delaware Chancery Court noted: "Many people com-
mit a huge portion of their lives to a single large-scale business organization.
They derive their identity in part from that organization and feel that they con-
tribute to the identity of the firm."
262
Other courts specifically have acknowledged the special concerns of em-
ployees in takeover transactions. For example, in GAF Corporation v. Union
Carbide Corporation,263 a federal court applying New York law declared that
the "protection of loyal employees, including managers, of the organization is
not anathema in the Courthouse." 2 64 More specifically, the court asserted:
A corporation with a perceived threat of dismemberment of large divi-
sions of the enterprise, employing thousands of employees, owes sub-
stantial regard for their pension benefits, and in the case of loyal
management, severance benefits. These legitimate concerns for the
past conduct of the enterprise and its requirements need not be left to
the goodwill of an unfriendly acquirer of corporate control in the jun-
gle warfare involving attempted takeovers. The exercise of independ-
ent, honest business judgment ... is the traditional and appropriate
way to deal fairly and even-handedly with both the protection of inves-
tors, on the one hand, and the legitimate concerns and interests of em-
ployees and management of a corporation who service the interests of
investors, on the other.
265
So -far, the courts have not compelled directors to take action to assist
them.266 Recently, the American Law Institute proposed a principle of corpo-
rate governance that would permit directors to prevent a takeover so long as
they did not "materially disfavor the long-term interests of the shareholders.
'267
Thus, the ALI proposal takes a step further than the case law by authorizing
directors to safeguard the stakeholders' interests to such an extent that the
10TH ANNUAL RAY GARNETT JR. CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW INSTITUTE 14-15 (1990)
[hereinafter SECURITIES LAW INSTITUTE].
261. In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
94,514, at 93,269 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
262. Id. (The directors took into account Time's "larger role.., in society.").
263. 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
264. Id. at 1019.
265. Id. at 1019-20. The court seemed to imply that concern for the employees ultimately would
benefit the shareholders, stating that the board's duty was "solely to the welfare of Carbide's inves-
tors and to deal with the interests of Carbide's employees and management fairly, in furtherance of
those interests." Id. at 1019.
266. See, eg., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1282 (6th Cir. 1980) (directors could close plant in spite of effects on community).
267. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02(a), at 122-23 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1990). Section 6.02 of the ALI's
Principles states that a target's board "may take an action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking
an unsolicited tender offer, unless the action would materially disfavor the long-term interests of the
shareholders." Id. At the May 1990 meeting of the ALI, a motion passed to amend the draft to
include the phrase "corporation and its" before "shareholders." In Departure from Corporate Gov-
ernance Draft, ALI Supports Broader Takeover Defense Authority, 5 Corp. Couns. Wkly. (BNA) No.
21, at 8 (May 23, 1990).
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shareholders may lose wealth in the short run. 268 The ALI, like the courts,
however, has failed to articulate an underlying theoretical basis for allowing
such business strategies.2 69 In other words, neither the ALI nor the courts have
explained why shareholders should not be entitled to profit in the short run. The
cases also fail to provide clear guidance as to when directors may support non-
shareholders and the extent to which directors can take nonshareholder needs
into account. 270
In addition to revising the business judgment rule in the takeover context,
the courts recently have modified directors' traditional fiduciarj duties. The
courts have augmented the directors' legal obligations by imposing affirmative
obligations beyond the duty of care.27 1  For example, in Smith v. Van
Gorkom,272 the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors have a special duty
to familiarize themselves with the available information about important busi-
ness decisions. 273 Other cases holding that directors must redeem poison pills
illustrate that directors may breach their fiduciary obligations even when they
act disinterestedly. 274 In this regard, Professor DeMott contends: "[D]irectors
as fiduciaries resemble other types of fiduciaries, like trustees and guardians,
whose positions are conventionally held to impart affirmative obligations."
275
In sum, the takeover context has pushed courts to resolve the inherent ten-
sion between shareholder accountability and stakeholder protection. In settling
this conflict, the courts have favored the shareholders, at least in the long run.
In contrast, a review of the state antitakeover statutes reveals that the legisla-
tures have opted to prefer nonshareholder considerations.
B. States Enact Antitakeover Statutes to Prevent Job Loss
1. Business Combination Statutes
The widespread concern that takeovers cause job loss has prompted most
states to enact some form of antitakeover legislation.276 Because the states ulti-
268. See McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 442-43 (1986)
[hereinafter Bondholders].
269. As Professor Johnson states, "[B]y implicitly seeking to reconcile interests in this manner,
the courts fail to state precisely why shareholders should not be entitled to elect an immediate stock
premium... over longer-run profit for the entity." Johnson, supra note 244, at 52.
270. See, eg., Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in
Takeover Contests, 11 SEc. REG. L.J. 44, 69-70 (1983); Feinberg, The Directors'New Dilemma in
the Takeover Crisis A Special Report, INsT. INv., June 1987, at 30, 46.
271. See DeMott, supra note 7, at 21-22.
272. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
273. Id. at 877-78.
274. DeMott, supra note 7, at 21; see Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 267 (1989).
275. DeMott, supra note 7, at 21.
276. These statutes have produced a large debate over whether the states sought to benefit non-
shareholder constituents or to allow existing management to save their jobs. Some commentators
assert that legislatures sought to protect nonshareholders. See, e.g., Bartlett, Beware of State Take-
over Laws, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 1987, at 182 (legislatures are protecting local businesses against out-
siders); Davis, supra note 243, at 515-17 (shareholders no longer protected by takeover statutes);
Johnson, supra note 244, at 35 (legislatures impose obstacles to takeovers even though such transac-
tions may benefit investors); Johnson & Millon, supra note 65, at 1863 (legislatures oppose takeovers
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mately bear the social and economic costs of takeovers, legislatures have tipped
the balance in favor of local stakeholders rather than nonresident sharehold-
ers.2 77 Specifically, at least one-half of the states have adopted some form of
business combination statute to prevent takeovers that are perceived as causing
layoffs and plant closings.278 For example, the business combination laws of
Delaware279 and New York280 limit a takeover bidder's ability to restructure the
corporation once it gains control. Delaware's statute prevents the bidder from
engaging in certain "business combinations"-that is, transferring the target's
assets to itself or to its affiliates. 281 Delaware's statute, however, does not totally
prevent "bust-up" takeovers as the bidder still can sell the corporation's assets to
others, and then distribute the proceeds to the shareholders. 282 New York's
"anti-bust-up" statute goes further and restricts the acquiror's ability to sell the
corporation's assets for five years after the takeover. 283
Pennsylvania recently passed the most controversial antitakeover provision
to date which requires a "controlling person" to disgorge to the target corpora-
tion any profits made on the sale of stock within eighteen months after becoming
because they result in layoffs); Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes,
87 MICH. L. Rav. 846, 848 (1989) (legislatures pursue objectives inconsistent with shareholder wel-
fare); More StatesAre Telling Raiders: Not Here, You Don't, Bus. Wx., Feb. 13, 1989, at 28 (statutes
designed to repel raiders rather than to protect shareholders). Other commentators contend that
these statutes allow managers to act in their own interests. See, eg., Butler, Corporation.Specfic
Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. Rav. 365, 367 (the
purpose of state antitakeover statutes is to protect management jobs); Macey, National Economy,
supra note 61, at 478 (major national unions voice opposition to state antitakeover statutes); Ro-
mano, supra note 66, at 462 (noting that labor does not lobby for such statutes); Romano, The
Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 137-38 (1987) (same). For additional
commentary on the role of the states in regulating takeovers, see Hazen, StateAnti-TakeoverLegisla.
tion: The Second and Third Generations, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 77 (1988); Langevoort, The
Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers" A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REy. 96 (1987). For an overview of state antitakeover statutes, see
Beasey, Finkelstein & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Com-
parisons, 43 Bus. LAW. 865, 877-81 (1988).
277. See, eg., Johnson & Millon, supra note 65, at 1980 (legislatures act because takeovers cause
plant closings and layoffs). For a discussion of the constitutional concerns raised by these statutes,
see Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (holding Indiana control share
statute constitutional under Williams Act and Commerce Clause); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.) (Wisconsin statute upheld), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
367 (1989); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) (holding tender offeror
seeking order declaring Delaware's Business Combinations statute unconstitutional not likely to pre-
vail on merits of Williams Act or Commerce Clause challenge); Black & Decker Corp. v. American
Standard, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Del. 1988) (Delaware antitakeover law held constitutional).
278. For a list of these statutes, see Garmer & Ryba, State Takeover Statutes--Amanda v. Uni-
versal Foods and its Aftermath, SECURITIES LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 260, at 1, 8 n.10.
279. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); see also Johnson, Corporate Life, supra note
24, at 909 ("Delaware's recent statute alone governs about half of all companies listed with the New
York Stock Exchange.").
280. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (Consol. 1988) (restricting mergers, certain asset sales, or
liquidations for five years after a hostile takeover).
281. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3) (Supp. 1988) (corporations cannot engage in a merger,
liquidation, or sale of assets for three years after acquiring 15% of the stock without board
approval).
282. J. CHOPER, J. COFFEE & C. MORRIS, CORPORATIONS 1097 (3d ed. 1989).
283. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (Consol. 1988). New York's statute bars any substantial sale
of assets or merger for five years after any shareholder acquires 20% of the corporation's stock
without prior board approval.
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a controlling person.2 84 As responses to the problem of job loss, these statutes
are overbroad because they apply to all takeovers, not just those that result in
layoffs and plant closings.
28 5
Few states have tailored their statutes to apply to layoffs resulting from
takeovers. Massachusetts enacted a statute, the first of its kind in the nation,
which provides that any employee terminated within two years after a change in
control is eligible for a lump sum payment from the acquiror equal to twice the
employee's weekly compensation times the number of years of service.286 The
statute, however, does not apply to layoffs and plant closings implemented by
existing management.287
2. Stakeholder Statutes
In response to the perception that takeovers produce job loss, over one-half
of the states have adopted some form of stakeholder statute.288 As noted previ-
284. Controversial Pennsylvania Legislation Would Require Raiders and Others to Disgorge Prof-
its, Corp. Coun. Wkly. (BNA) No. 12, at 7 (March 21, 1990) (applies to the target company's stock
acquired during the 24-month period before becoming a controlling person and the 18-month period
afterward); Armstrong, At Least 67Firms Buck Act 36,9 PHIL. Bus. J. 1 (July 30, 1990) (One-third
of companies covered opt out.).
285. See, eg., Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 8, at 460 ("[T]he problem with statutes such
as New York's is that they confer a de facto veto power. Real and exposed as the interests of
stakeholders are, they do not merit relief this drastic when less restrictive alternatives will suffice.").
286. MAss. GEN. L. Ch. 149 § 183(b) (1988).
287. Note, supra note 11, at 855 ("As long as managements' 'golden parachutes' are golden
enough, Business Corporation laws will do nothing to stop management from selling or closing down
the shop.").
288. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202.A (Supp. 1990); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
313(e)(3) & (4) (West Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-
1602 & 30-1702 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 8.85 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1990); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns 1989); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B.12-210 (4) ( Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:92G(2) (West
Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 716 (West Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (5) (West Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 794-8.30(d) (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347.1(4) (Vernon Supp. 1991); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2035(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); NJ. REV. STAT. § 14A:6-1(2) (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-11-35 (Supp 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1990); 1989 OR. LAWS § 60.357(5); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 511(c) & 1721(c), tit. 42 § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFED LAvs ANN. § 47-33-4
(Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (Supp. 1990);
WYo. STAT. § 17-16-830(e) (Supp. 1989).
Pennsylvania was the first state to pass a stakeholder statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 42 § 8363(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1990). One commentator refers to these statutes as "social justice" statutes. Andre,
A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 533, 574 (1990). The idea for these statutes originated in a charter amendment by Control
Data Corporation. Hanks, supra note 17, at 20. Other corporations also have charter amendments
that allow directors to take such considerations into account. Lipton, Corporate Governance, supra
note 11, at 41 n.188 (McDonald's Corporation). Many corporations adopt the stakeholder model of
management. The purpose of these statutes and charter amendments is not only to make hostile
takeovers more difficult, but also to alleviate concerns about directors' liability. Hanks, Evaluating
Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus.
LAW. 1207,1210 (1988). For additional commentary, see Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corpo-
rate Directors' Responsibilities Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes" The Use of Ex-
plicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1451 (1990); Hart & Degener, Non-Stockholder Constituency
Statutes, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 19, 1990, at 1; Wester, Achieving a Proper Economic Balance: Non-
shareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 STETSON L. REv. 581 (1990); Note, Takeover Dangers and
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ously, most of these statutes are worded broadly to permit directors making
business decisions to consider the interests of employees, suppliers, consumers,
and, in some jurisdictions, the local and national economies. These stakeholder
statutes are permissive; with one exception,2 89 they do not mandate that direc-
tors address the needs of nonshareholder constituencies. 290 So far, the courts
have not examined stakeholder statutes; 291 thus, the extent to which they will
assist stakeholders is uncertain.
The stakeholder statutes create uncertainty in two ways. First, the legisla-
tion does not explain why directors should have responsibilities to various con-
stituents.292 Second, the stakeholder statutes assume that directors must
balance the concerns of a variety of stakeholders, but fail to provide standards
for assigning relative weights to these interests.
293
By enacting the stakeholder statutes, state legislatures appear to be di-
recting judges to develop the common law of directorial fiduciary duties.
294
Commentators are beginning to analyze how these statutes may alter the tradi-
tional notion that a director's primary fiduciary duty is to maximize shareholder
wealth. 295 The uncertainty surrounding these statutes has given rise to active
debate. 29 6
Nonshareholders Who Should Be Our Brother's Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 301; Note,
Stakeholder Versus Stockholder. The Director's Proper Constituency in a Contest for Corporate Con-
trol, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. Rxv. 475 (1989).
289. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1990). The United Kingdom has a sys-
tem of voluntary regulation for its securities industry, called the City Code, which specifically in-
structs that directors shall consider nonshareholder constituents in the tender offer context. The
board of a U.K. company also has a statutory fiduciary duty to its employees. While these statutes
use the "shall" formulation, employees do not have the right to enforce the duty. See generally
Karmel, The Duty of Directors to Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Control Transactions--A Com-
parison of U.S. and U.K Law, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 61, 61 (1990) (matter of business judg-
ment of directors); see also DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons From the
British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 968 (1983); Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regula-
tion of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 734 (1984). The European community has
proposed a corporate statute that requires the board to carry out its function "having regard in
particular to the interests of the shareholders and the employees." COMMISsION OF THE
EUOROPEAN COMMUNITIES BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, STATUTE FOR A EURO-
PEAN COMPANY, Art. 74(2) (Supp. Mar. 1989). Germany once had a stakeholder statute, but it was
not successful. Conard, Reflections on the Public Interest Director, 75 MICH. L. REv. 941, 948 n.33
(1977).
290. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 289, at 68 ("[G]iving directors the right to consider non-
shareholder constituencies is different from imposing upon them the obligation to do so.").
291. See Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (noting
propriety of board's consideration of nonshareholders, such as employees, customers, and the com-
munity, but not analyzing the impact of statutes in any detail).
292. See, eg., Donaldson, Corporate Takeovers The Moral Backdrop, in ETHICS supra note 24,
at 3, 7; Macey, supra note 19, at 178 (Courts "have failed to articulate a theoretical basis" for taking
into account nonshareholder constituents.).
293. See eg., Donaldson, supra note 292, at 9; Hanks, supra note 17, at 21; Karmel, supra note
289, at 70.
294. See, e.g., Hart & Padegs, Legacy of Junk Bond, LBO Era, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 15,
20, col. 3; McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP L. 205, 222 (1988).
295. Hanks, supra note 17, at 22 (Stakeholder statutes are "[o]ne of the most remarkable but
least remarked developments in corporation law in many years.").
296. "Other Constituency" Statutes: Necessary or Misguided?, Corp. Coun. Wkly. (BNA) No.
22, at 8 (May 30, 1990) (calling nonshareholder constituency statutes "anti-theft" statutes and rais-
ing the debate of who is stealing from whom); see also Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?,
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Certain commentators favor a narrow approach, contending that the courts
should give stakeholder statutes little effect by merely interpreting them in ac-
cordance with existing case law.2 9 7 These commentators assert that, absent ex-
plicit authorization to disregard the shareholders' interests, the stakeholder
statutes only permit directors to aid nonshareholder constituents for the purpose
of increasing the shareholders' wealth in the long run. 298 Thus, according to
this view, the statutes should not be construed in derogation of the common law.
Another principle of statutory construction, however, suggests that legisla-
tures would not have passed the stakeholder statutes merely to codify existing
case law.2 9 9 Rather, these commentators assert that the statutory recognition of
stakeholders' interests reshapes the business judgment rule to bestow upon direc-
tors more leeway to make decisions. In this regard, a few stakeholder statutes
explicitly provide that courts should scrutinize directorial decisions to defend
hostile takeovers to the same degree they would defend ordinary business deci-
sions.3° ° With such judicial deference, the stakeholder statutes could allow di-
rectors to "just say no" to attractive takeover bids.30 1 In addition, these statutes
may lessen the threat of shareholder derivative suits for waste based on manage-
rial conduct that does not maximize shareholder wealth in the short run.
30 2
In contrast to these views, some commentators interpret the stakeholder
statutes as profoundly altering the basic foundations of corporate law. Under
these statutes, the courts may allow directors to disregard the notion of share-
holder wealth maximization in certain instances and to recognize that other con-
stituents have legitimate claims against the corporation.30 3 According to this
59 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 385 (1990) ("The question [of stakeholder statutes] has been an important
subject of debate among American corporate lawyers for at least fifty years."); Solomon, Humanistic
Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Constituency Debate, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 321, 321 (1990)
("Concern over the corporate role and whether corporate decision-makers should consider the inter-
ests of'stakeholders' other than the shareholders" is continuing.); Sommer, Other Constituency Stat-
utes" "A New Form of Welfarism?, ", I1 Bus. LAW. UPDATE 1 (1990) (recognizing that about half of
the states have adopted stakeholder statutes while others continue to grapple with constituency is-
sues); Wallman, Corporate Constituency Statutes Placing the Corporation's Interests First, 11 Bus.
LAW. UPDATE 1, 2 (1990) (citing selected benefits and objections to stakeholder statutes fueling
continued debate).
297. See A.B.A. Comm. on Corp. Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes Potential for Confusion,
45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2254 (1990). But see Hansen, Non-shareholders Constituency Statute: Analysis
of Law, in SECURITIES LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 260, at 18 (courts should read "some relation-
ship to the interests of the shareholders" into the statutes).
298. Hansen, SECURITEs LAW INSTITUE, supra note 260, at 13, 19-20.
299. McDaniel, The Promise and Potential of Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes, in SECURI-
TIES LAW INSTITuTE, supra note 260, at I1 n.17 ('[Stakeholder] statutes should be liberally con-
strued to accomplish their remedial purpose.").
300. See, ag., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (Burns 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(B)-(C), (E)(1)-(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
301. See, eg., Andre, supra note 288, at 576 ("[lt is clear that these statutes potentially provide
directors a far more secure shelter in rejecting tender offers than the case law curTently bestows.");
Franklin, Legislative Toss-up: Effect on 'Stakeholders' Is Factor to Consider in Takeovers, N.Y.L.J.,
July 6, 1989, at 5, col. 3; Klein & Greenbaum, Takeover Law: Many Pa. Companies Opt Out, Nat'l.
L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 15, 22, cols. 3-4; cf. Sparks, "Constituencies" and the Auction for Control, 3
Corp. Coun. Wkly. (BNA) No. 11, at 8 (March 16, 1988) (rejecting the precept that any beneficial
outcome could flow from stakeholder statutes).
302. Ryan, supra note 9, at 61 n.202.
303. See, eg., Hanks, supra note 17, at 21 ("TIhe real purpose of non-stockholder constituency
statutes must be to enable directors to provide benefits to non-stockholder groups even when doing
1991] 1231
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
view, the statutes revise the directors' historical fiduciary duties to encompass
fiduciary obligations to other corporate constituents. 304 One commentator
notes: "By blurring the distinction between the corporation's commercial and
fiduciary relationships, constituency statutes represent a significant change in
the basic ground rules."'305 These statutes may symbolize a transition period in
which corporate law will identify the corporation's purpose as serving its various
constituents in a more balanced fashion.30 6 Hence, these statutes suggest a new
definition of the corporation's role.
30 7
Viewed in this light, the stakeholder statutes have the potential for provid-
ing the most important source of relief for workers who must adjust to the per-
manent loss of their jobs in an era of rapid economic change.308 During
previous restructuring periods, corporations have implemented layoffs and
closed plants without prompting shifts in the focus of concern from shareholders
to stakeholders.3°)9 Traditionally, courts have refused to recognize employees'
noncontractual expectations, insisting that they lacked legal precedent to create
a remedy for displaced workers.3 10 These courts steadfastly adhered to the prin-
ciple of a representative democracy in which the legislature decides controversial
policy matters.31 1 The stakeholder statutes, however, provide courts with the
inherent legitimacy of legislative approval by explicitly acknowledging non-
shareholder interests in the corporation. The stakeholder statutes signify a
broad social consensus to acknowledge the noncontractual expectations of vari-
ous nonshareholder constituents. 3 12 With the widespread concern over the eco-
nomic consequences of capital mobility, social conditions may be changing so
that the courts may use stakeholder statutes as a basis for judicial intervention to
ameliorate the impact of corporate restructuring.
3 13
so would not benefit the stockholders."); Johnson & Millon, supra note 65, at 1907 ("State law that
successfully restricts their opportunity to receive tender offers in order to further other policy objec-
tives-specifically the protection of various nonshareholder interests-represents a profound depar-
ture from the orthodox principle of shareholder primacy as the principal focus of corporation law
304. Hanks, supra note 288, at 1228-29; Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the
Corporation a Paradigm for Directors?, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 677, 695 (1988); Macey, National Econ-
omy, supra note 61, at 469, 482.
305. Mahoney, New Laws Place Directors in Untenable Position, Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1988, at 26.
306. Millon, Redefining Corporation Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 225 (1991).
307. Id.
308. Professor Karmel states:
The support which organized labor has given to the stakeholder statutes suggests that the
power directors have been given to consider the interests of employees in responding to a
takeover could be transformed into a duty. Such a duty may be presaged in the Massachu-
setts stakeholder statute which imposes on tender offerors the obligation to honor existing
collective bargaining agreements and in addition to give two weeks severance pay per year
of service to any employee who is laid off as the result of a takeover.
Karmel, supra note 289, at 69-70.
309. See, eg., Johnson, Corporate Life, supra note 24, at 905 (Corporate law usually has
"shunned" the issue of effect on nonshareholders, leaving it to other disciplines and institutions to
resolve.).
310. See, eg., Singer, supra note 10, at 620.
311. See id.
312. See Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1979),
313. As Professor Karmel explains:
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The permissive nature of these statutes, however, creates two problems.
First, the stakeholder statutes may function only as a screen for directors be-
cause the statutes fail to reconcile the tension between corporate social responsi-
bility and accountability to shareholders. Instead of following the shareholder
wealth maximization standard, directors may hide behind vague duties to con-
flicting groups to serve their own interests.3 14 Second, the permissive nature of
these statutes loses much in terms of shareholder accountability without gaining
much in terms of protecting nonshareholder constituents. 3 15 These statutes
merely offer employees limited, indirect relief.3 16 Ironically, managers faced
with a hostile takeover contend that they must establish defensive barriers in
order to save jobs. Yet, these same managers resist legislation that would re-
strict their ability to make layoff and plant closing decisions. 317 Even in the
takeover setting, directors may not seek to benefit the employees if the directors
have golden parachutes or can respond with a leveraged buyout.318 Because
The idea that directors can even consider employee interests in a takeover is... novel and
the idea that directors should owe a duty to employees in a takeover is contrary to long
standing legal principles. Nevertheless, the traumatic impact on both labor and the public
of takeovers and restructurings of U.S. businesses in recent years has given rise to at least
the question of what priority employee interests should have when there is a change of
corporate control.
Karmel, supra note 289, at 69; see also Hanks, supra note 17, at 20 ("The interests of social activists
meshed nicely with others' concerns over unsolicited takeovers.").
314. As Professor Berle stated, "[lit is one thing to say that the law must allow for such develop-
ments. It is quite another to grant uncontrolled power to corporate managers in the hope that they
will produce that development." Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees" A Note, 45
HARv. L. Rv. 1365, 1372 (1932). These statutes simply may allow management to defeat a take-
over bid by providing management with an endless supply of excuses. See Davis, supra note 243, at
521 ("[Tlhe end result of the existing state statutes is essentially to leave stakeholder matters to
management's discretion, subject only to judicial review under existing fiduciary principles not par-
ticularly suited for the idiosyncrasies of the task."); Hanks, supra note 17, at 20 ("Any benefit in
increased latitude for board decision-making is more than offset by countervailing costs."); Johnson,
Who Are They For?, supra note 11, at 811 ("[The] chief concern is that defensive measures render
shareholders vulnerable to their own management, thereby nullifying the important governance pro-
tection provided to shareholders by the market for corporate control."); Karmel, supra note 289, at
68 ("The latitude to consider multiple constituencies is likely to become a legal fiction for the erosion
of shareholder rights."); Oesterle, supra note 75, at 139 (fears that managers charged with protecting
other constituencies will defeat takeover bids in their own self-interest); Ribstein, supra note 61, at
150 ("[Tlhere is no more reason to assume that managers would use their entrenchment for the
benefit of the stakeholders than that they would act in the shareholders' interests."); Steinberg, Some
Thoughts on the Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REv. 240, 257 (1984) ("Legislative or
judicial acceptance of the asserted protection of such noninvestor interests without careful scrutiny
would provide a smoke screen masking target managements' actual motives."). But see Conard,
Theses For a Corporate Reformation, 19 U. CALIF. DAVIS L. REv. 259, 295-96 (1986) (proposing
adoption of federal stakeholder statute without judicial intervention because "[tihe self-interest of
executives and powers of shareholders can be counted on to restrain excessive orgies of altruism").
315. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 8, at 126 (gives management "power to consider stakeholders'
interests, but does not make them accountable if the stakeholders believe that their interests are given
too little weight").
316. Johnson, supra note 244, at 39 (State efforts fail to protect nonshareholder constituencies
because "it does not genuinely and completely supplant the traditional focus of that law on the
narrow investor-manager relationship, a task that is much too radical for the present."); Note, supra
note 11, at 855 ("[Fiduciary duty laws do not help employees ... if a corporation's management
either supports a tender offer or closes up shop and moves somewhere else.").
317. Grundfest Challenge, supra note 65, at 423.
318. Butler, supra note 276, at 420 ("Managers who obtain some protection against investor
opportunism through the grant of discretion to resist bids may use the powers so created to appro-
priate quasi-rents from other investors in the firms.").
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these statutes do not mandate that directors consider nonshareholder constitu-
ents, these groups probably do not have standing to enforce these statutes.319
Thus, the "may" formulation may not safeguard the interests of labor in plant
closings. 320
Even if directors were inclined to favor nonshareholder interests, competi-
tive pressures would impede such tendencies. 321 That is, directors have an in-
centive to "hang back" when it comes to corporate social responsibility because
they may not be able to compete if other corporations escape these costs. 322 A
corporation that makes expenditures not mandated by the law to help workers
in plant closings may suffer a decline in its short-term stock prices, causing it to
become a potential takeover target. Indeed, while corporations usually are con-
cerned about their reputations in the community, the current restructuring era
has created a more cost-conscious atmosphere which has eroded basic ethical
business practices.
323
To ensure that corporations compensate displaced workers in layoffs and
plant closings, the current corporate governance scheme must be reformed. Di-
rectors should not be allowed to hide behind the shield of the stakeholder stat-
utes. Instead, directors should owe affirmative obligations to displaced workers
and bear the burden of proving that they have fulfilled their responsibilities. A
legal standard is needed that both shields the shareholders from managerial self-
interest and safeguards the employees' investments from expropriation. 324 Ac-
cordingly, the directors' fiduciary duty to the corporation's employees during
fundamental restructuring events requires formal recognition. Although such a
fiduciary duty would represent a substantial shift in the law, the overview of
recent takeover cases and statutes demonstrates that some precedent exists to
support this obligation.
Before examining specific reform proposals, Part III discusses the norma-
tive question: Should the law require corporations to compensate employees for
their reliance upon implicit contracts? In exploring this issue, it is necessary to
identify the policies and principles justifying such a change in the law.325 Rec-
319. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 289, at 734 ("Possible consideration is certainly not a surro-
gate for participation."); Hansen, supra note 260, at 20.
320. But see Hanks, supra note 288, at 1229-30 (statutes may give constituencies standing to
sue); Hanks, supra note 17, at 25 ("It would not be surprising for a court to hold that the board is
obligated to consider the wisdom and propriety of exercising any power available to it."); Newlin &
Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection AcL" A New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate
Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAW 111, 114 (1984) (constituencies may demand they be considered "so
that what was designed as a shield may be a sword as well.").
321. R. POSNER, supra note 216, at 395.
322. See, eg., R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 687 (1986).
323. But cf Dunfee, Professional Business Ethics and Mergers and Acquisitions, in ETHIcs, supra
note 24, at 18 ("Higher levels of ethical behavior should reduce the costs of long-term contracting,
limit the direct losses resulting from opportunistic behavior, and improve productivity through
greater responsibility and commitment.").
324. Cf. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 79 (analogizing federal pension plans to the legal
standard needed to protect shareholders and ensure equitable distributions of wealth); Johnson, Who
Are They For?, supra note 11, at 783 ("Divergence of interests raises the possibility that current
decision-making mechanisms do not equip beleaguered corporations to achieve what is best for
share-holders while also suitably serving the interests of other claimants.").
325. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 91, at 78 ("Should the law take cogni-
1234 [Vol. 69
DUTY TO DISPLACED WORKERS
ognizing a fiduciary duty to the employees challenges one of the basic premises
of corporate law, the maximization of shareholder wealth. Thus, this Article
turns to a discussion of the proper objectives of the corporation.
326
III. EVALUATING THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE: WHETHER THE LAW
SHOULD RECOGNIZE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO PROTECT
EMPLOYEES' RELIANCE ON IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
Academicians and practitioners debate the topic of appropriate corporate
objectives with renewed interest during periods of economic disruption, 327 such
as the 1930s328 and 1970s.329 The current restructuring era also has revived the
discussion Professors Berle and Dodd first explored over fifty years ago.330 The
question of the proper corporate objective involves a political issue, the resolu-
tion of which depends upon one's social outlook.331 In evaluating whether the
law should protect employees' reliance upon implicit contracts, much depends
upon whether one's sympathies lie with the corporation's shareholders or with
its employees. Most nexus-of-contracts theorists tend to favor a free market ap-
proach which allows transactors to allocate the risks associated with corporate
restructuring. Others advocate the corporation's pursuit of social goals such as
accommodating the interests of employees affected by corporate change. These
positions must be examined further in analyzing whether the corporation's
nexus of contracts should be restructured to recognize a fiduciary duty to dis-
placed workers.
zance of an implicit contract between the shareholders and managers of the public corporation,
which may have been disrupted by these developments?"); Singer, supra note 10, at 651 ("What
interests do we want the market to protect? What consequences do we want to foster?").
326. Engel, supra note 312, at 3 (the goal of corporate activity must be articulated clearly in
discussing reform proposals).
327. Buxbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
515, 517-20 (1984); Epstein, Societal Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1287 (1979); Johnson, Corporate Life,
supra note 24, at 874-75.
328. For the exchange between Professors Berle and Dodd, see Berle, Corporate Powers as Pow-
ers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1931); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) [hereinafter Dodd, Managers Are Trustees]; Dodd, Is Effective Enforce-
ment of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935).
329. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANer CORPORATION (1976) (advo-
cating federal chartering system to force corporations to be sensitive to public needs); C. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDs: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR xii (1975) ('Corpora-
tions have long since become, for better or for worse, the most effective 'private' forces to do both
widespread good and widespread harm. For this reason, to solve society's problems is, in no small
measure, to come to grips with the corporation problem."); Conard, supra note 289, at 959-61 (advo-
cating use of public interest directors).
330. See, eg., Davis, supra note 243, at 491 (debate over role of corporate takeovers "has rekin-
dled the 1930s/1960s debates over whether shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of the
corporations' largesse."); Lipton, Corporate Governance, supra note 11, at 4 (Berle and Means dis-
cussed "age of the professional business manager.").
331. See, eg., R. CLARK, supra note 322, at 677; Engel, supra note 312, at I ("[Tihe topic of
corporate social responsibility cannot be debated except against the background of a general political
theory.").
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A. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Approach to Corporate Contracts
Most nexus-of-contracts theorists focus almost exclusively upon the share-
holders' contract with the corporation. According to this free-market perspec-
tive, the shareholders bear the residual risk of corporate activity in return for a
promise that the directors will maximize the value of their investments. 332
Shareholders, however, cannot devise contractual restrictions to prevent mana-
gerial shirking because predicting and resolving the many contingencies that
arise in a long-term relationship is impossible. Due to the difficulty in drafting
such contracts, and because market mechanisms do not work perfectly, corpo-
rate law provides a standardized contract provision that the directors owe share-
holders a fiduciary duty to maximize their wealth.333 Illustrating this view,
Judge Easterbrook maintains that the fiduciary obligation is "a standby or off-
the-rack guess about what parties would agree to if they [had] dickered about
the subject explicitly." 334 Under the fiduciary duty term, shareholders rely
upon the courts to deter directors from engaging in conduct that would breach
the shareholders' contract with the corporation. 335
Freemarket proponents advocate that there is no need to examine the issue
of corporate social responsibility336 because the law should enforce only explicit
contracts between the corporation and its constituents.337 These commentators
assert that employees do not bargain for fiduciary protection because they are
not exposed to the same type of injury as the shareholders. 338 Employees volun-
332. See, ag., Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33; Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1447;
Macey, supra note 19, at 180.
333. See eg., Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Con-
tractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 28 (1990).
334. Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901
(1988). Commentators have developed the contractual view of fiduciary duty from the Coase Theo-
rem, which provides a law and economics analysis for choosing legal rules. Under the Coase Theo-
rem, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain for an efficient outcome regardless of the
legal rule. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). If there are positive
transaction costs, parties may not be able to bargain to achieve an efficient result. In the presence of
these costs, the government, in establishing legal rules, should attempt to approximate the result that
private parties would reach if they could contract without significant transaction costs. See, e.g.,
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest" Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV.
738, 781 (1978) (corporate code promotes both efficiency and fairness by providing standardized
rules). Professor Demott rejects this view of fiduciary duty. Demott, supra note 86, at 885-89 (This
formulation of fiduciary duty is "literally unprecedented in prior Anglo-American caselaw.").
335. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 333, at 29.
336. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1446 ("An approach that emphasizes the
contractual nature of a corporation removes from the field of interesting questions one that has
plagued many writers: What is the goal of the corporation?"); Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1273 (1982) (same); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 80, at 311
(issue of corporate social responsibility "seriously misleading ... [because t]he firm is not an
individual").
337. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1447; Macey, supra note 19, at 179;
Ribstein, supra note 61, at 141. Professor Rose responds to this type of argument as follows: "To
put it baldly, the ex ante perspective generally means sticking it to those who fail to protect them-
selves in advance against contingencies that, as it happens, work out badly for them." Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 592 (1988).
338. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1436 (shareholders have more need for
monitoring because they have residual claim); Ribstein, supra note 61, at 173 (fixed claimants are
exposed to a narrower range of harm from shareholders than are shareholders from managers).
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tarily enter into at-will employment arrangements; 339 thus, courts should not
force corporations to provide noncontractual severance payments to displaced
workers.34° Indeed, to imply that term into the labor contract gives the workers
something for which they did not negotiate and forces shareholders to pay twice
for the workers' inefficiency. 34 1 Rather, the risk of displacement is part of free
society and any attempt to minimize it is anticompetitive.
342
By emphasizing that the law should enforce only explicit agreements, this
free market perspective tends to overlook that nonshareholder constituents also
enter into long-term relationships with the corporation. 343 Professor William-
son has recognized that, similar to shareholders, nonshareholder constituents
cannot foresee all the possible circumstances that may arise throughout their
associations with the corporation. 34 4 He acknowledges that their written con-
tracts may be incomplete and occasions for opportunistic conduct may occur.
34 5
Like most nexus-of-contracts theorists, Professor Williamson favors a free mar-
ket approach, asserting that if opportunistic behavior ensues, the parties will
invent a structure to mitigate this threat.346 Professor Williamson argues that
nonshareholder constituents will develop governance mechanisms, such as board
representation, at the beginning of their relationship to alleviate problems that
cannot be addressed specifically in a formal agreement. 347 The most important
factor in determining whether a corporate constituent needs a special govern-
ance structure is the degree to which the group invests in firm-specific assets.
348
Professor Williamson assumes that workers with general purpose skills do not
need such protection because they easily can find employment elsewhere, and
workers with firm-specific skills can unionize to safeguard their investments.
349
Thus, the free market proponents conclude that the law should not ac-
knowledge the implicit contracts of employees by making different assumptions
about the shareholders' and employees' relative abilities to allocate risk contrac-
339. SeA eg., Epstein, supra note 128, at 953.
340. Id. In addressing the possibility that this approach may harm employees, Judge Easter-
brook and Professor Fischel assert: "This is not a reason to treat corporate law as if it ought to care
about these allocations, however;, the risk aversion of managers [and employees] is a regrettable cost
of the corporate form, not a reason to select a rule other than the wealth-maximizing one." Easter-
brook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1441.
341. Scheffman, The Economics and Ethics of Adjusting to a New Competitive Environment:
Mergers and Takeovers, in ETHics, supra note 24, at 107.
342. See, eg., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 75, at 1190 n.83 ("Such behavior is more char-
acteristic of medieval guilds than of free markets.").
343. See Bratton, CriticalAppraisal, supra note 78, at 417; Williamson, supra note 106, at 1201.
344. Williamson, supra note 106, at 1201.
345. Id. at 1202 (contract may "drift out of alignment" due to informational disparities).
346. Id.; Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 78, at 449 (Thus, some recognize relational con-
tingency yet at the same time "strain to leave the individual dominant.").
347. Williamson, supra note 106, at 1197.
348. Id. at 1202.
349. Id. at 1207. Professor Williamson states: "Such workers can quit and be replaced without
productive loss to either worker or firm." Id. Generally, Professor Williamson favors severance
payments to safeguard workers' firm-specific investments and to ease transitional costs. Id. at 1217.
He recognizes that his approach ignores transitional costs: "Unemployment insurance may provide
a necessary buffer. We may want to create some barriers to deter termination without cause and
reduce transition costs." Id. at 1208 n.31.
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tually. 3 50 These assumptions state political propositions that reveal a great deal
about the free market proponents' social vision of the corporation's role in soci-
ety. 351 The free market approach draws a sharp line between the business affairs
of the corporation and the public concerns of the state.352 In other words, the
corporation should operate in an atmosphere that stresses the individual's free-
dom to transact in pursuit of self-interest. 35 3 Free market proponents share
Holmes's bad man perception of the law354 with respect to legal rules that re-
strict people's ability to contract; that is, legal rules should only establish nega-
tive duties not to harm others.35
5
Although these nexus-of-contracts scholars acknowledge that the firm is a
bundle of implicit and explicit contractual associations, they continue to main-
tain that the corporation owes an exclusive fiduciary duty to maximize the
shareholders' wealth because shareholders are the sole residual risk-bearers.
35 6
Employees, however, also bear a great deal of firm-specific risk. If the firm con-
sists of mutually dependent alliances among corporate constituencies, why is
shareholder wealth maximization the only goal?357 Moreover, the traditional
contractual solution fails to protect the employees against the consequences of
corporate restructuring. Accordingly, the free market analysis raises the ques-
tion why fiduciary duties are cost-beneficial only as to stockholders. 3 8 As cor-
porations seek to compete internationally, the notion of the employees' implicit
contracts becomes significant because firms may rearrange their relationships in
a more efficient manner if the law imposes a legal duty to compensate workers
for their investments in the corporation.
35 9
350. These commentators have great faith that the market eventually will adjust to alleviate the
harsh consequences that corporate restructuring produces for nonshareholder constituencies. Pro-
fessor Macey states:
[Tmhe contracting process that creates a corporation is capable of addressing the difficulties
raised by the prospect of fundamental corporate change. The theory of the firm implies
that the various participants in a corporate enterprise will trade rights and obligation
among themselves, taking account of their respective skills and abilities as well as the cor-
poration's needs.
Macey, supra note 19, at 181.
351. Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 78, at 419.
352. Singer, supra note 10, at 633.
353. Epstein, supra note 128, at 955.
354. The commentators in the Critical Legal Studies Movement have characterized this position
as a kind of "alienated individualism." See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudica-
tion, 89 HARV. L. R~v. 1685, 1745 (1976) (rules abandon people to the wiles of the bad and mean
spirited).
355. Singer, supra note 10, at 634.
356. M. AoKI, supra note 18, at 10-I1; Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 12.
357. As Professor Aoki questions, if the firm is viewed "as a sort of coalition of financial as well
as human resource-holders, can there be such a thing as the single, well-defined objective of the
firm?" M. AomI, supra note 18, at 11.
358. Bratton, supra note 228, at 145.
359. M. Aoiu, supra note 18, at 5 (questions whether "extra gain can be generated by shifting
risk among constituents of the firm").
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B. The Social Relations Approach to Corporate Contracts
1. Arguments in Favor of Protecting Displaced Workers
The social relations approach provides the basis for a very different view of
the employees' contracts with the corporation.360 While some commentators
praise Professor Williamson for bringing a relational outlook to corporate con-
tracts, others criticize his theory for excluding from its analysis elements such as
power imbalances, political struggles, and cultural influences.36 1 [n contrast to
the free market perspective, the social relations model has a broad philosophy
that encompasses these noneconomic factors. 362 Shifting the spotlight away
from the shareholder wealth maximization issue, this method concentrates upon
the nature of the associations that have evolved. 363 Under this approach, obliga-
tions grow out of mutual respect and confidence that long-term commitments
require parties to maintain. The social relations view leaves room to evaluate
the employees' dependence upon the corporation that develops through implicit
dontracts. In this light, it is possible to assess whether a corporation should owe
its employees a fiduciary duty to protect their investments during corporate
restructurings.
Historically, the employment-at-will doctrine has governed the relation-
ships between employer and employee. 364 Contrary to the free market propo-
nents, Professor Summers argues that the at-will doctrine has no basis in
contract law because the courts fail to determine what the parties intended.
365
He asserts that an employee would not want to enter into an at-will arrangement
because it leaves the employee at the mercy of the employer. 366 To a limited
extent, labor law is moving away from the employment-at-will philosophy.36
7
In a few cases, the courts have used tort and contract doctrines to find that
360. Prior corporate law literature offered no basis for informed and critical evaluation of the
social relations view of contract. Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 78, at 447; Linzer, supra
note 179, at 403.
361. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 570, 575 n.27 (these elements of contractual relations perspective espoused
by Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil).
362. See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRAC-
TUAL RELATIONS 10-35, 84-90 (1980); Macneil, Values in Contract" Internal and External, 78 Nw.
U.L. REV. 340, 361-66 (1983). Thus, this relational approach to corporate contracts is just as polit-
ical as the free-market view. As Professor Bratton states, "[e]nhanced relational sensitivity in corpo-
rate law would not make these normative decisions easier. It would introduce no formulaic solutions
for general acceptance and application.... [It] would permit a range of theoretical conceptions of
firms... to bear on the contracting behavior of particular 1arties." Bratton, Critical Appraisal,
supra note 78, at 432.
363. Singer, supra note 10, at 652-63.
364. This rule first was enunciated without any judicial support by H.G. Wood in MASTER AND
SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). He rejected the English doctrine that implied the employment term
was for a year.
365. Summers, supra note 179, at 1099. But see Epstein, supra note 128, at 954. (IThe contract
at will is sought by both persons." (citing Payne v. Western & Al. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884),
overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915))).
366. Summers, supra note 179, at 1108.
367. See, ag., Beermarm & Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Prop-
erty in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REv. 911, 946-56 (1989); Blades, supra note 133; Linzer, supra note 179;
Minda & Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1137,
1167 n.106 (1989); Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the
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employees' job rights are safe from arbitrary or unreasonable termination.
36 8
Some commentators believe that the courts should acknowledge that the con-
tract of employment includes a right of future employment based upon the em-
ployees' reasonable expectations.
36 9
Related to the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, some commenta-
tors advocate that workers who invest physical and human capital in an enter-
prise should have property rights in their jobs.3 70 So far, these arguments have
not met with much success in court.37 1 For example, in Local 1330, United
States Workers v. United States Steel Corporation,372 the Sixth Circuit Court
considered whether property law principles could be extended to protect em-
ployees' reliance interests in their jobs. United States Steel had operated two
steel plants in Youngstown, Ohio for over seventy years. When the plants be-
came obsolete, U.S. Steel proposed to demolish them. In an effort to save its
members' jobs and their community, the union attempted to purchase the plants
from U.S. Steel. The corporation refused to negotiate with the workers in an
attempt to avoid competition; the union brought suit to force U.S. Steel to sell
the plants. The question arose whether a property right had evolved from the
community's long-term reliance upon the continued operation of the plants.
Although the court was sympathetic to the workers' plight, it ultimately decided
that there was no precedent to create such a property right. The court explained
that it lacked the authority to modify state property law to conform to the dic-
Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 329-32 (1982); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10-13 (1979).
368. See, eg., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 103-04, 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1255-56 (1977) (employee fired before earning commission); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551-52 (1974) (employee fired for refusing to date supervisor); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270,273-76 (W. Va. 1978) (employee fired for whistle blowing). But see
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 671-82, 765 P.2d 373, 380-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
218-27 (1988) (refusal to broaden exceptions for lack of good cause for termination).
369. See, eg., Summers, supra note 179, at 1099.
370. See, e-g., Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An
Essay on the New Properly, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457, 475-83 (1979); Hermann & Sor, Property Rights In
One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employment at Will, 24 ARiz. L. REV. 763, 816 (1982); Linzer,
supra note 179, at 329; Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv.
1081, 1108-10 (1973).
371. See, eg., Hass v. Darigold Dairy Prods. Co., 751 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1985); Cooper v.
General Motors Corp., 651 F.2d 249, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1981); Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Com-
munications Union, Local 6, 628 F.2d 156, 159-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-
Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); Vaughn v.
Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143, 144 (1974). But see Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1961), aff'd, 327 F.2d 949, 952 (1964) (in construing labor-management contract, pension rights
"earned" and vested even though explicit time in contract not satisfied). For commentary on Zda-
nok, see Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1532, 1542-54 (1962); Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden
Co., 47 MINN. L. REV. 505 (1963); Lowden, Survival of Seniority Rights Under Collective Agree.
ments Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 48 VA. L. REV. 291 (1962). Employees have obtained procedural
protection under the fourteenth amendment before their jobs can be terminated under the "new
property" theory. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 592, 601 (1972) (de facto tenure policy created
expectation of continual employment and may constitute sufficient "property" interest to require
hearing before dismissal); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (no past custom of
granting tenure to enable a finding of more than mere desire for continual employment; thus no
procedural due process required). But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) (ordinance
classifying police chief as "permanent employee" not sufficient to create property right under Roth).
372. 631 F.2d 1264, 1279-80 (6th Cir. 1980).
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tates of morality because that change should come from the legislature. 373
Criticizing this case, Professor Singer contends that the court "wrongly de-
fined the issue as a search for the 'owner' of the property. ' 374 Instead, Professor
Singer uses a social relations approach to demonstrate why the court should
have acknowledged the workers' right to purchase the plant from U.S. Steel.
375
He illustrates how a wide range of legal principles supports the notion of em-
ployees' reliance interest in property. 376 To establish this property right, Profes-
sor Singer notes that the fiduciary obligations of the directors of U.S. Steel
would have had to be expanded beyond that of maximizing shareholder
wealth. 37 7 The union argued that U.S. Steel should be forced to sell the plants
to the community because the directors owed the workers an obligation to act in
a socially responsible manner.378 This argument failed because the existing legal
doctrines did not support adequately an expansion of corporate law to include
these factors.379 At the time, Ohio did not have a stakeholder statute.
3 8 0
The idea that employees should have property rights in their jobs and the
literature disparaging the employment-at-will doctrine have developed indepen-
dently of the nexus-of-contracts scholarship. These approaches, however, com-
plement each other and serve as a basis for the stakeholder model of corporate
social responsibility. In contrast to the traditional legal model of the corpora-
tion, under the nexus of contracts view, the question of who owns the corpora-
tion is irrelevant. This approach does not distinguish sharply between the
interests of employees and shareholders.38 1 The social relations perspective of
the corporation's nexus of contracts opens up new possibilities by assessing the
characteristics shared by stockholders and employees in their associations with
the corporation.
Similar to the shareholders, employees cannot place all the terms of their
relationship with the corporation in a written contract because it is too costly.
38 2
In addition, as employees continue to work for a firm, they share in the residual
373. Id. at 1281-82.
374. Singer, supra note 10, at 621. The "new property" approach finds many entitlements
among people not traditionally viewed as owners. See, eg., Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733, 778-86 (1964).
375. Singer, supra note 10, at 699-701; see also Di Norcia, supra note 24, at 251 (restructuring
should balance employee, management, and shareholder interests).
376. Singer, supra note 10, at 663-701. Professor Singer notes:
It matters very little whether the reliance interest in property is conceptualized as a doc-
trine of property law, contracts, torts, trusts, labor law, corporate law, or anything else.
The divisions between these areas of the law exist merely for convenience, and it seems that
rigid categorization hampers analysis.
Id. at 700 n.309.
377. Id. at 711-12.
378. See Local 1330, U.S. Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1279-80 (6th
Cir. 1980).
379. Millspaugh, supra note 18, at 492-93 (discussing how arguments for judicial intervention to
restrain United States Steel were based on cases discussing legislative restraints on business).
380. The case was decided in 1986, two years before Ohio enacted its stakeholder statute. OHIO
Rav. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)(1)-(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
381. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
382. Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 8, at 448.
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risk with the shareholders.383 Risk-averse employees rely upon implicit con-
tracts by which they choose lower wages at the beginning of the association in
return for a degree of job security. 384 Labor increases the value of the corpora-
tion; wages, however, do not compensate fully employees for their work prod-
uct.385 So viewed, employees make an investment in the corporation that can be
measured by the present value of the discounted earnings stream they expect to
receive. 386 Through implicit contracts, an employee builds up a reliance interest
in the firn.387 The longer the employee works for a company, the more the firm
becomes his only means of livelihood. 38  Unlike shareholders who can sell their
shares and hold diversified portfolios, employees are tied to the corporation and
the risk that it assumes. 389 As Professor Summers asserts:
If the corporation is conceived in relatively narrow terms as an operat-
ing institution combining all factors of production to conduct an on-
going business, then the employees who provide the labor are as much
members of that enterprise as the shareholders who provide the capi-
tal. Indeed, the employees may have made a much greater investment
in the enterprise by their years of service, may have much less ability to
withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enterprise
than many of the stockholders. 39°
In this way, workers effectively become partners with the shareholders in the
enterprise. 391 Accordingly, lawful termination of the employment relationship
should not extinguish the employees' rights in the corporation. Shareholders
should still be entitled to the corporations' residual profits; yet, when a plant
closes or employees are laid off, the corporation should compensate the employ-
ees for their investments. 392 This analysis calls for a transfer of an entitlement
from the shareholders to employees which undercuts the concept of shareholder
wealth maximization. 393
383. See, e.g., Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 17 (employees' interests resemble the
residual interests of shareholders, but without the contractual guarantees); Di Norcia, Mergers,
Takeovers, and a Property Ethic, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 109, 115 (1988) (employees bear more risk than
shareholders in transfer of control decisions).
384. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
385. Id.
386. See, eg., Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 17.
387. Stone, Employees as Shareholders Under State Non Shareholder Constituence Statutes, 21
ST'EsoN L. Rlv. (1990) (forthcoming) (implicit contract theory explains common perception that
it is unfair to layoff longtime employees in their senior years).
388. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
389. See Stone, supra note 387, at 18-19.
390. Summers, Codetermination in the United Stater A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4
J. OF COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982); see also A. Chayes, The Modern Corporation
and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 39, 40-41 (Mason ed. 1960);
Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revisited, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 120, 126 (1989) (noting that many
stockholders probably would sell out for a small payment); Stone, supra note 88, at 157.
391. See, e-g., Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Develop.
ments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1484, 1464 n.157 (1984);
Rosen, supra note 33, at 1148.
392. Stockholders continue to occupy a place of prominence, but their interests and desires are
no longer absolutely decisive for the determination of corporate conduct. Buono & Bowditch, supra
note 50, at 130; Johnson, Corporate Life, supra note 24, at 884.
393. Davis, supra note 243, at 518 (The concept of implicit contract is a "useful tool for purposes
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The notion of maximizing the shareholders' return reduces appreciation for
the law by allowing shareholders to profit by imposing social costs upon workers
in layoffs and plant closings. 394 In this regard, the law tends to favor the
wealthy at the expense of the working class. 395 As Professor Dodd stated over
fifty years ago: "[C]apitalism is worth saving but... it can not permanently
survive under modem conditions unless it treats the economic security of the
worker as one of its obligations and is intelligently directed so as to attain that
object."'396 Since the mid 1970s, the problem of plant shutdowns has created
pressure for reform because employees are treated as "mere replaceable parts in
the overall production or service function." 397 Perhaps the situation has become
so severe that courts will begin to protect the worker because he has been
"caught up in a system of industrial relations that transcends the immediate
contracting situation.
'398
Indeed, other countries do not simply accept displaced workers as a cost of
allocating scarce resources.399 The notion of an implicit employment contract
corresponds to the Japanese view of employment in which workers retain their
jobs for life and the corporation is operated primarily for the benefit of the em-
ployees.4°° Many commentators advocate that American corporations would
gain much by adopting some of the Japanese labor philosophy.401 Specifically,
by changing the attitude toward human resources, managers may persuade the
work force to be more cooperative and productive.4° 2 Currently, managers are
of legitimizing the redistribution of value from shareholders to stakeholders against charges of
waste.... Efficiency and distributional considerations are simultaneously satisfied because the redis-
tribution is the result the parties themselves implicitly bargained for.").
394. Professor Conard states:
The doctrine that corporations must maximize shareholder gain works several kinds of
mischief. It diminishes respect for law by erecting an exclusive value system in which few
persons earnestly believe. It is invoked by executives and directors to relieve themselves of
discussing the problems that society as a whole depends on them to solve.
Conard, supra note 314 at 277; Johnson, Corporate Life, supra note 24, at 883 ("I]he assertion that
the interests of capital providers should trump all others in corporate affairs is at once consistent
with and repugnant to our cultural traditions.").
395. Johnson, Corporate Life, supra note 24, at 935 (While corporate law generally has escaped
the critical legal studies movement, the takeover debate may "take on the polarizing overtones of
pitting the privileged against the unprivileged."); Kay & Griffen, supra note 165, at 226-27 (1983)
(Corporate restructurings may cause rank and file workers to "challenge the blatant exploitation
caused by present corporate policies" and by re-examining the tradeoff made in the "negotiated class
struggle.").
396. Dodd, Managers Are Trustees, supra note 328, at 1151. Even Professor Berle speculated
that shareholders "may emerge . . . with a primary property right over residual income, but
subordinated to a number of claims by labor ... which cut down that residue." Berle, supra note
314, at 1371-72.
397. Buono & Bowditch, supra note 50, at 141.
398. Blumrosen, supra note 371, at 529.
399. See, eg., Gould, supra note 194, at 50-54.
400. See, eg., Reich, Labor Law, Reform, and the Japanese Model (Book Reiew), 98 HARv. L.
REV. 697, 705 (1985); Di Norcia, supra note 24; at 245; Sethi & Bhalla, supra note 24, at 210.
401. See, eg., Sethi & Bhalla, supra note 24, at 209.
402. Brudney, supra note 153, at 153 (Coffee "raises complex problems of social psychology and
organization theory that transcend the takeover phenomenon and indeed go beyond privately owned
enterprise-how to stimulate and how to constrain management in order to induce optimal perform-
ance."); see, e.g., Di Norcia, supra note 24, at 251 (Japanese and European experience with labor
relations during intense restructuring is instructive; the workforce is more cooperative if you inform
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beginning to realize that collaboration, and not the traditional adversarial em-
ployer-employee relationship, may lead to more efficient operations. 40 3 While
some corporations are adopting progressive labor policies, the current restruc-
turing era has created competitive pressures that give each firm the incentive to
"hang back," that is, to ignore the workers' interests in order to enhance short-
term stock prices.
It is therefore necessary to recognize a legal duty to compensate displaced
workers in plant closings and layoffs under the stakeholder model of corporate
social responsibility. This model provides the foundation for reconstructing the
corporation's nexus of contracts into a different set of rights and responsibilities
by recognizing that directors have a fiduciary duty to protect displaced work-
ers.404 This duty would represent a substantial change in the law. At this point
it is appropriate to consider arguments against this type of legal obligation.
2. Responses to Arguments Against Compensating Displaced Workers
a. The "Landlord Will Raise the Rent" Argument: Regulation Will
Hurt Those It Is Trying to Help
Opponents of regulation contend that plant closing restrictions ultimately
will harm employees in two respects. First, they maintain that the government
should not interfere with corporate restructuring because, if left alone, the cor-
poration eventually will create more jobs by opening new plants elsewhere. 4° 5
This Article does not dispute that restructuring will result in long-term benefits
for the economy. These new opportunities, however, fail to assure that workers
faced with job displacement are compensated for their investments in the
corporation.
406
Second, free marketers argue that requiring severance payments would be
analogous to a tax on labor. Employers would shift this tax to employees in the
form of lower wages, negating any benefit to the workers from the severance
payments. Professor Kennedy refers to this argument as "the landlord will raise
the rent" argument. 4° 7 The free market proponents assert that regulation will
restrict the workers' ability to choose freely the risks and rewards available in
them about decisions that affect their livelihood.); Sethi & Bhalla, supra note 24, at 210 ("[Ijn spite
of cost-cutting efforts, [U.S. industry] has not succeeded in improving its competitiveness, while
Japan, with its lifetime employment practices, has enhanced its competitive position in the world
market.").
403. See, eg., Karmel, supra note 289, at 173.
404. See, eg., Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, Community, and Heresy, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1051, 1056-57 (1988) ("One significant incident of this vision of corporate
law is to embrace, at least implicitly, the larger social and political repercussions felt in local commu-
nities as capital market forces drive corporate action."). But see Booth, supra note 390, at 125 (The
stakeholder concept ignores the fact that the nexus of contracts approach is based upon the free
market and "jumps to the conclusion that since a firm is a collection of relationships more or less
formal, it should not be so easy for it to be dismantled by unscrupulous corporate raiders who
pander to the greed of fickle shareholders.").
405. See, eg., Hanks, supra note 17, at 23 (stakeholder statutes make equity investment in those
states less attractive, thus harming nonshareholders).
406. See, e.g., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 50.
407. Kennedy, supra note 189, at 604-09.
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the job market.408
For two reasons, however, mandating severance payments is efficient.
First, the employees bargain for this right under their implicit contracts. Sec-
ond, by continuously engaging in opportunistic breach, corporations destroy the
market for implicit employment contracts.4° 9 If this destruction occurs, work-
ers will turn to costly contractual provisions to prevent opportunistic breach by
the corporation.410 These written contracts may be a more costly solution to the
problem than recognizing a fiduciary duty to protect displaced workers.
The extent to which workers would pay for plant closing restrictions
through lower wages depends on the employers' elasticity of response to the
regulation.4 11 The elasticity may be low if the employer does not have a ready
supply of labor.4 12 In addition, requiring protection in the form of severance
payments may provide employees with greater bargaining power at the collec-
tive bargaining table generally so that employers would not be able to lower
wages.
41 3
The workers' failure (or inability) to negotiate for severance payments
causes harm to third parties because unemployment has ripple effects on the
surrounding communities. 4 14 For this reason, one could argue that the law pa-
ternalistically should prevent the employees from giving in to the temptation to
contract away this obligation for higher wages in the short-run.415 This Article
takes the position, however, that workers should be able to opt out of the legal
assistance if the procedural practices surrounding the waiver demonstrate that
the employees fully understand the terms of the contract.
b. The Moral Hazard Argument: Providing Job Security Creates an
Incentive to Shirk
Opponents of plant closing laws suggest that regulation providing employ-
ees with job security creates an incentive to shirk,4 16 and that this so-called
408. See, eg., Macey, supra note 19, at 185.
409. Singer, supra note 10, at 717 & n.350.
410. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 91, at 109 ("[C]hange-of-control sever-
ance compensation is probably less expensive than the risk premium that managers would demand
once the 'old' equilibrium in the executive labor market shifts because the implicit contract has been
breached.").
411. See B. BLUEsTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 184-85 (states lower response by
offering incentives to plants to locate); Folbre, Leighton & Roderick, supra note 37, at 195 (imposing
cost on firm may lower cost to society as a whole); Singer, supra note 10, at 720-21 (Wage response
depends on "elasticity of supply and demand" in labor and product market.).
412. Singer, supra note 10, at 721.
413. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALiF. L. REv. 795, 834 (1983); Singer, supra note 10, at 783;
Stone, supra note 88, at 105.
414. Singer, supra note 10, at 717 n.350.
415. Id.
416. See eg., Macey, supra note 19, at 194 ("Giving workers an incentive scheme that makes
them indifferent to the success or failure of a firm is irrational."); Ribstein, supra note 61, at 146
("The parties must tread a fine line between incentive problems resulting from entrenchment and the
risk of opportunistic firing by the employer."); cf. Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 118,
at 713 ("Long-term guarantees may control the potential for opportunism by one party, but con-
tracts that guarantee the other party's income invite shirking, i.e., opportunism by that party.").
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"moral hazard" problem will increase the probability that the plant will close.
4 17
This argument, however, fails to take into account more progressive theories of
labor management. For example, one theory suggests that managers are more
effective if they create an environment that stresses support and encouragement
rather than constant threats of dismissal.4 18 The current restructuring era has
reduced employee morale, loyalty, and productivity.4 19 Thus, protecting dis-
placed workers may improve management-labor relations overall 420 and lead to
an increase in productivity that will enhance international competitiveness.
42 1
In sum, mandating severance benefits would ensure a more equitable and
efficient transition policy for long-term restructuring. This policy, however, pro-
vides only a general objective. Part IV transforms this notion into conventional
legal terminology for institutional reform.
4 22
IV. PROTECTING DISPLACED WORKERS: THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
APPROACH VERSUS A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
This Part evaluates two very different means to achieve the goal of corpo-
rate social responsibility. The first method seeks internal reform of the corpo-
rate structure by changing the corporation's objectives. 423 This Part analyzes a
proposal to expand the directors' fiduciary duties to protect employees during
fundamental corporate changes. Next, this Part explores the second manner of
corporate reform which applies external measures to regulate corporate activity.
417. See eg., Macey, supra note 19, at 193-94.
418. Buono & Bowditch, supra note 50, at 141; Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1621 (1989) (citing D.
McGREGOR, THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE (1960)).
419. See, eg., Fogg, Takeovers: Last Chance for Self-Restraint, 63 HARV. Bus. REv. 30, 32
(Nov.-Dec. 1985); Drucker, A Crisis of Capitalism, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1986, at 32, col. 3.
420. See, e.g., M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 5 ("[O]pen management-union confrontation.is in-
creasingly regarded as counterproductive."); Fedrau & Balfe, Cooperative Labor-Management
Worker Adjustment Programs, 41 LAn. L.J. 138, 139 (1989) (corporations that sponsor employee
transition programs improve labor relations).
421. See Weber & Taylor, Procedure for Employee Displacement: Advance Notice of Plant Shut-
down, 36 J. Bus. 302, 305 (1963).
422. As Professor Chayes stated over thirty years ago: "It is not always easy to identify such
constituencies, nor is it always clear what institutional forms are appropriate for recognizing their
interests. The effort to answer those questions is among the most meaningful tasks of the American
legal system." A. CHAYES, supra note 390, at 41.
423. For example, many commentators have proposed that corporations should have public in-
terest directors similar to the European system ofcodetermination. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN
& J. SELIGMAN, supra note 329, at 125; Conard, supra note 289; Summers, Codeterminaton in the
United Stater A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155 (1982)
(discussing employee representation on boards); Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Ger-
many, Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability in the United States, 14 HARV. J. LEGIs. 947
(1977) (analyzing Western European codetermination systems);. For additional commentary pro-
posing union representation on the board, see Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European
Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1338, 1348-52
(1984); Comment, An Economic and Legal Analysis of Union Representation on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 919 (1982) (addressing conflicts between union and corporate duties);
Note, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 639 (1981) (same). This approach has never been adopted widely in the United States. Lipton,
Corporate Governance, supra note 11, at 45 (Policy-making at managerial level may transform the
board into a quasi-legislature; this solution is too broad for the problem.).
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When the profit maximization goal fails to produce socially acceptable behavior,
the legislature can install penalties to steer corporations down the desired
path.424 This scheme involves enacting statutes that require specific corporate
actions such as providing advance notice and severance pay.42 5 This analysis
lays the groundwork to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the fiduci-
ary duty approach with legislative solutions.
A. Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Alleviate the Impact of Corporate
Restructuring Upon Labor
In considering whether directors should protect the interests of displaced
workers, it is first necessary to explore basic principles of fiduciary law. This
examination provides a basis upon which to analyze whether doctrinal barriers
prevent a recognition of a fiduciary obligation to employees. This discussion
also lays a foundation for defining the properties of the directors' fiduciary duty
to employees during fundamental corporate changes by exploring the nature of
this fiduciary relationship, the form of appropriate relief for its breach, and the
scope of judicial review.
1. An Overview of the Nature of Fiduciary Obligation
Fiduciary law is a remarkably nebulous doctrine.426 A logical starting
point in clarifying this area is a discussion of when and why fiduciary duties
arise.427 In many cases, no specific instance can be singled out to confirm when
fiduciary duties commence because the relationship often evolves over time.
428
Under traditional and more restrictive interpretations, "a fiduciary is a person
who undertakes to act in the interest of another" 429 or a person who accepts
entrusted property of another.4 30 Contemporary academic analysis, however,
stresses that the law establishes fiduciary duties to defend the weaker party in
various relational circumstances. 43 1 Often, the vulnerable party confers discre-
424. Engel, supra note 312, at 34.
425. Most conservative scholars favor regulation that reinforces profit-maximizing behavior. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1447-48; Macey, supra note 19, at 175.
426. DeMott, supra note 86, at 879 ("Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in
Anglo-American law.").
427. Professor DeMott explains that two questions arise in examining a fiduciary relationship:
"[I1n what circumstances does fiduciary obligation apply?" and "what does the obligation require a
person to do?" Id. at 882. Justice Frankfurter has stated: "Mo say that a man is a fiduciary only
begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations
does he owe as a fiduciary?" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
428. DeMott, supra note 86, at 911.
429. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949). But see DeMott, supra
note 86, at 910-11 (Scott's definition too limited).
430. DeMott, supra, note 86, at 912 (citing J. SHEPHERD, LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 96 (1981)).
431. Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 667,
732 (1984) (notes other commentators go further "defining the fiduciary obligation as the 'exercise of
judgment on behalf of another'" (quoting Jacobson, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepards' Law
of Fiduciaries, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 527 (1982))); DeMott, supra note 86, at 909-10 ("[C]ourts
impose fiduciary constraints whenever one person's discretion ought to be controlled because of
characteristics of that person's relationship with another."); Frankel, supra note 413, at 807 (risk of
abuse of power triggers the application of fiduciary law).
12471991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tionary decisionmaking power upon the stronger fiduciary to use his superior
knowledge on the weaker party's behalf.4 32 Accordingly, in determining
whether a fiduciary relationship exists, courts question whether the association
involves mutual trust and confidence or whether it entails arm's length negotia-
tions.433 Because fiduciary affiliations contain an imbalance of power, possibili-
ties for abuse arise. Consequently, fiduciary law operates to restrict
overreaching in long-term relationships when contract or market mechanisms
are inadequate to deter the more powerful party from engaging in opportunistic
conduct.434 Courts often use the language of moral obligation to support re-
stricting the stronger party on the weaker party's behalf.
435
Courts increasingly respond to changing social conditions by fashioning
new fiduciary relationships. Professor Frankel maintains that "[ihe twentieth
century is witnessing an unprecedented expansion and development of the fidu-
ciary law."' 436 Professor Frankel provides two explanations for this trend: a gen-
eral decrease in legal and social restraints and an overall increase in power from
the specialization of services and the pooling of capital.
4 37
Corporate fiduciary obligations continue to develop,438 with courts finding
that majority stockholders owe fiduciary duties to minority stockholders, 439 and
in close corporations, that stockholders owe fiduciary duties to each other.44°
As previously discussed, courts also have embellished directorial fiduciary re-
432. Professor Anderson explains: "Fiduciaries are typically decisionmakers; their specialized
function is that of recommending or making decisions of a discretionary nature about the manage-
ment or investment of the property of others. Such decisions cannot easily be subjected to detailed
standards or guidelines; instead, they require educated judgment about uncertain, problematical is-
sues." Anderson, supra note 334, at 757; Frankel, supra note 413, at 809 (expressing same point).
433. See, eg., Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 78, at 451 (fiduciary obligation facilitates
mutual trust); DeMott, supra note 86, at 911 (expressing same point).
434. See, eg., Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 11, at 737; Frankel, supra note 413, at 811.
435. See, eg., DeMott, supra note 86, at 891.
436. Frankel, supra note 413, at 796. Professor Frankel goes on to state: "[S]ociety is evolving
into one based predominately on fiduciary relations. The body of law governing fiduciary relations
can affect and be affected by this social trend." Id. at 798; see also A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS & S.
SIEGEL, AGENCY-PARTNERSHIPS 334 (4th ed. 1987). Even more generally, Professor Kennedy ex-
plores how rigid rules give way to change that tends to socialize society. Kennedy, supra note 354,
at 1687. Professor Rose notes in the property area that the law tends to shift from clear entitlements
to ambiguous rules that involve equitable second-guessing. Rose, supra note 337, at 578 (refers to
this occurrence as the substitution of"mud" rules for "crystal" rules); see also Singer, supra note 10,
at 653 ("Many of the legal developments of the twentieth century can be described as recognition of
obligations that emerge over time out of relationships of interdependence.").
437. Frankel, supra note 413, at 802-04.
438. Coffee, supra note 418, at 1621.
439. See, eg., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1977). For an expanded discussion, see R. CLARK, supra note
322, § 11.4, at 488-90; id. § 12.3.5, at 525.
440. See, eg., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-49, 353 N.E.2d 657,
662 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975);
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798, 801 (1981); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 289, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557-58 (1983). For a more detailed discussion, see
H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.30 (3d ed. 1988). Some com-
mentators suggest that a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to creditors. McDaniel, supra note 294,
at 265-312; McDaniel, Bondholders, supra note 268, at 442-50. But see Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d
300, 303 (Del. 1988) (no fiduciary duty to bondholders because creditors are protected by indenture).
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sponsibilities by requiring that directors become well-informed and, in certain
cases, by mandating specific actions such as redeeming poison pills.441 Outside
the corporate setting, courts continually create fiduciary duties in nontraditional
areas. These circumstances involve long-term commercial relationships in
which the weaker party accepts a risk that may lead to opportunism by the more
powerful party.442 For example, in the franchise and distributorship contexts,
courts place fiduciary controls on the more powerful party's freedom to end the
association.443 In some instances, courts have held that fiduciary restraints pre-
vent partners at will from terminating the arrangement. 444
Similarly, but to a more limited extent, in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps 445 the
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook, recognized a fi-
duciary restriction on the ability to end an at-will employment relationship.
446
In Jordan the question arose whether the corporation's entitlement to repur-
chase the stock of an employee upon termination of employment imposed on the
corporation a duty to disclose an impending merger under Rule lOb-5. 447 Spe-
cifically, the issue involved whether the corporation had a fiduciary relationship
with the shareholder/employee when the shareholder status was dependent
upon the continuation of employment. The Seventh Circuit found a duty to
disclose based upon an implied fiduciary duty that the stock would not be
bought back in an opportunistic fashion.448 Thus, Judge Easterbrook implied
that a narrow fiduciary duty arose from the at-will employment arrangement.449
441. DeMott, supra note 7, at 21 ("To this extent, directors as fiduciaries resemble other types of
fiduciaries, like trustees and guardians, whose positions are conventionally held to impart affirmative
obligations to be informed.").
442. For example, courts have held that banks may owe fiduciary duties to its customers. See,
e.g., Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d 927, 262 Cal. Rptr. 260, 278 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 4 1989); Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20-21
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 4 1986). Butsee Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465,477,261 Cal.
Rptr. 735, 740-41 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 1989) (no fiduciary relationship); Victoria Bank & Trust Co.
v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 893, 902 (Tex. App. 1989) (expressing same point).
443. Courts have found a fiduciary duty when a franchisor arbitrarily terminates a franchise
relationship. Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882-84 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446
U.S. 918 (1980); see, eg., General Business Machs. v. National Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS,
664 F. Supp. 1422, 1425-26 (D. Utah 1987) (whether fiduciary relationship exists matter for the
jury); ABA Distribs., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 542 F. Supp. 1272, 1285-86 (W.D. Mo. 1982). But
see Power Motive Corp. v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1048, 1051-52 (D. Colo. 1985)
(criticizing cases finding fiduciary relationship as inconsistent with prior law). See generally Brown,
Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. REv. 650 (1971) (favoring fiduciary restrictions
on franchisor); Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations,
1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 478-95 (1967) (discussing direct limitations on contract terminations); cf De-
Mott, supra note 86, at 887 ("In short, having the right to terminate a relationship does not establish
the absence of fiduciary constraints on transactions connected with the termination.").
444. See, eg., Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 196, 359 P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 646 (1961)
(power to terminate partnership at will, "like any other power held by a fiduciary, must be exercised
in good faith").
445. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
446. Id. at 438.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Coffee, supra note 418, at 1663 n.193. But see DeMott, supra note 86, at 887 ("IT]he em-
ployer's ability in Jordan to terminate the plaintiff's employment and thereby oblige him to sell his
shares to the corporation is irrelevant to the employer's obligation, as fiduciary, to disclose informa-
tion to the selling shareholder.").
1991] 1249
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Judge Posner dissented, contending that a fiduciary obligation to disclose the
merger did not exist because an employee at will could be fired at anytime.450
Jordan and the other commercial cases in which the courts have found fidu-
ciary relationships demonstrate that the dominant party does not always owe
responsibilities to the weaker party. The dependent party, however, does not
necessarily owe corresponding duties to the dominant party.451 Rather, the
courts mold particular obligations to fit the circumstances. 452 These cases also
reveal that fiduciary obligations do not depend upon the parties' agreement, but
are imposed by the law to control overreaching behavior.453
Because courts have found fiduciary duties in commercial contexts, fiduci-
ary principles must be distinguished from the duty of good faith in contracts. 454
The two duties are comparable in that both involve ad hoc, ex post facto, judi-
cial intervention against one-sided, opportunistic performance of contracts. 455
Courts often use the amorphous duty of good faith in cases in which a tradi-
tional fiduciary relationship does not apply;456 but three main differences exist
between them. First, the duty of good faith focuses more on the contract's terms
to protect the parties' from opportunism. In contrast, fiduciary relationships
arise from a broad range of circumstances over the history of the parties' associ-
ation.457 Indeed, fiduciary duties have a tendency toward contract avoid-
ance.458 Second, the duty of good faith involves a lower degree of selflessness
and morality than fiduciary duty.459 That is, the duty of good faith entails a
promise not to destroy the benefits that the other party expects from the con-
tract.460 Thus, the duty of good faith consists of a duty of fair dealing which
requires contracting parties to act in accordance with the accepted customs of
the marketplace. 461 Fiduciaries, however, must place the beneficiaries' interests
450. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 446-47 (Posner, J., dissenting).
451. See, eg., Frankel, supra note 413, at 801 (fiduciary relations are designed to satisfy weaker
parties' needs).
452. Se4 eg., DeMott, supra note 86, at 910; Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDOII
L.J. 69, 73; Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 1-3 (1975).
453. See, eg., DeMott, supra note 86, at 887 (Express agreements do not "control their obliga-
tions to each other as dispositively as it does under a contract analysis."); Frankel, supra note 413, at
820 ("Once a relation is established, ... its classification as fiduciary and its legal consequences are
primarily determined by the law rather than the parties.").
454. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (good faith and fair dealing);
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement."). For an expanded discussion of the duty of good faith in con-
tracts, see Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980); Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 666 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195
(1968). For a more extended discussion of the differences between the duty of good faith and fiduci-
ary duty, see Coffee, supra note 418, at 1653-64; DeMott, supra note 86, at 892-908.
455. Bratton, supra note 228, at 148.
456. Coffee, supra note 418, at 1655.
457. Eisenberg, supra note 198, at 1468.
458. Id.; Bratton, supra note 431, at 736.
459. Bratton, supra note 431, at 738-739.
460. See eg., Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships, supra note 11, at 148.
461. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1990) (Good faith means "honesty in fact and the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.").
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ahead of their own even though the costs exceed the benefits. 462 A fiduciary is
"held to something stricter than the morals of the market-place" and must fol-
low "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive."'463 Overall, the courts im-
pose fiduciary obligations rather than rely upon the duty of good faith when the
harm from opportunism is severe4 " and a stronger deterrent is needed to pre-
vent an abuse of discretion."65 Finally, there is a procedural difference. If the
vulnerable party alleges a breach of fiduciary duty, the fiduciary must demon-
strate that the transaction was fair. In contrast, the party claiming a breach of
the duty of good faith bears the burden of establishing that the other party did
not fulfill the obligation.4 66
Given the lofty obligations of a fiduciary, the question arises whether it is
theoretically possible to have dual or conflicting fiduciary duties.467 Examples
can be found. In the corporate area, courts apply a test of fairness when review-
ing decisions involving the competing interests of majority and minority share-
holders. 468 Outside the corporate context, a general principle of agency law
states that an agent cannot fully serve two principals. 4 9 If, however, the dual
agency is disclosed to both principals, and both agree, an agent can represent
antagonistic interests.4 70 In these cases, the agent must act to protect adverse
parties equally. 471 Similarly, in the trust area, if a trust has two or more benefi-
ciaries, the trustee must deal impartially with all of them.4 72 The fiduciary obli-
gation to act "fairly," "equally," and "impartially" basically requires the
fiduciary to maintain an equitable balance among the various competing
concerns.
4 73
462. Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1128 (1981).
463. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
464. Anderson, supra note 334, at 758 ("mT1he relative costs which [fiduciaries'] cheating may
impose on those whose property they manage are frequently much greater than the relative costs
that can be imposed without detection or remedy in simpler contractual exchanges."); Burton, supra
note 454, at 373 (duty of good faith controls opportunism).
465. Coffee, supra note 418, at 1658 n.177 ("Fiduciary law also has been inherently prophylactic,
while contract law has not.").
466. See, eg., DeMott, supra note 86, at 900.
467. Booth, supra note 390, at 128 ("unwise" to test "notion that a fiduciary can serve only one
master").
468. See, eg., Pavidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D.
Mass. 1986) (directors owe minority shareholders fiduciary duty in squeeze-out merger); Weinberger
v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983) (in merger between parent and partially owned
subsidiary, directors of the parent and subsidiary are fiduciaries with respect to minority sharehold-
ers). See generally 2 H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEALs' OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS § 7.17 (1985).
469. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 392, 394 (1957).
470. McDaniel, supra note 294, at 269 (citing W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY § 147 (1964)).
471. Id.
472. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2375 (West 1991); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1957);
see also Comment, The Practice of Dual Agency in California: Civil Code Sections 2373-2382, 21
U.S.F. L. REv. 81, 87-89 (1986) (noting California practice of allowing a real estate licensee to
represent multiple principals upon disclosure of such intent and receipt of principals' consent).
473. A. ScoTT, 3A Sco-r ON TRUSTS § 232, at 4.
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2. Defining Directors' Fiduciary Duty to Displaced Workers
General fiduciary principles support extending directorial fiduciary obliga-
tions to employees in some circumstances. 474 This fiduciary duty should arise in
recognition of the significant investments of time and human capital that em-
ployees make in the corporation. Often employees have no influence over the
directors' decisions because they are relatively unsophisticated and cannot ob-
tain relevant information; a disparity in bargaining power exists between corpo-
rations and employees as evidenced by the unilateral nature of plant closings and
relocations.4 75 Because employees become economically dependent upon the
continued existence of the employment relationship, they place their trust and
confidence in the directors to use their business expertise to manage their "prop-
erty" on their behalf. Employees have only one job and cannot diversify their
risk; thus, they are particularly vulnerable to directors abusing their discretion
because contract and market mechanisms are inadequate to deter opportunistic
breach of implicit employment contracts.
47 6
The scope and content of the directors' fiduciary duties could be redefined
to require directors to defend the employees' interests during fundamental cor-
porate changes. There is no need, however, to abandon most of the existing
framework of corporate law in creating a fiduciary duty to employees. 477 Dur-
ing normal operating conditions, the interests of shareholders and employees
coincide. Hence, the employees receive indirect protection when directors maxi-
mize shareholder wealth. The shareholders' and employees' interests clash,
however, in plant closings and layoffs. As discussed previously, the stakeholder
statutes may leave the resolution of this conflict to the directors' discretion; the
474. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have recognized the possibility that the directors
owe employees fiduciary duties: "[We] do not necessarily rule out arguments that directors owe
fiduciary duties to employees and other groups. Under some circumstances employees are investors
in the firm; they invest their human capital, to the extent that they become specialists and obtain
skills that are less valuable to other employers." Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transac-
tions, 91 YALE L.J. 699, 703 n.15 (1982). Professor Coffee responded as follows: "Such a rule, if
intended, might also deny directors the ability to close or relocate a plant if the private gains were
less than the social loss. This line of argument quickly converts the corporate director into an
unelected and unaccountable public servant." Coffee, supra note 178, at 1217 (citation omitted).
Later, Professor Coffee asserted:
Another significant aspect of the implicit contracting perspective is that it forces us to see
the board of directors in a very different light. Although the law has traditionally viewed
the board of directors as the agent of the shareholders, an alternative perspective sees the
board's role not as that of agent, but as that of mediator.
Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 8, at 448 (citation omitted).
475. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. But see Epstein, supra note 128, at 954 ("With
employment contracts we are not dealing with the widow who has sold her inheritance for a song to
a man with a thin mustache.").
476. Goetz & Scott, supra note 462, at 1142 ("In order to maintain the appropriate disincentives
to engage in socially disfavored activity, the risk of cheating or other opportunistic behavior must be
borne, therefore, by the party with the discretionary power to terminate the contract.").
477. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 274, at 267 n.65 (shareholder primacy necessary to pre-
vent total disregard of corporate purpose); Oesterle & Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or
Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 222 n.67 ("Once the primacy of share-
holders' interests is dismissed, a wide array of traditionally unacceptable corporate actions can be
justified as furthering some corporate constituency's interests."). But see Johnson, Corporate Life,
supra note 24, at 888 n.88 (view that there is a need to change drastically corporate law mistakenly
lumps takeover doctrine with traditional corporate law precepts).
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law, however, should go a step further to ensure that directors take the actions
that are necessary to compensate employees for their investments in the
corporation.
In allocating the risks and rewards of corporate restructuring, directors
should balance the competing factors of the shareholders' desire to maximize
their return and the employees' past reliance on implicit contracts. 478 Analogiz-
ing from trust law, trustees must act impartially when they are required to allo-
cate investment proceeds among various types of beneficiaries. In the same
manner, employees with fixed claims are comparable to life tenants, and share-
holders with residual claims are similar to remaindermen. 479 Directors should
act in accordance with what is reasonable and equitable in view of the different
concerns of stockholders and employees. 480 Many corporate commentators
have questioned directors' competence to balance these concerns, 481 maintaining
that this obligation forces directors into the role of public servants.4 82 In con-
trast, scholars in the organizational management field contend that managers are
in the best position to reduce the harm to employees resulting from the process
of restructuring.
4 83
The duty of good faith also would prevent the opportunistic breach of im-
plicit employment contracts. 484 This doctrine, however, is not as well suited as
fiduciary principles to compensate employees for their investments in the corpo-
ration. The fiduciary duty to displaced workers arises not from the employment
at-will contract, but rather from the directors' ability to exercise their decision
making power over employees' lives. A fiduciary duty would require directors'
conduct toward employees to rise above currently accepted customs of the mar-
ketplace in order to safeguard employees' noncontractual expectations. In sum,
fiduciary duty, with its moral undertones and high degree of selflessness, better
describes the obligation that directors should owe employees faced with job
dislocation.
478. Cf M. AOKI, supra note 18, at 126-27 (under the corporative managerialism model of the
firm, neutral managers make decisions to mediate the interests of shareholders and employees).
479. McDaniel, supra note 294, at 269 (suggesting analogy to recognize fiduciary duty to bond-
holders); Singer, supra note 10, at 721 ("The company is no longer the fee simple owner of the
property; the workers have a contingent future interest in the property."). But see Mahoney, supra
note 305, at 26 (trustee analogy fails because the settlor of a trust specifies preferences in advance).
480. McDaniel, supra note 294, at 270 (analogizing from trust area to propose a fiduciary duty to
protect bondholders).
481. Sea eg., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 75, at 1191 n.85 ("[A]lthough management, at
least in nonconflict-of-interest situations, is best situated to determine what actions will maximize the
return to shareholders, it is hardly qualified or authorized to balance shareholders' interests against
the uncertain effects of an acquisition on various vaguely defined noninvestor groups."); Oesterle,
supra note 75, at 140 (Even if management is well intentioned, "[p]redicting abuse by a bidder is
problematic, and fashioning an appropriate response within the psychological turmoil of a hostile
tender offer is even more so.").
482. See, eg., Davis, supra note 243, at 519 (similar to managerialist view of directors).
483. See, eg., Buono & Bowditch, supra note 50, at 126, 142; Freeman, Managing Stakeholder"
A Question of Ethics, in The First International Symposium, supra note 16, at 17, 19-23.
484. But see Conard, Take Charge, supra note 223, at 47 ("To other constituencies, managers do
not owe afiduciary duty. But they owe duties of fair dealing.").
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3. Determining the Appropriate Form of Relief for Displaced Workers
The fiduciary obligation to employees would require directors to honor im-
plicit contracts in plant closings and layoffs.4 85 In providing relief to employees,
shareholders' rights must be considered as well; directors should not go so far as
to force a corporation to retain workers or keep a plant open. At a minimum,
however, any corporation that closes a plant or orders a mass dismissal should
pay severance benefits according to the employee's years of service and should
continue health care insurance for a period of time.48 6 Older workers who have
given the corporation many years of service deserve the greatest assistance, espe-
cially workers over fifty who have the most difficult time finding alternative em-
ployment. For these workers, directors should fully vest pension funds. The
workers' ability to find replacement work also should be considered. For exam-
ple, where employees have made firm-specific investments of human capital that
cannot be used elsewhere, the corporation should implement job-retraining pro-
grams and provide workers with transfer rights and relocation pay.
48 7
This fiduciary duty also should include an obligation for the directors to
safeguard pension plan assets during hostile battles for control and internal re-
capitalizations. In some cases, the employees should be informed, consulted,
and even given the right to negotiate over plant shutdowns. 488 In other situa-
tions, a corporation should attempt to provide unions with successorship protec-
tion for their collective bargaining agreements. Severance packages should be
preplanned with approval by a majority of outside directors to avoid the use of
these benefits as poison pills. 48
9
4. Ensuring Accountability: The Scope of Judicial Review of Directors'
Decisions to Compensate Workers in Corporate Restructurings
The problem of how to enforce the directors' fiduciary duty to employees
remains. Employees should be permitted to sue for failure to fulfill this fiduciary
duty490 because fear of liability would deter directors from abusing their discre-
485. This notion is in accord with the basic restitutionary principle that governs remedies for
breaches of fiduciary duty. DeMott, supra note 86, at 900.
486. See Singer, supra note 10, at 742.
487. See eg., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 238.
488. See Macey, supra note 19, at 193 ("Courts would face the difficult task of distinguishing ex
post contractual opportunism from legitimate renegotiations in light of unforeseen circumstances.");
Singer, supra note 10, at 742.
489. The court would need to consider such factors as whether the plan has a double trigger and
whether it would apply in both friendly and hostile acquisitions. See, eg., Block, supra note 183, at
397-402; Robertson, supra note 177, at 199-200. In situations where the severance package was not
preplanned, the context of management's decision would be important too. A court should give
directors greater discretion where the compensation package is negotiated "as part of the terms of a
takeover it ultimately will approve rather than asserting those losses as grounds for rejecting a take-
over it opposes." Davis, supra note 243, at 520. In addition, such factors as a majority of outside
directors on the board and the presence of golden parachutes should persuade courts tO allow the
change-in-control provisions.
490. Professor Macey argues that courts should police ex post contractual opportunism by par-
ties seeking to exploit firm-specific capital investments. Macey, supra note 19, at 176. A derivative
suit would not be feasible for the same reasons that it is not feasible in a bondholder context. See
Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder
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tion. In addition, this right would force directors to assume a greater awareness
and respect for the needs of employees.
4 91
Recognition of a fiduciary duty to employees would empower courts to po-
lice corporate restructuring events to determine whether the corporation treated
displaced workers fairly. Thus, the standard of review becomes critical. The
courts could employ the business judgment rule, affording directors wide lati-
tude in mediating between the interests of employees and stockholders. 492 This
degree of judicial deference, however, would reduce the effectiveness of the pro-
posed fiduciary duty to employees for two reasons. First, the absence of mean-
ingful judicial evaluation would allow directors to favor wrongly one group over
another.493 In some cases, directors may reduce employees' severance packages
to maximize shareholder returns. Under other circumstances, directors improp-
erly may prefer employees over shareholders by establishing benefits that
amount to poison pills. Second, granting directors even greater leeway to make
business decisions would increase agency costs by facilitating inefficient manage-
rial behavior and encouraging excessive risk aversion by management. Hence,
the market for corporate control would lose most of its force as a deterrent to
managerial shirking.
In contrast, application of a test of fairness to evaluate whether directors
have compensated displaced employees in layoffs and plant closings adequatele
would provide equitable and efficient protection of employees' interests. Courts
face similar problems when reviewing directors' decisions to engage in transac-
tions that may benefit the majority stockholders at the expense of the minority
stockholders and when reviewing trustees' decisions to allocate investment pro-
ceeds among beneficiaries. In these situations, directors and trustees are not
given the benefit of the business judgment rule; rather, courts examine the fiduci-
aries' decisions by conducting a degree of substantive review. 494 Such judicial
scrutiny may lower agency costs because employees are uniquely situated to re-
view executive inefficiency and self-serving behavior. Because the directors' fi-
duciary duty to employees is limited to circumstances involving plant closings
and layoffs, there would be no need for sweeping judicial second-guessing.
A variety of remedies for breach of fiduciary duty is available, with restitu-
tion being the most common.4 95 Courts would face some difficulty in determin-
ing whether employees were compensated adequately for their investments in
Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 46 n.102 (conflict with shareholders; the employees cannot be
said to represent the corporation).
491. Blades, supra note 133, at 1414 (discussing exceptions to employment-at-will doctrine).
492. Cf. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 107-09 (Directors should be given a wide range
of discretion in the takeover situation to protect middle managers.).
493. See Davis, supra note 243, at 518 ("If we are really dealing with a contract, then its inter-
pretation and application should be left to target management's business judgment. It may not be
wise to go this far, however."); Note, supra note 11, at 856 ("Such strengthened Fiduciary Duty law
would probably operate only as shields for the managers against shareholders, and not as swords for
employees or others against managers.").
494. 3A A. ScoTr & W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTs § 232, at 7 (4th ed. 1988) (absent
specific controls within the trust instrument, the trustee has considerable discretion in maintaining
the balance among competing interests of beneficiaries).
495. Sealy, supra note 452, at 73.
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individual oases.496 They would need to take into account how long the em-
ployee had worked for the corporation, the nature of the employee's skills, and
the employee's ability to find alternative employment.
B. Legislative Solutions to Protect Displaced Workers
Most commentators who recognize that industrial relocation imposes sig-
nificant costs on workers prefer a legislative solution.497 Federal law provides
limited relief to workers who suffer from plant closings by providing notice.
Several states also have plant closing laws that require notice and severance pro-
tection.498 The desirability of an objective standard to measure how to compen-
sate employees suggests that the federal government should statutorily define
plant closing benefits to include items such as monetary compensation, vesting
of pension funds, and job retraining programs.
499
C. A Comparison of the Fiduciary Duty and Legislative Approaches.
Evaluating the Merits of Ex Ante and Ex Post Relief
This section evaluates the costs and benefits of recognizing a fiduciary solu-
tion to protect displaced workers versus enacting a legislative solution that item-
izes displacement assistance. The fiduciary duty response represents a marked
departure from the conventional method of regulating corporate conduct. Leg-
islatures usually endeavor to alter corporate behavior by external measures that
require specific action. In contrast, the stakeholder model of the corporation
seeks internal reform of the corporate structure by changing the legal role of
corporate directors. This role may enable courts to require directors to ascertain
the social costs of corporate restructuring on employees and to provide
restitution.
Some commentators flatly assert that the courts should not recognize a fi-
duciary duty to employees because the resulting costs clearly exceed the bene-
fits.o50 o Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of plant closing restrictions
is a political question.50 1 The debate is fueled by disagreement both over what
496. McDaniel, supra note 294, at 257 (judicial review to determine the fairness of an allocation
of gain between bondholders and stockholders raises complex valuation questions); Cornell & Sha-
piro, Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance, FIN. MGMr. 5, 8-9 (Spring 1987) (financial
literature is beginning to consider the importance of implicit claims).
497. Macey, supra note 19, at 180; Ruder Says Commission Should Oppose Expansion of Non-
Shareholder Rights, 21 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1504, 1504.
498. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
499. Previous plant closing bills favored mandated severance pay provisions based on a formula
that takes into account levels of pay and years of service. Barron, Causes and Impact of Plant
Shutdowns and Relocations and Potential Non-NLRA Responses, 58 TUL. L. REv. 1389, 1403 (1984).
500. See, eg., Ribstein, supra note 61, at 118-21.
501. Professor Singer states:
Just about everyone thinks that knowing the costs and benefits of adopting one legal regime
over another gives us information that helps us in making the rule choice. Controversy
arises when we differ about (1) what counts as a cost and a benefit; (2) how to value costs
and benefits...; [and] (3) how confident we can be that we have accurately measured costs
and benefits ....
Singer, supra note 10, at 632.
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counts as a cost and over the relative importance of different types of evi-
dence.502 This Article contends that relief should be formulated to provide
workers with the most equitable and efficient type of remedy. 503 From this per-
spective, an examination of the alternatives of internal versus external regulation
focuses upon the following issues: Will precise regulations that dictate specific
forms of relief provide the best method of compensating displaced workers? Or,
will ex post judicial review of directors' decisions to safeguard employees' inter-
ests better protect displaced workers?
In examining these questions, institutional capability must be consid-
ered.-5  One of the major concerns of corporate scholars is whether corporate
law should be made at the federal or state level and whether it should be formu-
lated by legislatures or judges.50 5 Overall, federal legislation tends to be prefera-
ble to state legislation because corporations can relocate to escape state
restrictions; 50 6 the higher cost of relocating outside of the United States makes
the avoidance of federal laws more difficult.50 7 Although Congress continues to
study the question of whether takeovers result in job loss,508 it is unlikely to take
further action because plant-closing legislation recently was passed. Thus, in
practical terms, the responsibility to provide further protection to displaced
workers falls to the states.
A state court may be better able than the legislature to protect displaced
workers from layoffs and plant closings for several reasons. First, legislatures do
not have specific case-by-case information. Recognizing a fiduciary duty allows
judges to formulate standards over time through an evolutionary process not
available to legislatures. The state legislatures appear to have recognized this
502. See Folbre, Leighton & Roderick, supra note 37, at 186. The authors state:
Those who believe that workers have, or should have, a right to substantial job security will
obviously place a high value on policy measures that mitigate the effects of job loss. Those
who stress employers' right to operate their businesses without any interference from the
state will oliously value the absence of regulation.
Id.
503. The reversal of offer and asking price may have an enormous impact on the efficiency deter-
mination. See, eg., Singer, supra note 10, at 722-23.
504. Coffee, supra note 418, at 1626 ("[F]rom a policy perspective, the permissibility of devia-
tions from the traditional standards of corporate law should be judged primarily in terms of the
competence of courts or other agencies to monitor these departures and prevent opportunism.").
505. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395,
1413 (1989).
506. Macey, supra note 19, at 197. Although corporations can relocate overseas to escape fed-
eral legislation, Professor Macey believes that the new federal plant-closing law will not be a decisive
factor for most domestic firms debating whether to relocate overseas. Id. States compete for corpo-
rate charters and debate continues about whether states tend to favor shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion, R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 28-42 (1978), or whether they compete
to favor managerial self-interest. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 665-66, 670 (1974).
507. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: To-
ward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265, 272 (1990).
508. See, e.g., Sens. Sanford, Sasser Introduce Bill to Limit Takeovers, Leveraged Buyouts, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 265 (Feb. 23, 1990) (six-months severance pay for plant closing after
takeover); Domenici Bill Would Require Notice when Plant Closing Is Linked to Takeover, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1031 (July 1, 1988) (90-days advance notice or severance pay to workers who
will lose their jobs within 18 months after takeover).
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and have enacted stakeholder statutes that leave to the courts the question of
how the principle of corporate social responsibility should be applied in specific
instances. Second, courts are not subject to the pressure of interest groups and
are more independent than state legislatures, which tend to have a strong bias
favoring management. 5°9 As Professor Johnson notes, the "common law
method provides a channel by which the beliefs of a wide segment of society can
be brought to bear on ... significant social issues." 510
Along similar lines, the choice between statutory relief and the fiduciary
duty solution requires analysis of the costs and benefits of the legislature's pre-
scribing a remedy ex ante or the court's determining the appropriate relief ex
post. First, legislatures would find it difficult to anticipate all the problems that
arise in plant closings and layoffs, leaving the workers subject to opportunistic
conduct. Statutes would be overinclusive in some cases and underinclusive in
others.511 Conceivably, the federal government could create a highly structured
set of rules to alleviate the consequences of job dislocation. Complex regula-
tions, however, would impede directors' ability to respond to the situation se-
verely.512 Corporate scholars who favor internal reform of the corporation
argue that if the corporations' institutional structure remains unchanged, the
reasons prompting the need for government regulation may lead to more regula-
tion.5 13 Thus, external regulation is inadequate because it results in layer upon
layer of rules that impose unnecessary costs.5 14 Further, statutes provide a
blunt form of relief that cannot remedy opportunistic behavior effectively. 515
Recognizing a fiduciary duty to displaced workers would allow for judicial mon-
itoring to confront and evaluate transactions as they arise. Courts traditionally
have played an important role in policing long-term relational contracts; 516 from
its ex post perspective, a court can determine if the more dominant party has
taken advantage of the weaker party in the relationship unfairly.5 17 In addition,
509. Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80
Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 55 (1985).
510. Johnson, Who Are They For?, supra note 11 at 878.
511. See, eg., Linzer, supra note 179, at 416. Professor Macey contends: "[Plant closings] in-
volve particular problems [that] require detailed (and costly) contractual solutions. Public-law solu-
tions prove unsuitable in this setting, because each case presents unique problems."
512. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System
to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REv. 343, 345-46 (1981).
513. Id. at 345 (advocating that two-thirds of a corporation's directors should be proponents of
"altruistic capitalism," which balances the public interest against the pursuit of maximum profits).
514. Macey, supra note 19, at 193.
515. Professor Davis notes the "preference for general principles over specific standards in light
of the richness and variety of the factual situations presented by the conduct of corporate manage-
ments." Davis, supra note 510, at 53; cf Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 37
(1977) ("Given the limitations of human foresight and knowledge, any attempt to describe the ma-
jority's duties and obligations precisely is likely to leave the minority vulnerable to some overlooked
form of exploitation while, at the same time, seriously impairing the efficiency of the firm by fettering
management.").
516. See, eg., Coffee, supra note 418, at 1619; Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 589-90 (1981).
517. Coffee, supra note 418, at 1622; see also Rose, supra note 337, at 592 ("[T]he ex ante per-
spective generally means sticking it to those who fail to protect themselves in advance against contin-
gencies that, as it happens, work out badly for them.").
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ex post settling-up provides a comparative benefit over ex ante adjustment be-
cause it measures compensation on a situation-specific basis.5 18
While the fiduciary duty solution provides a case-by-case remedy, its flexi-
bility also creates uncertainty.5 19 Thus, it is necessary to respond to the conten-
tion that the costs of litigating and second-guessing business decisions may
outweigh any social benefits derived from imposing a fiduciary duty. Professor
Macey argues that the increase in shareholder uncertainty will deter investment
and ultimately result in fewer workers being hired.520 In response, the current
system that allows companies to close plants without showing concern for af-
fected employees produces substantial uncertainty for displaced workers. As
Professor Singer notes, the question is not only whether regulation creates more
or less uncertainty, but how that uncertainty is distributed.5 21 Indeed, imposing
a fiduciary duty on directors to prevent the corporation from externalizing the
costs of displacement may prevent some socially inefficient transactions.
In sum, ex post judicial review is efficient even though it creates uncertainty
ex ante. Courts have an advantage over legislatures in monitoring long-term
relational contracts because the courts can determine the appropriate form of
remedy on a case-by-case basis. True, recognizing a fiduciary duty to displaced
workers may lead to greater uncertainty and litigation.522 Legislation avoids
these problems by providing clear rules about the corporation's liability. Conse-
quently, to take advantage of the benefits of both types of solutions, states may
want to facilitate corporate planning by providing statutory safe harbors for di-
rectors to use in providing relief to displaced workers, while concurrently per-
mitting judicial expansion of the directors' fiduciary duties to displaced workers.
CONCLUSION
Widespread layoffs and plant closings have focused national attention on
the problems of displaced workers. Due to increasing competitive pressures,
corporations are making radical labor cutbacks that demonstrate a decreasing
concern for employees. Traditional corporate law ignores the impact of layoffs
518. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 9, at 37-38 n.101. Ex post settling up is attractive
because
[c]ontracting is after all costly, and many doubt that contractual provisions drafted on an
ex ante basis can be adequately specific to cover all or even most contingencies or to relate
sensibly the amount of compensation promised to the amount that would have been paid
on an ex post settling-up basis.
Id.
519. Rose, supra note 337, at 579 (shift from crystal to mud rules "sharply alter[s] the clarity of
the relationship between the parties").
520. Macey, supra note 19, at 201; cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 87, at 1447;
Hanks, supra note 17, at 22; see also R. MCKENZIE, RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS MOBILrrY 54-59
(1979) (restrictions on business movements will retard ecomomic development of all regions of the
country, decrease wages in many nonunionized labor markets, and cause wealth transfers and
losses).
521. Singer, supra note 10, at 728.
522. Indeed, recognizing a fiduciary duty may hurt employees if they must bring suit to enforce
rights. Gordon, supra note 361, at 572 ("Parties with a lot of resources... do not mind general
equitable standards even if the substance of such standards cuts against them because they cannot
practically be enforced without a lot of expensive evidence.").
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and plant closings on employees, viewing the corporation as an entity operated
by management for the primary good of the shareholders. Other participants in
corporate affairs are assumed to contract for protection. This contractual ap-
proach, however, fails to recognize that less than twenty percent of the
workforce is unionized. In addition, several legal and practical impediments
prevent unions from shielding their members from the consequences of job
dislocation.
Over one-half of the states recently have enacted stakeholder statutes that
are worded broadly to allow directors to consider nonshareholder interests in
making business decisions. Although these statutes have not been tested in the
courts, they are a potential source of protection to displaced workers. The stat-
utes, in addition to general fiduciary principles, could serve as a basis for ex-
panding the directors' fiduciary duties to employees in the context of
fundamental corporate changes. These statutes parallel a view of the corpora-
tion in which many nonshareholder constituents have entitlements in the firm.
Employees' entitlements arise because they rely on implicit contracts when they
enter into long-term relationships with corporations. Through these implicit
contracts, employees make substantial investments in the corporations, exposing
them to a considerable amount of risk. To a large extent, shareholder gains in
corporate restructurings may arise from the breach of implicit employment con-
tracts and losses of the value of employees' human capital.
Using fiduciary duty principles, courts could play a more intrusive role in
the corporation-employee relationship, similar to the role they play in protecting
the interests of shareholders. Recognizing a fiduciary duty to employees would
be efficient because, if restructuring is to be successful, the implementation pro-
cess must treat employees fairly.
1260 [Vol. 69
